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Chapter 1
Introduction
Starting with the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market in the second half of
2007, the global nancial crisis led to a disruption of global nancial markets and an
economic downturn in advanced economies all over the world. To mitigate the crisis
and its aftermath, central banks did set up a variety of new unconventional programs
and lending facilities. However, since then, turbulent years for the global economy
have been passed. The global nancial crisis was followed by the Great Recession, a
phase marked by a sharp decline in economic activity of economies around the world.
At the end of 2009, amplied by the global nancial crisis, the European debt crisis
hit European economies, inducing periods of low economic growth, instabilities of
nancial markets and institutions, and rising sovereign bond yield spreads in Euro
Area.
The past years raised important and exciting questions for researchers and prac-
titioners alike. How did the unconventional monetary policy programs a¤ect the
economy? Assessing the e¤ectiveness of those programs is non-trivial since the coun-
terfactual - how the economy would have evolved in the absence of these programs 
is not directly observable, as noted by Bernanke (2012). In addition to the provision
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of liquidity, some of these programs also aimed to reduce long-term rates in order
to ease nancial conditions. The term premium part is one important component
in long-term bond rates. Therefore, movements in the term premium should a¤ect
aggregate spending and to the extent that movements in term premia do a¤ect the
economy, monetary policy should take these movements into account. However, so
far, the evidence of how movements in term premia a¤ect the economy is less clear.
Moreover, during the European debt crisis, yield spreads rose dramatically. What
were the drivers of the observed surge in yield spreads? For the transmission of
monetary policy to nancial markets, sovereign bond yields play an important role
(see ECB, 2012, p. 67). Understanding the drivers of yields and yield spreads is thus
important for the conduction of monetary policy.
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters contributing to di¤erent re-
search strands in monetary and nancial economics. Chapter 2 analyzes the e¤ects
of di¤erent unconventional monetary policy actions on interest rate spreads in a
stylized macroeconomic model. Chapter 3 evaluates the interplay of term premia
movements, monetary policy, and the economy in the Euro area. Chapter 4 investi-
gates the e¤ects of changes in economic fundamentals, risk aversion, and a common
non-fundamental risk factor on selected spreads of Euro area sovereign bond yields.
The nal chapter concludes.
The chapters of the thesis also di¤er methodologically. In Chapter 2, I apply a
numerical simulation of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in
order to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent unconventional monetary policy actions
on the economy. DSGE models allow to analyze the transmission mechanisms of
policy interventions in a fully dynamic micro-founded framework and help to analyze
the e¤ectiveness of these policy interventions by providing the counterfactual policy
simulations. Chapter 3 and 4 use di¤erent types of macro-nance models of the term
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structure of interest rates. Both models belong to the class of no-arbitrage a¢ ne
term structure models. The canonical no-arbitrage a¢ ne term structure model, as
proposed by Du¢ e and Kan (1996), uses a set of latent variables that span the
yield curve. By the assumption of the absence of arbitrage opportunities in bond
markets, cross-equation restrictions are derived that tie the dynamic of yields over the
yield curve closely together. Exploiting all information available over the entire yield
curve helps to identify potentially unobservable and observable drivers of movements
in yields and yield spreads and to separate the expectation part from the term
premium part in long-term bond yields. Based on the class of no-arbitrage a¢ ne
term structure models, macro-nance models of the term structure of interest rates
include, in addition to latent variables, also observable macro variables. Thus, both,
observable and unobservable variables span together the yield curve. Therefore,
these models o¤er insight of the economic drivers of movements in yields and help to
analyze the evolution of macroeconomic variables, the yield curve, and term premia
jointly.
Before the nancial crisis, monetary policy was mainly considered as interest rate
policy and monetary policy decisionmaking usually consisted of setting an adequate
operating target for an overnight interest rate. The target for the short-term interest
rate is implemented by adjusting the supply of reserves in open market operations
(see e.g. Woodford, 2003, pp. 24). Until the nancial crisis, the Fed adjusted reserve
balances by purchasing or selling almost exclusively treasury bonds in open market
operations (a policy referred to as Treasuries only; see Goodfriend, 2011).
Since the onset of the nancial crisis in late 2007, central banks of di¤erent ad-
vanced economies introduced a variety of unconventional policy measures to ght the
nancial crisis and its aftermath. These unconventional policy measures were imple-
mented to support the liquidity of di¤erent kinds of asset markets and of nancial
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intermediaries, to reduce long-term interest rates, and to improve the stability of -
nancial markets. The programs and their theoretical mechanism through which they
might have a¤ected the economy have become quickly into the focus of researchers
(see e.g. Cúrdia and Woodford, 2011, Del Negro et al., 2016, Gertler and Karadi,
2011, Gertler and Karadi, 2013, Gertler, et al., 2016, Schabert, 2014, or Schabert,
2015). Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013) show in a model where nancial intermedi-
aries are limited in their ability to arbitrage by an agency problem that the benets
of the provision of public nancial intermediation (e.g. direct lending) can be pos-
itive. Under this kind of policy the central bank channels funds from households
directly to non-nancial corporations.
However, under numerous programs which were implemented during the nan-
cial crisis (e.g. extended discount window lending, extended open market operations,
and more specic programs like the Term Auction Facility), the Fed did not provide
public nancial intermediation but supplied liquidity by exchanging high-powered
money against eligible collaterals with nancial institutions like banks and other de-
pository institution. Under these programs, the Fed did not only accepted treasuries
as collateral in open market operations but also di¤erent types of private assets like
e.g. securities of non-nancial rms.
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by studying the e¤ects of changes in the
central banks collateral policy in a model where private nancial intermediation
is subjected to an agency problem as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). In particu-
lar, under this kind of policy, the central bank supplies reserves, i.e. high powered
money, against private securities under repurchase agreements (also referred to as
collateralized lending, see Schabert, 2015). Thus, in contrast to direct lending, un-
der collateralized lending, the central bank does not intermediate funds directly but
exchanges liquidity providing reserves against eligible collaterals under repurchase
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agreements. Moreover, I compare the e¤ects of collateralized lending to the e¤ects
of direct lending.
For the analysis, I use a macroeconomic model with sticky prices, liquidity pro-
viding reserves, a central bank that supplies reserves against eligible collaterals, two
di¤erent types of nancial intermediaries, and nancial frictions. Specically, the
agency problem induces a leverage constraint on one type of nancial intermediaries.
The leverage constraint amplies the e¤ects of nancial disturbances. I evaluate
the e¤ectiveness of collateral lending under di¤erent settings in which the leverage
constraint, induced by the agency problem, a¤ects the dynamic of the economy dif-
ferently strong.
Chapter 2 shows that both policies can work to reduce interest rate spreads,
however, they work through di¤erent channels, and the e¤ectiveness of both policies
is in general not identical. Thus, in order to evaluate the e¤ects of central banks
asset purchases, it is important to take into account how the asset purchases are
conducted. Under direct lending, the central bank sidesteps the agency problem by
channeling funds directly to non-nancial rms. In contrast, under collateralized
lending, the central bank manipulates the liquidity premium incorporated in private
assets.
The e¤ectiveness of both policies depends on how strong the leverage constraint
a¤ects the dynamic of the model. Specically, in a setting where the leverage con-
straint a¤ects the dynamic of the model considerably, the e¤ects of collateralized
lending on interest rate spreads are only moderate, while direct lending works well
to reduce these spreads. In contrast, if the leverage constraint has only mild e¤ects
on the dynamic of the model, collateralized lending is more suitable to reduce in-
terest rate spreads. In other words, if the leverage constraint does strongly a¤ect
the dynamic of the model, the e¤ects of a purchase of private assets in open market
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operations under repos (i.e. a temporary central bank holding of private assets) on
interest rate spreads are at its best only moderate.
Although central banks use the interest rate policy to conduct monetary policy,
aggregate demand does not only depend on short-term interest rates but also on
long-term interest rates. Indeed, as argued by e.g. Woodford (2005), spending deci-
sions do rather depend on long-term interest rates than on short-term interest rates.
The rate of a long-term bond can be decomposed into an expectation and a term
premium part. The expectation part consists of the average of the expected sum of
current and future short-term interest rates until the bond matures. By shaping the
market expectations of the future path of short-term interest rates, central banks are
able to inuence long-term bond yields. The term premium part compensates risk-
averse investors for the risk of holding longer-dated instruments. Thus, if aggregate
spending depends, among other macroeconomic factors, on long-term rates, changes
in the term premium component of these rates a¤ect economic activity. Therefore,
the central bank should take changes in term premia into account for the conduc-
tion of monetary policy in order to balance output and ination. This view is most
prominently labeled by the term practitionerview (see Rudebusch et al., 2007).
Under the practitioner view, a rise in term premia slows down economic activity.
Thus, in response to a rise in term premia, the central bank should counterbalance
the change in term premia by reducing the short-term interest rate. However, using
a variety of di¤erent empirical models, the ndings of the literature on the e¤ects
of term premia movements on the economy are less clear. Often these models are
only able to estimate a reduced form relationship (see e.g. Hamilton and Kim, 2002,
Favero et al., 2005, or Wright, 2006), restrictions in the models are imposed that
prevent e¤ects running from changes of term premia to the economy (see e.g. Ang
et al., 2006, or Dewachter et al., 2012) or they specify a particular channel through
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which changes in term premia potentially a¤ect the economy (see e.g. Chen et al.,
2012). Recently, Ireland (2015) presents a macro-nance model of the term structure
that explicitly allows term premia movements to a¤ect output and ination.
The contribution of Chapter 3 is to explore the e¤ects of movements of term
premia in Euro area sovereign bond yields on the economy of the Euro area and
to study whether the European Central Bank (ECB) does respond to term premia
movements. In order to do so, I use a macro-nance model of the term structure in the
lines of Ireland (2015). The model uses restrictions on the contemporaneous relation
between the state variables to identify structural macroeconomic and monetary policy
shocks.
The model is estimated by Bayesian estimation techniques. Using a Bayesian
approach helps to rule out economically non-reasonable regions of the parameter
space by employing prior information. This is in particular helpful since the non-
linearity of the a¢ ne term structure model can produce a multimodal likelihood
function, as discussed by Chib and Ergashev (2009). Chapter 3 provides evidence
for e¤ects running from term premia movements to the economy and back. Indeed, an
exogenous rise in term premia does dampen economic activity. Moreover, the model
reveals that during the sample period, the ECB lowered the nominal short-term
interest rate in response to a rise in term premia. Thus, in line with the practitioner
view, by adjusting the policy rate the ECB counteracted changes in term premia.
At the end of 2009, after the global nancial crisis, the economies of Euro area
countries were hit by the European debt crisis. Accompanied by a sharp decrease
in sovereign debt of several Euro area sovereigns, European sovereign debt markets
experienced a dramatic surge in spreads between bond yields of several Euro area
sovereigns and the yields on German sovereign bonds. However, not did only the
yields of bonds of highly indebted countries rise, but also of those with solid scal
7
fundamentals, suggesting that not only credit risk did account for the surge in yield
spreads. Although credit risk seems to be an important determinant of yield spreads
(see among others Barrios et al., 2009, or Attinasi et al., 2010), the recent literature
stresses the relevance of di¤erent common factors driving Euro area yield spreads:
risk aversion and common non-fundamental factors. The non-fundamental factors are
the part of Euro area yield spreads that cannot be explained by changes in economic
fundamentals and country-specic factors (see e.g. Dewachter et al., 2015). They
are frequently interpreted as redenomination risk or systemic risk. Risk aversion and
redenomination risk are not directly observable. In order to quantify the importance
of these components of yield spreads, the way these factors are captured becomes
important. In the literature, risk aversion is typically proxied by the interest rate
spread of U.S. corporate bonds over U.S. treasury bonds or a volatility index of U.S.
stock markets (see e.g. Bernoth et al., 2012, Codogno et al., 2003, or Favero et al.,
2010).
Using a multi-country macro-nance model of the term structure, Chapter 4 in-
vestigates the drivers of Euro area yield spreads using a measure for risk aversion
that is directly derived from Euro area bond markets within in the macro-nance
model. In particular, it disentangles the e¤ects of risk aversion and a common non-
fundamental factor while accounting for country-specic scal variables, the Euro-
pean business cycle, monetary policy and their dynamics and interactions. Sovereign
bond yields play an important role for asset pricing and are used as reference rate
for key interest rates. Understanding the determinants of yields and yield spreads
is important to understand the transmission of monetary policy in a currency union
and to detect impairments in the transmission channel, as discussed by the ECB (see
ECB, 2014).
The model is applied to yield data of French, German, Italian, and Spanish gov-
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ernment bonds. As in Chapter 3, the model is estimated using Bayesian estimation
techniques. The results show that although economic fundamentals are the most
dominant driver of Euro area yield spreads, the common risk factor accounts for a
non-negligible part in Euro area yield spreads. Notably, the contribution of common
risk factor shocks to the yield spreads increased from 2012 onwards. Among the
economic factors, risk aversion shocks were the most important source for variations
in yield spreads. In contrast to the ndings of the recent literature (see Dewachter
et al., 2015), the contribution of common risk factor shocks to yield spreads is com-
parably smaller. The results highlight the importance of measuring risk aversion in
Euro area bonds markets adequately. Indeed, changes in risk aversion are able to
explain most of the spread between 2010 and the Beginning of 2012.
In summary, this thesis contributes to di¤erent important topics of the recent
literature of nancial and monetary economics. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the
e¤ects of collateralized lending and direct lending are in general di¤er. Moreover,
under a setting where direct lending is highly e¤ective, collateralized lending does
only work modestly to reduce interest rate spreads at its best. Chapter 3 provides
evidence that a rise in term premia works to dampen activity and that the ECB
does, in turn, respond to movements in term premia. Chapter 4 shows that although
a common non-fundamental factor has been important for the dynamic of Euro area
yield spreads during the European debt crisis, economic shocks, in particular, risk
aversion shocks, were the most dominant drivers of yield spreads.
9
Chapter 2
Collateralized Lending, Direct
Lending, and Interest Rate
Spreads
2.1 Introduction
For decades, the main monetary policy tool of the Federal Reserve (Fed) to inuence
spending, production, employment, and ination has been the policy rate. However,
since the onset of the nancial crisis in late 2007, the Fed used a variety of new policy
instruments to mitigate the crisis and its aftermath. The Feds policy actions during
the nancial crisis can broadly be categorized into three groups: the provision of
short-term liquidity to nancial institutions like banks and other depository institu-
tions, the provision of liquidity to actors in key nancial markets, and the expansion
of open market operations to reduce long-term interest rate and the support of the
function of credit markets (see Fed, 2015).
In order to support the liquidity of depository institutions, the Fed expanded
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discount window lending and introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF) where
depository institutions were able to exchange a broader range of assets for reserves
as at the discount window. Moreover, the Fed provided liquidity to primary dealers
under the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and the Term Security Lending
Facility (TSLF) under which primary dealers were able to receive (fully collateral-
ized) overnight loans as an additional source of liquidity and to trade less liquid assets
against Treasuries, respectively. In addition, the Fed did set up liquidity swap lines
with foreign central banks to address strains in global dollar funding markets. The
second group of policy actions contains programs like the Asset-Backed Commercial
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), the Commercial Pa-
per Funding Facility (CPFF), the MoneyMarket Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF),
and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) that were aimed to fa-
cilitate the provision of liquidity directly to actors in nancial markets. Specically,
under the CPFF the Fed provided liquidity to issuers of commercial papers by pur-
chasing commercial papers directly from eligible issuers. The third set of policy
actions were implemented by purchasing long-term Treasuries and Mortgage-Backed
Securities (MBS) in open market operations (see Fed, 2015).
Figure (2.1) and gure (2.2) depict for illustration purposes the evolution of the
asset side of the Feds balance sheet and the evolution of the composition of the
di¤erent liquidity facilities set up by the Fed during the nancial crisis, respectively.
As shown in Figure (2.1), the Feds balance sheet has grown substantially since the
fall of 2008. The newly introduced liquidity facilities did account for a large fraction
of the Feds balance sheet from the fall of 2008 until the fall of 2009. While the
size of the di¤erent liquidity programs over time did change, the TAF, the CPFF,
and the Liquidity Swaps have been the largest facilities among the di¤erent liquidity
programs, as highlighted in gure (2.2).
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Figure 2.1: Assets of the Federal Reserve (in trillions of dollar). Support for Specic
Institutions includes: Maiden Lane LLC; Maiden Lane II LLC; Maiden Lane III
LLC; and support to AIG. (Source: Federal Reserve Board.)
The di¤erent programs of the Fed and their e¤ects on the economy have gained
attention from many researchers since their introduction. Specically, Gertler and
Karadi (2011, 2013) show that if nancial intermediaries are limited in their ability to
arbitrage, the benets of the provision of public nancial intermediation (e.g. direct
lending) can be positive. Under this policy, the central bank substitutes private
nancial intermediation by central bank nancial intermediation. To do so, similar
to a private nancial intermediary, the central bank issues interest-rate bearing debt
in order to fund the purchase of private securities.
However, in open market operations, at the discount window, and under similar
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Figure 2.2: Composition of the di¤erent liquidity facilities (in trillions of dollar).
Other includes: primary credit; secondary credit; seasonal credit; Primary Dealer
Credit Facility and Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility. (Source: Federal Reserve.)
but more specic and temporary programs like the TAF, the central bank supplies
reserves to nancial institutions like banks and other depository institutions against
eligible collaterals under repos (e.g. collateralized loans), where reserves are high-
powered money. Under this policy, the central bank does not channel funds directly
to non-nancial rms but provides liquidity to nancial intermediaries. In fact,
while the e¤ects of direct lending in a model where private nancial intermediaries
are limited in their ability to arbitrage in nancial markets are well studied, the
e¤ects of a change in central banks collateral standards under this kind of friction
are less clear.
13
Contributing to the literature, in this work, I study the e¤ects of the purchase
of private securities, i.e. the central banks exchange of reserves against private
assets under repurchase agreements (also referred to as collateralized lending, see
Schabert, 2015), where reserves are high-powered money that provide liquidity, and
compare these e¤ects to the e¤ects of direct lending in a model where private nancial
intermediation is subjected to an agency problem.
In order to analyze the e¤ects of collateralized lending, I use a macroeconomic
model with sticky prices, reserves that provide a liquidity service, nancial interme-
diaries, and nancial frictions. In particular, I extend the Gertler and Karadi (2011)
model by a retail banking sector with a reserve demand and a central bank that
supplies reserves against eligible collaterals as in Schabert (2014, 2015). Precisely,
private nancial intermediation consists of two di¤erent kinds of banks: retail banks
and wholesale banks. Both types of banks are specialized and have di¤erent business
models. Retail banks collect funds by supplying deposits to households. They use
these funds either for lending in the wholesale market or for lending to non-nancial
rms. Retail banks are not specialized in funding non-nancial rms: They lack spe-
cic knowledge and may face regulatory constraints. Therefore, they are supposed to
be at disadvantage to wholesale banks in funding non-nancial rms. This disadvan-
tage is captured by managerial costs. Due to the managerial costs, arbitrage by retail
banks does not have to eliminate interest rate spreads. Retail banks also participate
in open market operations with the central bank. Similar to Gertler et al. (2016),
wholesale banks are modeled as highly leveraged nancial institutions that are spe-
cialized in the funding of non-nancial rms.1 They rely on short-term interbank
1Gertler et al. (2016) extend the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model by a retail and wholesale
banking sector in order to study the role of retail and wholesale banks during the nancial crisis.
The wholesale banking sector in this model is similar to the one in Gertler et al. (2016). In contrast
to the here presented work, the retail banks in Gertler et al. (2016) neither have a reserve demand
nor participate in open market operations.
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market loans and their own net worth to nance the purchase of non-nancial rm
securities. Based on Gertler and Karadi (2011), a nancial friction is introduced by
an agency problem between wholesale banks and its creditors. This agency problem
leads to an endogenously determined maximum leverage ratio for wholesale banks.
In the presence of a nancial turmoil, it is this balance sheet constraint that ampli-
es the economic downturn. Indeed, while retail markets have been relatively stable
during the nancial crisis, wholesale markets, where banks lend to each other, have
been strongly disrupted.2 By supposing that households rely on demand deposits in
order to purchase consumption goods, as in Bredemeier et al. (2015), a demand for
reserves is introduced. Specically, due to a withdrawal of demand deposits before
asset markets open, retail banks are required to hold reserves to fulll their obliga-
tions. As in Schabert (2014, 2015), reserves are not supplied in an unbounded way
but only against eligible collaterals.
I evaluate the e¤ects of both policy actions on the economy. For this purpose, I
consider di¤erent scenarios in which the leverage constraint, induced by the agency
problem, a¤ects the dynamic of the model di¤erently strong. First, the dynamic
of the model in response to a nancial disturbance is evaluated. As demonstrated,
the amplication of nancial disturbances by the leverage constraint does depend,
among other factors, on the degree of the elasticity of retail banksdemand for private
securities. Next, the e¤ectiveness of collateralized lending and direct lending with
respect to di¤erent calibrations for the managerial costs are discussed.
The results are as follows: Purchases of private securities either conducted un-
der collateralized lending or under direct central bank lending both potentially work
to stimulate output and to reduce the excess return on capital by stimulating the
2See Gertler et al. (2016) for a discussion of the e¤ects of the nancial crisis on retail and
wholesale banking.
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demand for non-nancial rm securities. However, both policies work through dif-
ferent channels. By direct lending to non-nancial rms, the central bank provides
central bank nancial intermediation. Due to the presence of the agency problem
and the managerial costs, central bank nancial intermediation does not substitute
private intermediation one-to-one. Thus, the increase in central banks demand for
non-nancial rm securities due adds up partly to the aggregate demand for non-
nancial rm securities which raises the price of private securities and reduces credit
spreads in capital markets. While central bank nancial intermediation directly af-
fects the total demand for non-nancial rm securities, under collateralized lending,
the central bank manipulates the liquidity premium incorporated in private rm se-
curities. Specically, by inuencing the retail banksvaluation of non-nancial rm
securities, the central bank is able to stimulate retail banks to increase their demand
for non-nancial rm securities.
Among other factors, the magnitude of the change in the retails banksdemand
for non-nancial rm securities in response to a change in nancial conditions deter-
mines how strong the leverage constraint, induced by the agency problem, a¤ects the
dynamic of the economy. The less elastic the retail banksdemand for non-nancial
rm securities is, the more e¤ective is direct lending and the less e¤ective is collat-
eralized lending. Thus, if retail banksdemand for non-nancial rm securities is
less elastic, the provision of liquidity has at its best only moderate e¤ects on the
economy. In contrast, if retail banks are able to absorb a substantial fraction of cap-
ital when nancial conditions change, direct central bank lending is less impactful,
while the e¤ectiveness of collateralized lending increases. However, in this case, the
leverage constraint, induced by the agency problem, is less relevant for the dynamic
of the economy. Hence, also the amplication of nancial disturbances is less strong
and the e¤ects of nancial disturbances on the economy become more similar to the
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e¤ects of the same disturbance in a more standard New-Keynesian model without
the agency problem.
In other words, to the extent that the Feds liquidity programs worked to eased
nancial conditions and reduced interest rate spreads,3 the model is not able to
explain these e¤ects of these programs if the agency problem works to a¤ect the
dynamic of the economy substantially.
This paper relates to the literature on unconventional monetary policy, in partic-
ular, to those papers studying central banks purchases of private securities as e.g.
in Cúrdia and Woodford (2011), Del Negro et al. (2016), Gertler and Karadi (2011,
2013), Gertler, et al. (2016), and Schabert (2014, 2015). While all of these papers
consider the purchase of private securities, the mechanism and the conduction of
assets purchases di¤er across these papers. My work shares the closest focus with
Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013) and Schabert (2014, 2015). In particular, Gertler
and Karadi (2011, 2013) nd in a model where private nancial intermediaries abil-
ity to arbitrage is restricted that the provision of public nancial intermediation has
strong e¤ects on the economy if nancial markets are disrupted. Schabert (2014)
analyzes the e¤ects of asset purchases in open market operations under repos in a
model where money serves as a mean of payment and borrowing between households
is constrained by a collateral constraint. Schabert (2015) examines optimal mone-
tary policy in a stylized macro model where money is a mean of payment and only
supplied in open market operations against eligible collaterals. He shows that under
a money supply rationing policy, the central bank is able to improve welfare in the
short-run and in the long-run by purchasing private securities when the economy is
hit by cost-push shocks. Moreover, the introduction of the reserve demand is based
3Indeed evidence by e.g. Campbell et al. (2011), Carpenter et al. (2014), Christensen et al.
(2014), Duygan-Bump et al. (2013), Fleming (2012), Mc Andrews et al. (2015), and Wu (2011)
suggests that the Feds liquidity programs worked to ease nancial conditions and to reduce interest
rate spreads.
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on Bredemeier et al. (2015).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section (2.2) the model
is presented and the equilibrium properties are discussed. Section (2.3) discusses
the calibration of the model, examines the dynamic of the model in response to a
nancial disturbance, and evaluates the e¤ects of collateralized central bank lending
and direct central bank lending on the economy. Section (2.4) concludes.
2.2 The Model
This section discusses the model. The presented framework is a monetary DSGE
model with nominal rigidities based on Calvo (1983) and nancial frictions as in
Gertler and Karadi (2011). Financial intermediaries consist of two types of banks:
retail banks and wholesale banks. Both types of banks are specialized and have
di¤erent business models. Retail banks collect deposits and use these funds either
to lend to wholesale banks or to purchases non-nancial rm securities. Wholesale
banks are specialized in investing in non-nancial rm securities. For funding their
investments, they rely on interbank market credit and own net worth. In addition,
following Bredemeier et al. (2015), a reserve demand of retail banks is introduced
by a premature withdrawal of a fraction of demand deposits by households. As in
Schabert (2014, 2015), the central bank does supply reserves only against eligible
collaterals.
The timing in the period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, after
aggregate shocks are realized but before asset markets open, open market operations
are conducted, where the central bank supplies money either outright or under repur-
chase agreements (repos) against eligible collateral. After open market operations
are conducted, production takes place and nal good markets open. Households
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withdraw a fraction of their demand deposits to nance consumption and repurchase
agreements are settled. In order to be able to satisfy the premature withdrawal of
demand deposits, retail banks need to hold reserves. Then, repos are settled. Fi-
nally, asset markets open. Wholesale banks and retail banks receive payo¤s from
their investments. Retail banks issue deposits and use their funds to lend to whole-
sale banks in the interbank market and to purchase non-nancial rm securities.
Wholesale banks use their funds to invest in non-nancial rm securities.
2.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of innitely-lived and identical households
of mass one with identical endowments. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013), it is
supposed that each household consists of workers and wholesale bankers. Both types
of household members share a perfect consumption insurance. In the following, the
fraction of household members being workers is denoted by 1   and the fraction of
household members being wholesale bankers is denoted by  . Workers supply labor to
non-nancial rms. Bankers run wholesale banks. Both types of household members
switch occupations over time. Each period, a random fraction 1    of bankers
retire and become workers. Hence, the average survival time of a wholesale banker
is given by 1= (1  ). In order to keep the ratio of bankers to workers constant over
time, each period the same number of workers change their occupation and become
wholesale bankers. Due to an agency problem that limits wholesale bankers ability
to raise funds, wholesale banks retain all earnings until the period they retire. When
a wholesale banker retires, retained earnings are paid to its household. In turn, each
new banker starts operating its wholesale bank with a start up transfer from the
household.
Householdspreferences are dened over consumption ct and labor lt. The ex-
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pected discounted lifetime utility of the representative household is given by
ut = Et
1X
i=0
t

ln (ct+i   hct+i 1)  
1 + 
l1+t+i

; (2.1)
where ct indicates external habit formation (as in Bredemeier et al., 2015),  2 (0; 1)
is the discount factor and h 2 [0; 1) is the habit formation parameter.
The representative household enters the period t with holdings of demand deposits
and term deposits. It receives additional income from labor. Moreover, any prots
from retail banks, retiring wholesale bankers, and non-nancial rms are transferred
to the representative household. It uses its income for consumption or saving. House-
holds can store wealth by holding demand deposits and term deposits at retail banks.
Term deposits are one-period contracts that deliver a safe nominal return. Demand
deposits also pay a safe interest rate, but in addition to saving services, they supply a
liquidity function. In contrast to term deposits, demand deposits can be withdrawn
before maturity. The budget constraint of the household is given by
Ptct +Dt=
 
1 + rdt

+Bht = (1 + rt) + Pt t = Wtlt + Pt
h
t +Dt 1 +B
h
t 1; (2.2)
where Pt is a price index, Dt are demand deposits,Bht are term deposits,  t are lump
sum transfers from the government, Wt is the nominal wage, and ht contains prots
from non-nancial rms and retail banks and the cumulated earnings from retiring
wholesale bankers.
A liquidity demand of households is introduced as in Bredemeier et al. (2015).
Following Bredemeier et al. (2015), the household needs to pay cash in order to
purchase consumption goods. While the household could hold money to satisfy its
liquidity needs, demand deposits o¤er the same function. Thus, in order to purchase
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consumption goods, the following goods market constraint has to hold:
Ptct  Dt 1; (2.3)
where the parameter  2 [0; 1] is the fraction of withdrawn demand deposits. For  <
1, the goods market constraint takes into account that, on average, households period
deposit holdings may be higher than its period consumption. As in Bredemeier et al.
(2015), the specic form of this type of cash-in-advance constraint can be motivated
as follows: Consider an idiosyncratic shock with a bounded support that hit each
household before the goods market opens and shift their valuation of consumption.
In an e¢ cient allocation, each household holds exactly the amount of money that
it needs in order to purchase the desired amount of the consumption good after
the valuation shock realized. However, since households need to decide about cash
holding before they know the realization of the idiosyncratic valuation shock, their
cash holding would lead to an ex-post ine¢ cient allocation. Instead, households can
rely on interest-bearing demand deposits to satisfy their liquidity needs. Bredemeier
et al. (2015) show that a constrained e¢ cient allocation can be implemented if all
households hold an amount of deposits that accords to the maximum of the valuation
shock and then, after the valuation shock hits and goods market open, withdraw
the required amount. Therefore, the parameter  refers to the mean fraction of
withdrawn deposits.
Households maximization problem is to choose its holding of demand deposits,
consumption, labor supply, and term deposits in order to maximize its expected
discounted life-time utility subject to the budget constraint (2.2) and the goods
21
market constraint (2.3). The rst order conditions are given by
dt :
1
1 + rdt
= Et
t+1 + 
hh
t+1
tt+1
; (2.4)
ct : uc;t = t + 
hh
t ; (2.5)
lt : l
n
t = twt; (2.6)
bht :
1
1 + rt
= Et
t+1
t
 1t+1; (2.7)
where t = Pt=Pt 1 is the ination rate, dt = Dt=Pt, ct = Ct=Pt, wt = Wt=Pt,
bht = B
h
t =Pt,
uc;t =
1
ct   hct 1 ;
is the marginal utility, and hht is the multiplier on the goods market constraint (2.3).
Moreover, a transversality condition and the following complementary slackness con-
ditions have to hold:
ct  dt 1 1t ; 0  hht ; 0  hht
 
dt 1 1t   ct

: (2.8)
2.2.2 Financial Intermediaries
The banking system consists of two di¤erent types of nancial intermediaries: retail
banks and wholesale banks. Both types of nancial intermediaries have di¤erent
business models. Retail banks o¤er demand deposits and term deposits to house-
holds, hold government bonds and reserves, invest in non-nancial rm securities,
and lend in the interbank market. They hold reserves to satisfy their need for liq-
uidity which is induced by householdswithdrawal of demand deposits before assets
markets open. For simplication purposes, reserves are supplied by the central bank
only in open market operations (and not e.g. at the discount window against a higher
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penalty rate). The wholesale banks use funds from retail banks and their own equity
- or net worth - in order to acquire non-nancial rm securities. Wholesale banks are
specialized in non-nancial rm security management. Therefore, following Gertler
et al. (2016), I suppose that wholesale banks have a cost advantage over retail rms
in the management of non-nancial rm securities. Thus, the rate of return on non-
nancial rm securities is larger for wholesale banks than for retail banks for any
positive amount of non-nancial rm securities hold by retail banks. If nancial
markets work frictionless, retail banks do not invest in non-nancial rm securities.
However, if the ability of wholesale banks to raise funds in the interbank market is
constrained, then also retail banks will acquire non-nancial rm securities.
Retail banks
Set-up Retail banks invest in government bonds, reserves, and capital (via the
purchase of non-nancial rm securities) and provide funds to wholesale banks. In
order to raise funds, the retail banks rely on household saving. There exists a contin-
uum of perfectly competitive retail banks i 2 [0; 1]. The structure of the retail bank
is based on Bredemeier et al. (2015). The introduction of managerial costs follows
Gertler et al. (2016).
Consider a retail bank i in period t. It enters the period with holdings of trea-
suries Bi;t 1, interbank market loans Bibi;t 1, money Mi;t 1, and non-nancial rm
securities Si;t 1. Non-nancial rms use the funds acquired by issuing non-nancial
rm securities to purchase new capital. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013), each
unit of the security is a state-contingent claim to all future returns of the nanced
unit of capital. Let zt denote the income ow to the wholesale bank from a security
that is nancing one unit of capital,  the depreciation rate of one unit of capital,
Qt the market price of physical capital in terms of the nal good, and t a random
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capital quality disturbance, then the value of retail bank is holding of non-nancial
rm securities at the beginning of period t equals (zt + (1  )Qt) tSi;t 1.
At the beginning of period t, the retail bank can adjust its stock of money by
receiving money injections from the central bank. Following Schabert (2014, 2015),
money is supplied by the central bank in open market operations. Open market
operations are conducted either outright or under repurchase agreements against
eligible collateral at the monetary policy rate rmt . Specically, in normaltimes, the
central bank only accepts treasuries as a collateral in open market operations. Hence,
in order to be able to participate in open market operations, the retail bank needs to
hold treasuries. However, in the event of a disruption of nancial markets, the central
bank may also decide to accept non-nancial rm securities as a collateral in open
market operations. Thus, the retail bank may also receive reserves by exchanging
non-nancial rm securities for reserves. The money injections Ii;t of the retail bank
are given by
Ii;t =
BCi;t
1 + rmt
+
SCi;t
1 + rmt
; (2.9)
where BCi;t  btBi;t 1 and SCi;t  st (zt + (1  )Qt) tSi;t 1. The policy parame-
ters bt and 
s
t are set by the central bank. In the steady state, 
s
t = 0 holds.
As in Bredemeier et al. (2015), the retail banks money demand is induced by
households withdrawing demand deposits before maturity. Specically, after open
market operations are conducted, the goods market opens and households withdraw
a fraction of deposits. Thus, the retail bank faces the following liquidity constraint:
Mi;t 1 + Ii;t  Di;t 1; (2.10)
where  denotes the fraction of deposits that is withdrawn.
Before asset markets open, repurchase agreements are settled. The retail bank
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repurchases those government bonds that were traded under repurchase agreements,
BRi;t = (1 + r
m
t )M
R
i;t. Then, its holding of government bonds in period t, after re-
purchase agreements are settled, reads Bi;t 1  BCi;t + (1 + rmt )MRi;t. In the case of
a nancial crisis, the central bank may choose to also accept rm claims in open
market operations (st > 0). The central bank only exchanges reserves against
non-nancial rm securities under repos (e.g. collateralized lending). In this case,
the nancial intermediary repurchases rm claims SCi;t = (1 + r
m
t )M
S
i;t and its
holding of rm claims is given by QtSi;t 1. Thus, its money holding is given by
Mi;t 1   (1 + rmt )
 
MRi;t +M
S
i;t

+ Ii;t. When asset markets open, the retail bank re-
ceives demand deposits Di;t at the price 1=
 
1 + rdt

and term deposits Bhi;t at the
price 1= (1 + rt). In the asset market, the retail bank uses its funds either to invest
in government bonds Bi;t at the price 1=
 
1 + rbt

, for lending in the interbank mar-
ket Bibi;t, or to directly acquire capital by purchasing state-contingent non-nancial
rm securities Si;t at the market price of capital Qt. Loans to the wholesale banks
are one-period risk-free debt contracts that pay the market interest rate ribt . In
contrast to wholesale banks, retail banks are not specialized in capital management
and therefore not as e¢ cient as wholesale banks in the screening and monitoring
of investment projects. Moreover, they also may face regulatory constraints. As in
Gertler et al. (2016), these ideas are captured by the introduction of managerial
costs. Specically, the real management cost function is given by  (si;t) = cm 1s

i;t,
where cm > 0,   0, and si;t = Si;t=Pt. Due to the managerial costs, retail banks
arbitrage does not eliminate interest rate spreads in the non-nancial rm security
market. If  = 0, the retail banks do not face management costs. In contrast, if
 !1, the retail banks do not invest in non-nancial rm securities. The nominal
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prots of the retail bank i are then given by
Pt
rb
i;t = Di;t=
 
1 + rdt
 Di;t 1 +Bhi;t= (1 + rt) Bhi;t 1 +  1 + ribt 1Bibi;t 1  Bibi;t
+Bi;t 1  Bi;t=
 
1 + rbt

+ (zt + (1  )Qt) tSt 1  QtSi;t   Pt (si;t)
 Mi;t +Mi;t 1   rmt Ii;t:
Maximization Problem The retail banks maximization problem is to choose de-
mand deposits, non-nancial rm securities, loans to wholesale banks, term deposits,
treasuries, money holding, and money injections to maximizes the sum of expected
discounted prots,
Et
1X
l=0
t+l+1
t+l
rbi;t+l;
subject to the money supply constraints (2.9) and the liquidity constraint (2.10). The
rst order conditions with respect to demand deposits, non-nancial rm securities,
loans to wholesale banks, term deposits, treasuries, money holdings, and money
injections read:
di;t :
1
1 + rdt
= Et
t+1
t
1 + dci;t+1
t+1
; (2.11)
si;t : 1 = Et
t+1
t
 
1 + rkrb;t+1
  
1 + st+1
mc
i;t+1

 1t+1; (2.12)
bibi;t :
1
1 + ribt
= Et
t+1
t
 1t+1; (2.13)
bhi;t :
1
1 + rt
= Et
t+1
t
 1t+1; (2.14)
bi;t :
1
1 + rbt
= Et
t+1
t
1 + bt+1
mc
i;t+1
t+1
; (2.15)
mi;t : 1 = Et
t+1
t
1 + dci;t+1
t+1
; (2.16)
ii;t : 1 + 
dc
i;t = (1 + r
m
t )
 
1 + mci;t

; (2.17)
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where
1 + rkrb;t+1
t+1
=
zt+1 + (1  )Qt+1
Qt + 0 (si;t)
t+1; (2.18)
di;t = Di;t=Pt, bibi;t = B
ib
i;t=Pt, bi;t = Bi;t=Pt, mi;t = Mi;t=Pt, ii;t = Ii;t=Pt, and 
mc
i;t and
dci;t are the multipliers on the money supply constraints (2.9) and on the liquidity
constraint (2.10), respectively. Moreover, the following complementary slackness
conditions have to hold:
(1 + rmt ) ii;t  btbi;t 1 1t + st (zt + (1  )Qt) tsi;t 1 1t ; mci;t  0;
mci;t
 
st (zt + (1  )Qt) tsi;t 1 1t + btbi;t 1 1t   (1 + rmt ) ii;t

= 0;
and
di;t 1 1t  mi;t 1 1t + ii;t; dci;t  0; dci;t
 
mi;t 1 1t + ii;t   di;t 1 1t

= 0:
Aggregation The aggregate holding of non-nancial rm securities by retail banks
srb;t, the aggregate retail banksdemand for government bonds brb;t, and the aggregate
supply of interbank market lending bibrb;t are given by srb;t =
R 1
0
si;tdi, brb;t =
R 1
0
bi;tdi,
and bibrb;t =
R 1
0
bibi;tdi, respectively. In the following, the aggregation of the remaining
retail banksvariables is facilitated by recognizing that in equilibrium all retail banks
will behave identical. Thus, the index i can be dropped. Combing eq. (2.4) from the
households and eq. (2.11), establishes an equilibrium relation between hht and 
dc
t ,
Et
t+1 + 
hh
t+1
t
 1t+1 = Et
t+1
t
1 + dct+1
t+1
:
If hht = t
dc
t holds, this condition is satised (see Bredemeier et al., 2015). Finally,
since retail banks do behave identical and do not face idiosyncratic risks, in equi-
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librium each retail bank will hold the same amount of non-nancial nancial rm
securities. Hence, the aggregate management costs are simply given by  (srb;t).
Wholesale banks
Set-up Wholesale banks are specialized in capital management. As in Gertler et
al. (2016), wholesale banks do not face management costs. In contrast to retail
banks, they solely rely on collecting funds in the interbank market to nance the
purchase of non-nancial rm securities. However, their ability to raise funds in the
interbank market is limited by an agency problem. The wholesale banking sector is
based on Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler et al. (2016).
There exists a continuum of wholesale banks. Consider an wholesale bank j that
uses net worth Nj;t and funds obtained from the interbank market Bibj;t to acquire
state-contingent non-nancial rm securities Sj;t at the price Qt. Its balance sheet
is given by
Bibj;t +Nj;t = QtSj;t: (2.19)
Non-nancial rms use their funds to purchase new capital (by purchasing non-
nancial rm securities). The wholesale banksreal rate of return on non-nancial
rm securities is given by
1 + rkt+1
t+1
=
zt+1 + (1  )Qt+1
Qt
t+1: (2.20)
Net worth is accumulated through retained prots. It is given by the di¤erences
between wholesale banks gross return on non-nancial rm securities and the costs
of borrowing in the interbank market,
Nj;t =
 
1 + rkt

Qt 1Sj;t 1  
 
1 + ribt 1

Bibj;t 1. (2.21)
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If the wholesale bank is constrained in its ability to raise funds in the interbank
market, it is optimal for the bank to retain all earnings to overcome the nancing
constraint. In order to prevent wholesale banks from being able to fund all of its
investments by their own net worth, it is assumed that wholesale banks have a nite
expected lifetime. Specically, the wholesale bank j in period t will survive with
probability  until the next period and retires with probability 1 . The probability
of surviving does not depend on the history of the wholesale bank. Hence, each period
the fraction 1  of wholesale banks exit the banking sector. A fraction of the similar
size of household members become wholesale bankers, keeping the overall number
of wholesale banks constant. A newly founded bank receives a one-time endowment
from its household.
A wholesale bank retains all earnings until the point in time when it exits the
banking sector and pays out all retained earnings to its household. Its objective is
thus to maximize the expected value of discounted terminal wealth,
Vj;t = Et
1X
=t+1
(1  ) t 1t;nj; ;
where nj;t = Nj;t=Pt, t;t+1 = t+1=t is a stochastic discount factor,  is the
probability to survive until the next period, and 1    is the probability that a
banker exits the sector and becomes a worker.
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), am agency problem that limits the wholesale
banks ability to nance lending is introduced. After the wholesale bank received all
funds, it may choose to divert a fraction of its assets and transfer this fraction to its
household. If a wholesale bank decides to fraud, its lender will force it into bank-
ruptcy. However, wholesale banks creditors are only able to reclaim the remaining
fraction, but not the total quantity of funds. Specically, let  denote the fraction
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of non-nancial rm securities the bank can divert, then the divertable amount is
given by Qtsj;t, where sj;t = Sj;t=Pt. It is supposed that diverting assets takes time.
A wholesale bank is not able to divert assets immediately. Therefore, the whole-
sale bank must decide at the end of period t, before knowing the state in period
t + 1, whether it wants to fraud. Retail banks are only willing to supply funds to a
wholesale bank, as long as they can be sure that the wholesale bank will not divert.
This is the case if the gain from fraud does not exceed the franchise value Vj;t of the
wholesale bank. Hence, in order to be able to raise funds in the interbank market,
the following incentive constraint has to be satised
Vj;t  Qtsj;t: (2.22)
Using the balance sheet (2.19) in the net worth accumulation equation (2.21) and
dividing by the price level Pt gives the law of motion of wholesale bank js real net
worth,
nj;t =
 
rkt   ribt 1

Qt 1sj;t 1 1t +
 
1 + ribt 1

nj;t 1 1t : (2.23)
Maximization Problem Let Vt (sj;t; nj;t) denote the maximized franchise value
of a wholesale bank j given sj;t and nj;t at the end of period t. Then, the franchise
value of a bank at the end of period t  1 can be expressed by the following Bellman
equation:
Vt 1 (sj;t 1; nj;t 1) = Et 1t 1;t

(1  )nj;t + max
sj;t
Vt (sj;t; nj;t)

: (2.24)
The term in the square brackets in eq. (2.24) reects that the wholesale bank may
retire with probability 1   and survives with probability . The wholesale banks
problem in period t is to choose sj;t to maximize the franchise value Vt (sj;t; nj;t)
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subject to the incentive constraint eq. (2.22) and the law of motion of real net worth
eq. (2.23). I follow Gertler and Karadi (2011) and conjecture that the value function
Vj;t is a linear function of the balance sheet components,
Vt (sj;t; nj;t) = 
k
tQtsj;t + 
n
t nj;t. (2.25)
Appendix (2.A.1) shows that the coe¢ cients of the value function are given by
kt = Ett;t+1t+1
 
rkt+1   ribt

 1t+1; (2.26)
nt = Ett;t+1t+1
 
1 + ribt

 1t+1; (2.27)
where kt is the excess returns on non-nancial rm securities, 
n
t is the saving in
costs for funds by holding another unit of net, and t+1 is the shadow value of one
more unit of net worth at t+ 1 averaged across existing and continuing states,
t = (1  ) + 

ktt + 
n
t

; (2.28)
where
t =
Qsj;t
nj;t
(2.29)
is the leverage ratio. Due to the symmetricity of the structure of wholesale banks
maximization problem, the leverage ratio is independent of bank-specic character-
istics.
Insert the conjectured solution (2.25) into the Bellman equation (2.24), then the
wholesale banks maximization problem is to chose sj;t to maximize this objective
subject to the incentive constraint (2.22). The rst order condition of the wholesale
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banks maximization problem is given by
kt =
kt
1 + kt
; (2.30)
where kt is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive constraint (2.22). Moreover, the
complementary slackness conditions,
Vj;t  Qtsj;t; kt  0; kt (Vj;t   Qtsj;t) = 0;
have to be satised. Eq. (2.30) shows that the marginal benet of holding non-
nancial rm securities kt equals its marginal costs, that is, the tightening in the
incentive constraint (2.22) from holding one more unit of non-nancial rm securities.
If the incentive constraint does not bind
 
kt = 0

, then, from eq. (2.26), the excess
returns on non-nancial rm securities are zero. Thus, if the incentive constraint is
not binding, wholesale banks extend lending to non-nancial rms until the rate of
return on non-nancial rm securities is equal to the marginal costs of borrowing in
the interbank market.
Under a binding incentive constraint (2.22), kt > 0, a restriction on the ratio
of banks net worth to assets is imposed. The maximum asset to net worth ratio is
given by
t =
nt
   kt
: (2.31)
Aggregation Since the maximum leverage ratio is independent of rm-specic
characteristics, the relation between the aggregate net worth and the aggregate asset
portfolio of wholesale banks is obtained by simply summing up over eq. (2.29):
Qtsw;t = tnt: (2.32)
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where sw;t =
R 1
0
sj;tdj. Eq. (2.32) illustrates that a deterioration in aggregate net
worth generates uctuations in the aggregate asset portfolio of the wholesale banks.
The wholesale banksdemand for interbank market lending is given by bibw;t =
R 1
0
bibj;tdj.
Moreover, the aggregate net worth consists of net worth of existing wholesale banks
net and the net worth of entering wholesale banks n
n
t :
nt = n
e
t + n
n
t :
Summing up across the wholesale banksnet worth (2.23) yields the aggregate net
worth of existing nancial intermediaries,
net = 
 
rkt   ribt 1

Qt 1sw;t 1 +
 
1 + ribt 1

nt 1

 1t ;
where  is the fraction of bankers that survived from t 1 to t. New wholesale banks
receive a start-up transfer from their household. It is assumed, that this transfer
is a fraction != (1  ) of the value of total assets that the exiting wholesale banks
held in period t  1, (1  )Qtsw;t 1 1t . The net worth of newly founded wholesale
banks is thus given by
nnt = !Qtsw;t 1:
Hence, aggregate net worth evolves according to
nt = 
 
rkt   ribt 1

Qt 1sw;t 1 +
 
1 + ribt 1

nt 1

 1t + !Qt 1sw;t 1
 1
t : (2.33)
2.2.3 Firms
The economys production sector consists of four types of rms: intermediate goods
producing rms, monopolistically competitive retailers, nal good producers, and
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capital good producers. Competitive intermediate rms produce intermediate goods
using capital and labor as inputs. Retail rms repack these intermediate goods and
sell them in a monopolistically competitive market to a representative nal goods
producing rm. Capital producers produce new capital which is sold to intermediate
rms. They use solely the nal good as input and are subjected to adjustment costs.
Intermediate rms
A continuum of perfectly competitive intermediate rms produce di¤erentiated goods
that are sold to retailers. Each intermediate rm j, j 2 [0; 1], operates under a
constant returns to scale production technology,
yj;t = (tkj;t 1)
 l1 j;t ; (2.34)
where kj;t 1 and lj;t are rm js capital and labor input, respectively. In each period
t, a rm j hires labor from households taking as given the market wage rate, uses
existing capital kj;t 1 as input, and purchases new capital xj;t for production in period
t+1. The variable t denotes a capital quality shock. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011,
2013), this shock is meant to capture economic obsolescence and is a simple source
of exogenous variation in the capital stock. Thus, the e¤ective quantity of capital
used for production in period t is given by tkj;t 1. At the end of the period, rm
j is left with the depreciated capital stock (1  ) tkj;t 1. It purchases new capital
xj;t from capital producers for production in period t + 1. Hence, intermediate rm
j0s capital stock evolves according to
kj;t = (1  ) tkj;t 1 + xj;t; (2.35)
Firms are required to collect funds to nance the purchase of new capital. In
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order to nance new capital, an intermediate rm issues state-contingent securities
sj;t to nancial intermediaries. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013), each unit of
new capital is nanced by issuing a claim to all future returns of this unit. One unit
of capital pays the state-contingent net nominal interest rate rkt+1 in period t+ 1. In
equilibrium, the price of one claim equals the price of one unit of capital Qt. The
supply of non-nancial rm securities of rm j at the end of period t is given by
sj;t = kj;t: (2.36)
Denote the price of the intermediate goods by Pmt , then, following Gertler and Karadi
(2011, 2013), the intermediate rmslabor demand is given by
wt = (1  a) P
m
t
Pt
yj;t
lj;t
: (2.37)
Since intermediate rms operate under a constant return to scale technology in
perfect completive markets, they earn zero prots in equilibrium. The zero prot
condition implies that intermediate rmsgross return on capital which is paid out
to the holders of non-nancial rm securities is given by
1 + rkt
t
=
zt +Qt (1  )
Qt 1
t; (2.38)
where zt  a (Pmt =Pt) (yj;t= (tkj;t 1)) is the real marginal product of capital.
Retail rms
Monopolistically competitive retail rms purchase intermediate goods and simply
repack them into retail goods. A retail rm uses one unit of intermediate goods to
produce one unit of the di¤erentiated retail good. Thus, the production function of
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a retail rm f , f 2 [0; 1] is given by yf;t = yj;t. The real marginal costs of a retail
rm are given by mct = Pmt =Pt. Nominal frictions are introduced as in Calvo (1983).
In each period a retail rm f is only allowed to adjust the nominal price of its good
yf;t with exogenous probability 1   . With probability  the rm is not allowed
to adjust the price. Following Yun (1996), if the rm cannot adjust its price, it
indexes the price to the steady state ination, Pf;t = Pf;t 1. Consider the problem
of a retail rm that is allowed to reset its price. The adjusted price is denoted by
~Pf;t. The rm seeks to maximize its expected discounted sum of prots by choosing
~Pf;t subject to the demand function for its good (which is given by eq. (2.41), as
described below in more detail). The maximization problem reads:
max
~Pf;t
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s
(
s
~Pf;t
Pt+s
  Pt+smct+s
)
yf;t+s,
s.t. yf;t+s =
 
s ~Pf;t
Pt+s
! "
yt+s:
The rst order condition for this problem is given by
~Pf;t
Pt
=
"
"  1
Et
P1
s=0 
st;t+s (
s) "mct+s (Pt+s=Pt)
" yt+s
Et
P1
s=0 
st;t+s (s)
1 " (Pt+s=Pt)
" 1 yt+s
:
Since all re-optimizing rms face the same demand function and technology, their
problem is symmetric. Thus, each of these rms chooses the same price ~Pf;t. Dene
~xt  ~Pf;t=Pt, then the rst order condition can be expressed recursively by
~xt =
"
"  1
x1;t
x2;t
; (2.39)
where x1;t  tmctyt + Et"t+1x1;t+1 and x2;t  tyt + Et" 1t+1x2;t+1. Finally, by
using the price index and the law of large numbers, the aggregate price level evolves
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according to
1 = (1  ) (~xt)1 " + 
t

" 1
: (2.40)
Final goods producers
The nal output is produced by a representative nal goods rm using solely retail
goods as input. Its production technology is given by the following CES function
yt =
Z 1
0
y
" 1
"
f;t df
 "
 1
:
The nal goods rm operates in a competitive market. Hence, it takes the nal
goods price Pt and the retail goods price as given. Final goods rms real prots
are given by yt P 1t
R 1
0
Pf;tyf;tdf . Its demand for input yf;t is derived from the rst
order condition of prot maximization:
yf;t =

Pf;t
Pt
 "
yt: (2.41)
Moreover, since there is perfect competition in the nal goods sector and the produc-
tion technology is linear homogeneous, the nal goods rm earns zero prots. Thus,
the aggregate price level is given by
Pt =
Z 1
0
P 1 "f;t df
 1
1 "
:
Capital Goods Producers
Capital producing rms operate in a perfectly competitive environment. They pro-
duce new capital xt using the nal good as the only input. The new capital is sold
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to intermediate rms at the price Qt. All prots are distributed to the sharehold-
ers. The objective of the representative capital goods producing rm is to maximize
prots by choosing xt,
max
It
Et
1X
=t
t;

Qx  

1 + f

x
x 1

;
where f () are convex adjustment costs. From the rst order condition, the price of
capital goods is
Qt = 1 + f

xt
xt 1

+
xt
xt 1
f 0

xt
xt 1

  Ett;t+1

xt+1
xt
2
f 0

xt+1
xt

: (2.42)
Aggregation
The aggregate factor demand of intermediate rms is derived by integrating over eq.
(2.37) and (2.38),
lt = (1  a)mct yt
wt
t; (2.43)
kt 1 = mct
 
1 + rkt

Qt 1  Qt (1  ) t
 1
yt; (2.44)
where t 
R 1
0

Pf;t
Pt
 "
df is the price dispersion. The price dispersion can be
expressed in recursive form as in Yun (1996),
t = (1  ) ~x "t + 
t

"
t 1: (2.45)
The aggregate output is obtained by integrating over eq. (2.34) and (2.41),
tyt = (tkt 1)
 l1 t : (2.46)
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Finally, by integrating over eq. (2.35) the aggregate capital stock evolves according
to
kt = (1  ) tkt 1 + xt: (2.47)
2.2.4 Public Sector
The public sector consists of the government and the central bank. The government
issues one-period nominal risk-free government bonds at a constant growth rate. As
in Schabert (2015), it is assumed that the governments bond supply Bt is given by
the following rule
Bt =  Bt 1, (2.48)
where   >  and B 1 > 0. The government purchases goods Gt, receives seigniorage
revenues Pt cbt from the central bank, and pays lump sum transfers Pt t to the
household to balance it budget,
Bt 1 + Pt t +Gt = Bt=
 
1 + rbt

+ Pt
cb
t :
The central bank supplies money in open market operations outright,Mt =
R 1
0
MBi;tdi,
and under repurchase agreements against treasuries, MRt =
R 1
0
MRi;tdi, and against
non-nancial rm securities, MSt =
R 1
0
MSi;tdi. As in Hörmann and Schabert (2015),
the central bank transfers its earnings from interest rate payments to the government
and reinvests its wealth only in government bonds. Thus, at the beginning of a
period, the central bank holds government bonds Bcb;t 1 and its liabilities, given by
the stock of outstanding money, are equal to Mt 1. It then receives treasuries BCt
and non-nancial rm securities SCt in exchange for newly issued reserves,
It = Mt  Mt 1 +MRt +MSt : (2.49)
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Repos are settled before asset markets open. After repos are settled, the amount of
outstanding reserves is reduced by MRt + M
S
t , the holding of government bonds is
reduced by BRt , and the holding of non-nancial rm securities by S
C
t . At the end
of the period, if the central bank does not provide public nancial intermediation
(see the discussion of the di¤erent central bank policies below), its budget constraint
reads
Pt
s
t +
Bcb;t
1 + rbt
= Bcb;t 1 + rmt
 
Mt  Mt 1 +MRt +MSt

+Mt  Mt 1;
where I used BCt + S
C
t = (1 + r
m
t ) It. It is assumed that all central bank prots
from interest rate earnings are transferred to the government and that maturing gov-
ernment debt is rolled over, Pt st = Bcb;t Bcb;t=
 
1 + rbt

+rmt
 
Mt  Mt 1 +MRt +MSt

.
Thus, the central banks holding government bonds evolves according toMt Mt 1 =
Bcb;t Bcb;t 1. Moreover, assuming that the initial values of outstanding money and
government bonds are equal, M 1 = Bcb; 1, the central banks end-of-period holding
of government equals
Bcb;t = Mt:
The central bank has di¤erent conventional and unconventional instruments for
the conduction of monetary policy. First, it sets the policy rate rmt . Specically, I
assume that the central bank sets the policy rate according to the following Taylor-
type interest rate rule (see Taylor, 1992)
1 + rmt = max
( 
1 + rmt 1
R (1 + rm)t

 yt
y
y1 R
; 1
)
; (2.50)
where the parameters R 2 [0; 1],   0, y  0, rm denotes the steady state value
of the policy rate,  the ination target, and y the steady state value of output.
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The policy rule respects the zero lower bound. Moreover, the central bank sets the
ination target  and chooses the ratio of money supplied outright and under repos
in exchange for government bonds 
t,

tMt = M
R
t : (2.51)
As in Schabert (2014, 2015), 
t is set su¢ ciently large enough to guarantee the
non-negativity of Injections. In addition, the central bank can choose the fraction of
randomly selected treasuries in open market operations, bt 2 (0; 1].
The central bank in this economy has two unconventional monetary policy in-
struments. It may either provide liquidity by purchasing non-nancial rm securities
under repos (e.g. collateralized lending), or it may choose to channel funds directly
to non-nancial rms (e.g. direct lending). Under collateralized lending, the central
bank changes its collateral policy. Precisely, following Schabert (2014), by setting
st 2 [0; 1], the central bank decides about the fraction of randomly selected non-
nancial rm securities that are eligible in open market operations.
Under direct central bank lending, the central bank provides public nancial
intermediation. Suppose that the central bank intermediates the value QtSd;t of
non-nancial rm securities.
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013), direct central bank lending is nanced
by the issuance of one-period risk-free debt Bibcb;t. The central bank issues B
ib
cb;t
to retail banks at a risk-free nominal interest rate and lend the acquired funds to
non-nancial rms.4 Thus, the equation QtSd;t = Bibcb;t always holds. The cen-
tral bank debt is e¤ectively government debt. Interbank market lending and cen-
tral banks short-term debt are both one-period risk-free nominal contracts. Hence,
4Since retail banks are not constrained in their ability to collect funds, this is equivalent to an
economy where the central bank issues debt to the households.
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both assets pay in equilibrium the same market rate. A role for central banks
intermediation arises from the frictions of private nancial intermediation. The
wholesale banks ability to collect funds is restricted by the agency. Due to the
management costs, retail banksarbitrage does not eliminate interest rate spreads.
Hence, public nancial intermediation does not substitute private nancial inter-
mediation one-to-one. Following Gertler et al. (2016), public nancial intermedi-
ation does not come without costs. The central bank faces managerial costs for
direct lending to non-nancial rms, cb (sd;t) = cm;cb ()
 1 sd;t, where cm;cb > cm.
Thus, it is supposed that the central bank is less e¢ cient in funding non-nancial
rms than the private nancial intermediaries.5 All prots or losses from the pur-
chase of non-nancial rm securities are transferred to the government, Pt
d;cb
t = 
1 + rkt

Qt 1Sd;t 1 +Bibcb;t   Ptcb (sd;t) QtSd;t  
 
1 + ribt 1

Bibcb;t 1. Thus, the total
transfers from the central bank to the government are given by
Pt
cb
t = Pt
s
t + Pt
d;cb
t :
In the following, in order to evaluate and compare solely the e¤ects of the pur-
chase of non-nancial rm securities under both policies, the total amount of money
supplied by the central bank is left unchanged under the respective policy measure.
This implies that if the central bank decides to accept non-nancial rm securities
in open market operations, the change in st is accompanied by a neutralizing ad-
justment of bt and an adjustment of the ratio of money supplied outright and under
repos in exchange for treasuries. Precisely, I impose that a rise in the amount of
reserves against non-nancial rm securities supplied under repos MSt reduces the
5In contrast, the acquisition of non-nancial rm securities in open market operations does not
involve e¢ ciency costs, since there is no structural di¤erence to the purchase of treasuries in open
market operations, as discussed in Schabert (2015).
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amount of reserves supplied against treasuries under repos MRt proportionally, keep-
ing the ratio of reserves supplied outright Mt and under repos MRt +M
S
t untouched
from the policy action.
2.2.5 Equilibrium and Interest Rate Relations
This section presents the equilibrium and discusses the relation of the di¤erent in-
terest rates.
Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets are clear. Thus, the aggregate supply of funds in the
interbank market equals the aggregate demand,
bibrb;t = b
ib
w;t + b
ib
cb;t; (2.52)
where I used that interbank market borrowing by wholesale banks and one-period
central bank debt the are perfect substitutes for retail banks to simplify the notation.
Market clearing in the market for non-nancial rm securities implies
st = kt; (2.53)
where st is the aggregate demand for non-nancial rm securities given by
st = srb;t + sw;t + sd;t: (2.54)
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In equilibrium, the total supply of government bonds equals aggregate demand. Gov-
ernment bonds can be either held by retail banks or by the central bank,
bt = brb;t + bcb;t: (2.55)
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
yt = ct + xt + f

xt
xt 1

xt + gt +  (srb;t) + 
cb (sd;t) ; (2.56)
where gt = Gt=Pt. I restrict the attention to equilibria where the money supply
constraint (2.9), the the liquidity constraint (2.10), and the incentive constraint
(2.22) always bind (i.e. mct > 0, 
dc
t > 0, and 
k
t > 0). The formal denition of the
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is given in Appendix (2.A.2).
Interest Rates and Interest Rate Di¤erentials
The derivations for the presented equations in this section are shown in Appendix
(2.A.3). Following Bredemeier et al. (2015), the multiplier on the money supply
constraint (2.16) can be expressed by
mct =
1 + rISt
1 + rmt
  1; (2.57)
where
1
1 + rISt
= Et
uc;t+1
uc;t
 1t+1; (2.58)
is the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (see Schabert, 2015). Hence, the
money supply constraint (2.9) binds if the central bank sets the policy rate below
the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. If the money supply constraint is
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binding, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution di¤ers from the policy rate
by a liquidity premium.
The multiplier of the goods market constraint can be written as
hht = uc;t

1  1
1 + rISt

: (2.59)
Hence, as long as the rate of intertemporal substitution is larger than one, the goods
market constraint of households binds. Then, from dct = 
hh
t =t also the liquidity
constraint of retail banks does bind. Notably, this holds independently of the policy
rate.
The equilibrium interest rate on government bonds can be expressed by
1
1 + rbt
= Et
  
1  bt+1
  
1 + rmt+1

+ bt+1
 
1 + rISt+1
 
1 + rISt+1
  
1 + rmt+1
  1t+1
!
: (2.60)
Eq. (2.60) shows that the interest rate on government bonds is a function of the
expected policy rate and the expected marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
where the policy parameter bt 2 (0; 1] is a weighting factor. If all government bonds
are eligible in open market operations (bt = 1), the interest rate on government
bonds equals the expected policy rate up to rst order.
In equilibrium, the interest rate on lending in the interbank market ribt follows
the expected marginal rate of intertemporal substitution up to rst order,
1
1 + ribt
= Et
1
1 + rISt+1
: (2.61)
Next, I turn to the retail banksreturn on capital. The rst order condition for
retail banks investment in capital (i.e. non-nancial rm securities) is given by eq.
(2.12). If the central bank does not accept non-nancial rm securities as collaterals
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in open market operations (i.e. st = 0), then eq. (2.12) can be expressed by
1 = Et
1 + rkrb;t+1
1 + rISt+1
: (2.62)
If st > 0, then it follows that 1 > Et
  
1 + rkrb;t+1

=
 
1 + rISt+1

. By setting st ,
the central bank is able to manipulate the retail banksmarginal valuation of non-
nancial rm securities. Moreover, combining eq. (2.12) and eq. (2.13) shows that
the following interest rate condition between the rates of return of non-nancial rm
securities and interbank market loan has to hold in equilibrium:
Et
 
1 + rkrb;t+1
  
1 + st+1
mc
i;t+1
   1 + ribt 
1 + rISt+1
= 0: (2.63)
Finally, consider the rate of return on capital rkt+1 and the interbank market
rate ribt . Wholesale banks borrow funds in the interbank market to invest in non-
nancial rm securities. A binding incentive constraint (2.22), kt > 0, induces
a spread between the expected discounted rate of return on capital rkt+1 and the
riskless interbank market rate ribt . Specically, by combining eq. (2.26) and (2.30),
the expected discounted spread is given by
Et
t+1
t
t+1
rkt+1   ribt
t+1
=
kt
1 + kt
:
Under a binding incentive constraint, the spread is positive. Due to the agency
problem, the wholesale banksability to obtain funds is limited, preventing wholesale
banks e¤ectively from expanding their purchase of non-nancial rm securities until
the marginal cost of borrowing hits the marginal return from lending. As a result,
the capital costs for non-nancial rms are larger and investment and output are
lower compared to the case where the incentive constraint is not binding. Thus, the
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spread between the rate of return on capital rkt+1 and the riskless interbank market
rate ribt is an important measure of the ine¢ ciency of nancial markets caused by
the agency problem. Moreover, due to the retail banksmanagement costs, the rate
of return on capital rkt exceeds the retail banksrate of return on non-nancial rm
securities rkrb;t. If the retail banks do not face managerial costs ( (srb;t) = 0 8srb;t),
then all capital is funded by retail banks (given that the wholesale banksincentive
constraint is binding). Equivalently, if wholesale banksincentive constraint (2.22)
is not binding, all capital is funded by wholesale banks (given that the retail banks
face management costs).
2.3 Model Analysis
This section presents the calibration of the models parameters and evaluates the
dynamic of the model. The rst part discusses the choice for the parameter values.
Then, the dynamic of the model is evaluated. First, the response of the model to a
nancial disturbance is considered. The nancial turmoil is caused by an unantici-
pated decline in capital quality. The decline in capital quality leads to a drop in the
value of non-nancial rm securities, inducing a tightening of the leverage constraint
of wholesale banks. The amplication of the nancial disturbance on the economy
is discussed for di¤erent calibrations of the managerial cost parameter . Then, the
e¤ects of collateralized central bank lending and direct central bank lending on the
economy are evaluated. Moreover, the impact of di¤erent calibrations of the manage-
rial cost parameter  on the e¤ectiveness of collateralized lending and direct lending
on the economy are discussed.
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Table 2.1: Calibration: Parameters and targeted Moments
Households
 0:990 Discount Rate
n 0:276 Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply
n 0:333 Steady State Working Time
Intermediate Good Firms
 0:330 Capital Share
 0:025 Depreciation Rate
Capital Producing Firms
 1:728 Inv. Elasticity of Invest. to the Price of Capital
Retail Firms
" 4:167 Elasticity of Substitution between Goods
 0:779 Probability of keeping Prices constant
Retail Banks
Srb= (Srb + Sw) 0:500 Share of Firm Securities
Wholesale Banks
 0:900 Survival Rate of Bankers
 20:00 Steady State Leverage Ratio 
rk   rib  1 0:016 Real Steady State Excess Return p.a.
Government
 1:500 Ination Coe¢ cient of Interest Rate Rule
y 0:050 Output Gap Coe¢ cient of Interest Rate Rule
r 0:900 Smoothing Coe¢ cient of Interest Rate Rule
rm 0:015 Steady State Policy Rate

 1:000 Fraction of Money supplied under Repos
 1:011 Steady State Ination Rate
  1:011 Growth Rate of Treasuries
G=Y 0:200 Proportion of Government Expenditures
b 1:000 Fraction of Treasuries eligible in OMOs
s 0:000 Fraction of Firm Securities eligible in OMOs
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2.3.1 Calibration
Overall there are 22 parameters to calibrate. Table (2.1) lists the calibrated parame-
ter values and the targeted steady state values of some variables. Following Gertler
and Karadi (2013), householdsdiscount rate is set to  = 0:99, the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is set to n = 0:276, the relative utility weight of labor
supply is picked to hit a steady state working time of n = 1=3, the capital share is
set equal to  = 0:33, the depreciation rate is set to  = 0:025 , the inverse elasticity
of investment to the price of capital is set to  = 1:728, the elasticity of substitution
is set to " = 4:167, and the probability of keeping prices constant is set to  = 0:779.
For the calibration of the parameters belonging to nancial intermediaries, I follow
closely Gertler et al. (2016). The scaling parameter cm in the management cost
function is set to target the steady-state share of non-nancial rm securities hold
by retail banks. This share is set equal to 0:5which corresponds to the pre-crisis
ratio of capital held by retail banks and wholesale banks in 2007 (see Gertler et al.,
2016). The managerial cost parameter of retail banks  is important for the ampli-
cation of nancial disturbances in the economy. It determines the degree of retail
banksability to adjust capital holding if nancial conditions change. As a result, as
demonstrated below, it controls how strong the leverage constraint, induced by the
agency problem, a¤ects the dynamic of the model.
Lower values of  imply that retail banks are able to absorb larger amounts of
capital during a nancial turmoil, mitigating the e¤ects of the tightening of wholesale
banksleverage constraint on the total demand for non-nancial rm securities. For
the crisis experiment and the evaluation of the e¤ectiveness of collateralized lending
and direct lending, di¤erent values of this parameter are considered and discussed.
As in Gertler et al. (2016), the survival rate of wholesale banks is set to  = 0:9.
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The proportional transfers to new entering wholesale banks ! and the fraction of
divertable capital  are picked to lead to a steady state leverage ratio of 20 and
an annual spread between the real return on capital and the real interbank rates
equal to 1:6 percentage points. The picked values are based on the targets of Gertler
et al. (2016). The policy rate and ination rate are set to rm = 1:06351=4   1
and  = 1:0451=4 which accords to their respective average of the sample 1964.Q2 -
2008.Q2 (see Bredemeier et al., 2015). Moreover, following Bredemeier et al. (2015),
the growth rate of treasury bonds is set equal to the ination target   = .6 The
fraction of money supplied against treasuries under repos is set, for simplicity, to

 = 1. In the steady state, the central bank only accepts treasuries in open market
operations, thus s = 0. This policy corresponds to the treasury onlydoctrine of
the Federal Reserve (Fed) before the nancial crisis (see Goodfriend, 2011). Further,
treasuries are fully eligible in the steady state, b = 1. Finally, similar to Bredemeier
et al. (2015), the ratio of government expenditure to output is set to 0:2 and the
interest rate rule coe¢ cients are set to conventional values r = 0:8, y = 1:5 and
y = 0:05.7
2.3.2 Crisis Experiment
In this subsection, I evaluate the response of the model to a capital quality shock for
di¤erent calibrations of the managerial cost parameter. This parameter determines
the degree of retail banksability to adjust capital holding if nancial conditions
change. Indeed, the managerial cost parameter  is an important parameter for the
amplication of the capital quality shock, as shown in this subsection. As in Gertler
and Karadi (2011, 2013), the crisis is triggered by a capital quality shock. The shock
6Schabert (2015) shows that the central bank can still implement its ination target if   6= .
7Moreover, following Bredemerier et al. (2015), the parameter  is set equal to 1. While this
choice is somewhat arbitrary, the parameter does not a¤ect the models dynamic.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses of output, investment, interest rate spread, capital,
and asset prices to a capital quality shock for di¤erent calibrations of the managerial
cost parameter .
is calibrated to lead to a drop in the capital quality of 1 percent on impact. The
shock process is modeled by a stationary AR(1) process with an autoregressive factor
of 0:66. The corresponding impulse response functions (IRFs) are displayed in gure
(2.3). The IRFs displayed in gure (2.3) describe the response of the model to a
capital quality shock for di¤erent calibrations of the managerial cost parameter .
Most of the variables are depicted in percentual deviations from their steady state.
The real interest rate spread Et
 
Rkt+1  Ribt

is depicted in annual percentage points.
The variables t is presented in absolute variations from its steady state.
The fall in capital quality leads to a drop in capital, output, and investment.
Moreover, the unanticipated decline in capital reduces the value of non-nancial rm
securities, resulting in a drop in wholesale banksnet worth. From the decline in
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wholesale banksnet worth, the leverage constraint is tightened, forcing wholesale
banks to sell assets. The decline in their demand for non-nancial rm securities
puts downward pressure on their price. The drop in the price of non-nancial rm
securities further enhances the downturn by tightening wholesale banks leverage
constraint and forcing them to re sale non-nancial rm securities in order to meet
the leverage constraint. Retail banks, who do not face an agency problem, increase
their holding of capital by purchasing non-nancial rm securities. However, due to
the capital management costs their ability to fund capital is limited. Thus, they are
not able to fully compensate the drop in wholesale banksdemand for non-nancial
rm securities. As a result, both, investment and output drop. Investment declines
on impact and needs roughly one year to recover.
As shown in gure (2.3), the amplication of the capital quality shock does depend
on the calibration of the managerial cost parameter . The capital quality shock
leads to a tightening in the leverage constraint of wholesale banks, inducing a drop
in their demand for non-nancial rm securities which results eventually in a rise
of the interest rate on non-nancial rm securities. Retail banks are not leverage
constrained. Thus, the rise in the interest rate spread leads, ceteris paribus, to
an increase in the retail banks demand for non-nancial rm securities. Higher
values of  imply that a rise in retail banks non-nancial rm security holdings is
associated with higher management costs. Thus, for high values of , the magnitude
of the change of retail banksdemand for non-nancial rm securities in response to
a change of nancial conditions is comparably small. In contrast, for low values of
, the magnitude of the change in the retail banksdemand for non-nancial rm
securities in response to a rise in nancial conditions is considerably stronger. As a
result, the rise in the retail banksdemand for non-nancial rm securities during
the nancial turmoil is stronger for low values of . The increase in the retail banks
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses of output, investment, and the interest rate spread
to a collateralized lending and a direct lending shock for di¤erent values of the
managerial cost parameter .
demand for non-nancial rm securities dampens the rise in the interest rate spread
and mitigates the amplication of the capital quality shock by the leverage constraint.
2.3.3 Policy Simulations
This section analyses the e¤ects of a small purchase of non-nancial rm securities
either conducted by collateralized lending or by direct lending on the economy for
di¤erent values of the managerial cost parameter . If  > 0 (and cm > 0), arbitrage
by retail banks does not eliminate the spread between the interest rate on capital and
53
the interbank market rate due to the management costs. Specically, the parameter 
determines the magnitude of the change in the retail banksdemand for non-nancial
rm securities in response to a change in nancial conditions. High values of  reduce
the amount of capital the retail bank can absorb if nancial conditions change. Figure
(2.4) displays the impulse responses to an unanticipated purchase of non-nancial
rm securities of three key variables (output, investment, and the excess returns on
capital) for three di¤erent values of . The central bank either provides funds to
non-nancial rms directly (direct lending) or purchases non-nancial rm securities
under repos in open market operations (collateralized lending). Direct lending is
modeled as an unanticipated purchase of non-nancial rm securities directly from
non-nancial rms. As described in section (2.4), the central bank issues one-period
riskless bonds to nance lending to non-nancial rms. The purchase of non-nancial
rm securities is modeled as an AR(1) process with an autoregressive factor of 0:9.
The size of the shock is set to achieve that, on impact, the amount of purchased
non-nancial rm securities equals 0:05 (which accords to roughly 0.9 percent of the
total capital stock). Similar to Gertler et al. (2016), I suppose that the central bank
intermediation comprises an e¢ ciency loss. The e¢ ciency cost is interpreted as the
cost of publicly channeling funds to non-nancial rms. I choose a moderate value
of cm;cb = 0:005. Collateralized lending is modeled as an unanticipated rise in the
fraction of non-nancial rm securities accepted in open market st . The value of non-
nancial rm securities purchased in open market operations under repos is denoted
by ISt .
8 In order to compare the e¤ects of both policy actions, the purchased amounts
of non-nancial rm securities are of similar magnitude. Specically, the shock is
calibrated so that, on impact, the value of non-nancial rm securities purchased in
8ISt is dened as the value of non-nancial rm securities that the central bank purchases under
repos, Ist = 
s
t (zt +Qt (1  )) srb;t 1:
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open market operations equals also roughly 0:9 percent of the total capital stock.9
Both policies a¤ect the economy through di¤erent channels. By direct lending,
the central bank substitutes private nancial intermediation by public nancial inter-
mediation, contributing directly to the aggregate demand for non-nancial rm secu-
rities. In contrast, collateralized lending does not a¤ect the demand for non-nancial
rm securities directly. By accepting non-nancial rm securities as a collateral in
open market operations, the central bank is able to manipulate the liquidity premium
incorporated in non-nancial rm securities and is eventually able to stimulate the
retail banksdemand for non-nancial rm securities.
The bottom panels in gure (2.4) show the IRFs of the three variables in response
to both policy actions for a high value of . The dotted line in gure (2.4) reports
the e¤ects of direct lending. Direct central bank lending raises the total demand
for non-nancial rm securities. Since wholesale banks are balance sheet constrained
and retail banks face management costs, the rise in the demand for non-nancial rm
securities by the central bank does not substitute the demand for non-nancial rm
securities perfectly. The increase in the total demand for non-nancial rm securities
drives up the price of non-nancial rm securities Qt, resulting in a drop in the rate
of return of capital rkt+1 and the real interest rate spread Et
 
Rkt+1  Ribt

. Moreover,
the rise in the demand for capital pushes up investment and output.
As displayed by the solid line in the bottom panels in gure (2.4), also collater-
alized lending works to stimulate aggregate demand for non-nancial rm securities.
However, the impact of collateralized lending is rather small compared to direct lend-
ing for high values of . By allowing retail banks to trade non-nancial rm securities
against reserves in open market operations, the central bank is able to inuence the
9As described in section (2.4), the change in st is accompanied by a neutralizing adjustment
of bt and an adjustment of the ratio of money supplied outright and under repos in exchange for
treasuries, in order to keep the total amount of reserves and the amount of reserves supplied outright
unchanged by the policy action.
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retail banksmarginal valuation of non-nancial rm securities. More precisely, the
equilibrium relation between the retail banksexpected marginal valuation of non-
nancial rm securities and the interbank market rate, given in eq. (2.63), together
with eq. (2.18) show how the central bank is able to manipulate the retail banks
demand for these securities. If the central bank sets st > 0, ceteris paribus, the
retail banksmarginal valuation of non-nancial rm securities rises. Thus, by ar-
bitrage, retail banksstart to purchase additional non-nancial rm securities until
their expected marginal valuation of these securities equals the expected interbank
market rate in equilibrium. Thus, a rise in st increases retail banksdemand for non-
nancial rm securities, resulting in a rise in the total demand for these securities
and pushing up the price of these securities. As a result, the the real interest rate
spread Et
 
Rkt+1  Ribt

drops. The rise in the total demand for non-nancial rm
securities pushes up investment, the total capital stock, and output.
The top panels in gure (2.4) display the IRFs of output, investment, and excess
returns on capital in response to both policy actions for a low value of . Again, both,
collateralized lending and direct lending work to stimulate the aggregate demand
for non-nancial rm securities. In result, the excess returns on capital drop and
investment and increases.10 However, for the low value of , direct lending is less
e¤ective than collateralized lending. The drop in the excess returns on capital is
stronger under collateralized lending for the low value of .
The intuition for the di¤erent e¤ects of both policies for di¤erent values of the
managerial cost parameter  is as follows. Direct lending works by increasing the
demand for non-nancial rm securities directly. If the central bank purchases non-
nancial rm securities by direct lending, the demand for these securities increases
10Notably, under the direct lending policy, output declines on impact. The initial decline in
output results from a drop in labor. For moderate public nancial intermediation costs, public
intermediation of a small amount of assets reduces the aggregate costs of asset management. As a
result, under the chosen calibration, households consume more leisure and consumption goods.
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which pushes down the rate of return on capital in equilibrium. For a high value of
, retail banksdemand is less elastic. Thus, if the return on capital decreases, the
drop in the retail banksdemand for non-nancial rm securities is relatively small.
Therefore, the overall impact of direct lending on the aggregate demand for non-
nancial rm securities increases in . For high values of , the e¤ects of collateralized
lending on the excess return on capital are comparably small. In contrast to direct
lending, collateralized lending does not increase the total demand for non-nancial
rm securities directly, but by inuencing the retail banksmarginal valuation of
these securities. The less elastic the retail banks demand for non-nancial rm
securities is, the less e¤ective is collateralized lending in stimulating retail banks
demand for rm securities.
The analysis shows that the e¤ects of both policies on the economy are in gen-
eral not identical. Therefore, in order to analyze the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent asset
purchase programs, it is important to take into account how central banks asset pur-
chases are conducted. Moreover, overall, the e¤ects of direct lending on the excess
returns on capital are of stronger magnitude for a high value of  than the e¤ects of
collateralized lending for a low value of .
2.4 Conclusion
In this work, I evaluate the e¤ects of central banks purchase of private securities
in a macroeconomic model with money serving as a mean of payment, two types
of nancial intermediaries (namely retail banks and wholesale banks), and nancial
frictions. Both types of nancial intermediaries have di¤erent business models. Retail
banks rely only on householdssaving for funding the acquisition of non-nancial rm
securities and lending in the interbank market. Wholesale banks use funds acquired
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in the interbank market to lend to non-nancial rms. Based on Gertler and Karadi
(2011), a nancial friction is introduced by an agency problem that entails a leverage
constraint on the wholesale banksbalance sheets. In addition, due to management
costs, retail banksarbitrage is not able to eliminate spreads in the non-nancial rm
security market.
I analyze the e¤ects collateralized central bank lending and compare these e¤ects
to those of direct central bank lending. Under collateralized central bank lending, the
central bank purchases private securities in open market operations, i.e. exchanges re-
serves against private securities under repos, where reserves are high-powered money.
Alternatively, under direct central bank lending, the central bank provides public -
nancial intermediation by lending funds directly to non-nancial rms, where direct
lending is nanced by issuing interest-rate bearing debt, as in Gertler and Karadi
(2011, 2013). Thus, similar to a private nancial intermediary, the central bank
intermediates funds to non-nancial rms directly. In order to evaluate the e¤ective-
ness of collateralized central bank lending, I consider di¤erent settings in which the
agency problem a¤ects the models dynamic di¤erently strong.
First, the dynamic of the model in response to capital quality shock is analyzed.
As demonstrated, the e¤ectiveness of both policies depends on how strong the lever-
age constraint a¤ects the models dynamic which, in turn, depends on the elasticity
of retail banksdemand for non-nancial rm securities. Next, the e¤ectiveness of
collateralized central bank lending and direct central bank lending are analyzed.
The results show that both policies, collateralized central bank lending and direct
central bank lending, are able to reduce excess returns on capital in this model.
Ultimately, both policies work by changing the aggregate demand for non-nancial
rm securities. However, both policies a¤ect the aggregate demand for non-nancial
rm securities through di¤erent channels.
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Due to the presence of the nancial friction and the management costs, the change
in the aggregate demand for non-nancial rm securities is not o¤set by private -
nancial intermediaries. Specically, under collateralized central bank lending, the
central bank is able to manipulate the liquidity premium incorporated in these secu-
rities by adjusting the fraction of non-nancial rm securities eligible in open market
operations. In response, retail banks adjust their demand for non-nancial rm se-
curities accordingly. In contrast, by intermediating funds publicly to non-nancial
rms directly, the central bank provides public nancial intermediation. The increase
in the demand for non-nancial rm securities raises the price of private securities
and reduces excess returns on capital.
I want to stress two main points of my results and their implications. First, the
e¤ectiveness of both policies is in general not identical. Thus, in order to evaluate
the e¤ects of central banks asset purchases, it is important to take into account how
the asset purchases are conducted. In fact, under a considerable number of programs
(e.g. the discount window lending or the Term Auction Facility) the Fed supplied
reserves against an eligible collateral to nancial institutions in order to support the
liquidity of these institutions and did not intermediate funds publicly from lenders
to borrowers.
Second, collateralized lending and direct lending are each most e¤ective under
the exactly opposite market conditions of the private nancial sector. More pre-
cisely, if retail banksdemand for non-nancial rm securities is completely inelastic,
collateralized lending does have no impact on the economy, while direct lending is
most e¤ective and vice versa. In contrast, if retail banksare able to expand their
demand for private assets relatively elastically when nancial conditions change, the
e¤ects of direct lending on the economy are less benecial compared to the analysis
of Gertler and Karadi (2011). The presence of retail banks mitigate the e¤ects of the
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wholesale banksleverage constraint on the economy and reduces the e¤ectiveness
of direct lending thereby. Moreover, if retail banks are able to adjust its demand
for non-nancial rm securities more elastically, the amplication of a nancial dis-
turbance (here modeled by a reduction in the capital quality) is less strong and the
e¤ects of the nancial disturbance in this model become more similar to the e¤ects of
this disturbance in a more standard New-Keynesian model without the agency prob-
lem. Thus, in this case, the agency problem is less relevant for the dynamic of the
economy. In other words, under a calibration where the leverage constraint a¤ects
the models dynamic substantially, the e¤ects of central banks liquidity programs
are, at its best, only moderate.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Value Function
Inserting the conjectured solution (2.25) of the value function into the Bellman equa-
tion (2.24) yields
kt 1Qtsj;t 1 + 
n
t 1nj;t 1 = Et 1t 1;t

(1  )nj;t + 
 
ktQtsj;t + 
n
t nj;t

= Et 1t 1;ttnj;t;
where
t  (1  ) + 

ktt + 
n
t

:
Next, by using the law-of-motion of wholesale bank j, given by eq. (2.23), the
following expression is obtained
kt 1Qtsj;t 1 + 
n
t 1nj;t 1 = Et 1t 1;tt
 
rkt   ribt 1

Qt 1sj;t 1 1t
+
 
1 + ribt 1

nj;t 1 1t

:
Comparing terms yields that the conjectured solution (2.25) holds for any (sj;t; nj;t)
if
kt = Ett;t+1t+1
 
rkt+1   ribt

 1t+1;
nt = Ett;t+1t+1
 
1 + ribt

 1t+1:
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2.A.2 Equilibrium
A REE is a set of sequences,

t; t; lt; wt; ct;mct; yt; kt; ~xt; x1;t; x2;t;t; Qt; nt;t; t; xt;mt;m
R
t ;m
S
t ;
it; bt; brb;t; st; sw;t; srb;t; 
hh
t ; 
dc
t ; 
mc
t ; 
n
t ; 
k
t ; 
k
t ; r
d
t ; rt; r
k
rb;t; r
k
t ; r
ib
t ; r
b
t
	1
t=0
;
satisfying
1
1 + rdt
= Et
t+1 + 
hh
t+1
tt+1
; (2.64)
uc;t = t + 
hh
t ; (2.65)
lnt = twt; (2.66)
1
1 + rt
= Et
t+1
t
 1t+1; (2.67)
1 = Et
t+1
t
 
1 + rkrb;t+1
  
1 + st+1
mc
t+1

 1t+1; (2.68)
ct = mt +m
R
t +m
S
t ; (2.69)
hht = t
dc
t ; (2.70)
1
1 + ribt
= Et
t+1
t
 1t+1; (2.71)
1
1 + rbt
= Et
t+1
t
1 + bt+1
mc
t+1
t+1
; (2.72)
1 = Et
t+1
t
1 + dct+1
t+1
; (2.73)
1 + vdct = (1 + r
m
t ) (1 + 
mc
t ) ; (2.74)
1 + rkrb;t
t
=
zt + (1  )Qt
Qt 1 + 0 (srb;t 1)
t; (2.75)
(1 + rmt ) it =
 
btbrb;t 1 + 
s
t (zt + (1  )Qt) tsrb;t 1

 1t ; (2.76)
mt = mt 1 1t  mRt + it; (2.77)
mSt = 
s
t
(zt + (1  )Qt) t
(1 + rmt )t
srb;t 1 (2.78)
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1 + rkt
t
=
zt + (1  )Qt
Qt 1
t; (2.79)
kt = Ett;t+1t+1
 
rkt+1   ribt

 1t+1; (2.80)
nt = Ett;t+1t+1
 
1 + ribt

 1t+1; (2.81)
t = (1  ) + 

ktt + 
n
t

; (2.82)
t =
nt
   kt
; (2.83)
t =
Qtsw;t
nt
; (2.84)
kt =
kt
1 + kt
; (2.85)
nt =


 
rkt   ribt 1

Qt 1sw;t 1 +
 
1 + ribt 1

nt 1

 1t
+!Qtsw;t 1 1t

;
(2.86)
Qt =
h
1 + f

xt
xt 1

+ xt
xt 1
f 0

xt
xt 1

 Ett;t+1

xt+1
xt
2
f

xt+1
xt

;
(2.87)
lt = (1  a)mct yt
wt
t; (2.88)
kt = (1  ) tkt 1 + xt; (2.89)
tyt = (tkt 1)
 l1 t ; (2.90)
~xt =
"
"  1
x1;t
x2;t
; (2.91)
x1;t = tmctyt + Et
"
t+1x1;t+1; (2.92)
x2;t = tyt + Et
" 1
t+1x2;t+1; (2.93)
1 = (1  ) (~xt)1 " + 
t

" 1
; (2.94)
t = (1  ) ~x "t + 
t

"
t 1; (2.95)
yt = ct + xt + f

xt
xt 1

xt + gt +  (srb;t) ; (2.96)
bt =  bt 1 1t ; (2.97)
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mt = 
tm
R
t ; (2.98)
st = kt; (2.99)
st = srb;t + sw;t + sdl;t; (2.100)
bt = brb;t +mt; (2.101)
where the auxiliary variables are given by
uc;t =
1
ct   hct 1 ;
 (srb;t) =
cm

srb;t;
t;t+1 = 
t+1
t
;
zt = amct
ytt
tkt 1
;
f

xt
xt 1

=

2

xt
xt 1
  1
2
;
a transversality condition, scal and monetary policy setting fgt; rmt  0; st 2 [0; 1] ;
bt 2 (0; 1];
t  0; sdl;t  0
	1
t=0
,    and    1, for given sequences of shocks
ftg1t=0, and given initial values m 1 > 0, b 1 > 0, brb; 1, d 1, and  1  1.
2.A.3 Interest Rate Relations
Starting with the retail banks, using eq. (2.16) and the equilibrium relation hht =
t
dc
t yields
t = Et
t+1 + 
hh
t+1
t+1
: (2.102)
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Furthermore, plugging hht = t
dc
t into eq. (2.17) yields
1 + hht =t = (1 + r
m
t ) (1 + 
mc
t ) : (2.103)
Combining eq. (2.102), (2.103), and (2.5) leads to
(1 + rmt ) (1 + 
mc
t ) =

Et
uc;t+1
uc;tt+1
 1
, mct =
1 + rISt
1 + rmt
  1: (2.104)
where
1
1 + rISt
= Et
uc;t+1
uc;t
 1t+1:
By plugging eq. (2.5) into (2.102), the multiplier of the goods market constraint can
be written as
uc;t   vhht = Et
uc;t+1
t+1
, hht = uc;t

1  1
1 + rISt

: (2.105)
Moreover, from eq. (2.15) together with (2.5) and (2.102) the equilibrium interest
rate on government bonds is given by
1
1 + rbt
= Et
1
1 + rISt+1

1  bt+1 + bt+1
1 + rISt+1
1 + rmt+1

 1t+1
= Et
  
1  bt+1
  
1 + rmt+1

+ bt+1
 
1 + rISt+1
 
1 + rISt+1
  
1 + rmt+1
  1t+1
!
: (2.106)
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The interest rate on lending in the interbank market ribt is obtained by plugging eq.
(2.5) and (2.102) into (2.13)
1
1 + ribt
= Et
 
Et+1
t+2 + v
hh
t+2
t+2

Et
t+1 + v
hh
t+1
t+1
 1!
 1t+1
= Et
 
Et+1
uc;t+2
t+2

Et
uc;t+1
t+1
 1!
 1t+1
= Et
1
1 + rISt+1
: (2.107)
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Chapter 3
Evaluating the Interplay of Term
Premia, Monetary Policy, and the
Economy in the Euro Area
3.1 Introduction
Standard decomposition of yields separates the yield of a long-term bond into an
expectation part and a term premium part. The expectation part consists of the
average of the expected sum of short-term interest rates until the bond matures
while the term premium part compensates risk-averse investors for the risk of holding
longer-dated instruments. In order to a¤ect spending, production, employment, and
ination, manipulating the expectations of the future short rates by the forward
guidance of future short-term interest rates is one important tool of central banks, as
emphasized by Woodford (2005). This routine is known as the expectation channel.
However, to the extent that aggregate demand depends, among other macroeconomic
factors, not only on the short-term interest rate but also on long-term interest rates,
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also changes in the term premium component of these rates a¤ect economic activity.
Indeed, recently, Ireland (2015) nds evidence for the U.S. that an increase in term
premia dampens economic activity. In turn, by inuencing the term premium in
long-term bond yields, there is another, less conventional way, how monetary policy
might be able to a¤ect economic activity (see e.g. Wu, 2014). This paper analyses the
e¤ects of movements in term premia of Euro area government bonds on the economy
of the Euro area, the e¤ects of monetary policy on term premia, and whether the
ECB responds, in turn, on term premia movements.
The e¤ects of variations in term premia on the economy, and how monetary policy
a¤ects these premia, are in the focus of policy makers and researchers, not solely, but
especially since the nancial crisis. During the crisis, with the short-term nominal
interest rate at the zero lower bound in the US, unconventional methods of monetary
policy sought to inuence the expectation of future short-term rates and to reduce
term premia in long-term bond yields in order to ease nancial conditions. But also
before the onset of the nancial crisis, the e¤ects of changes in term premia on the
economy and the response of monetary policy to these uctuations were considered
by researchers and policy makers. As explained by then Federal Reserve Chairman
Bernanke (2006), "if spending depends on long-term interest rates, special factors
that lower the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates will stimulate
aggregate demand. Thus, when the term premium declines, a higher short-term rate
is required to obtain the long-term rate and the overall mix of nancial conditions
consistent with maximum sustainable employment and stable prices". This practi-
tionerview, as labeled by (Rudebusch et al., 2007), states two assumptions. Firstly,
a drop in the term premium and with it in long-term yields, all else is being equal,
works to stimulate aggregate demand and output. Secondly, the central bank is re-
quired to counteract the drop in the premium by adjusting the short-term interest
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rate in order to balance output and ination. Although this view is prevalent among
practitioners (see Rudebusch et al., 2007), less evidence for it has been found so far
(as discussed in Ireland, 2015). The empirical ndings of the e¤ects of changes in the
premium on output are rather mixed, ranging from exactly the opposite relationship
of what the practitioner view suggests to the expected inverse relationship between
term premia and output. Since a broad literature focuses on the e¤ects of movements
of term premia on output, the next section serves a more detailed literature overview
of the e¤ects of term premia movements on GDP.
However, not are only the e¤ects of changes in term premia on output unclear,
but also how monetary policy should respond to these changes (if it responds at all).
The practitioner view advocates that in response to a rise in the term premium,
the central bank should lower the policy rate to o¤set the increase.1 In contrast,
Goodfriend (1993) and McCallum (2005) argue that the central bank should increase
the short-term interest rate in response to a rise in the term premium. Both interpret
the rise in the term premium as evidence for an increase in ination scares which
the central bank should ght by raising the short-term interest rate. More recently,
Ireland (2015) investigates the response of monetary policy to changes in the term
premium for the US. He provides evidence that an increase in the premium led the
Fed to tighten monetary policy.
This paper seeks to evaluate the interplay of monetary policy, term premia and
the economy in the Euro Area. My analysis focuses on the euro area before and
during the nancial crisis in order to investigate if movements in term premia a¤ect
output and ination, whether the ECB responds to these movements, and if term
premia, in turn, respond to conventional monetary policy actions. For this purposes,
1Indeed, Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2014) demonstrate in a DSGE model with segmented
nancial markets and imperfect nancial intermediation that a negative response coe¢ cient in the
monetary policy rule on the term premium increases welfare modestly.
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I apply a macro-nance model of the term structure of interest rates based on Ireland
(2015) to the Euro area.
The recent period raises questions about the necessity to impose a non-negativity
constraint or lower-bound constraint on the short-term interest rate processes of the
model, usually known as the zero lower bound. While the results of Bauer and
Rudebusch (2015) stress the relevance of shadow rate models (a particular class of
term structure models that respects a lower bound for the short-term interest rate
process) for the US, the need for this kind of models for the Euro area is less obvious.
As argued by Christensen and Krogstrup (2014, 2016), bond yields in Europe (in
their example: German and Swiss bond yields) have actually been well below zero
for intermediate maturities and for extended periods in recent years. Hence, in
these cases, a standard Gaussian modeling approach appears to be fully warranted
(Christensen and Krogstrup, 2016, p.2 7). I follow their argumentation and do not
enforce a zero-lower bound.
For analyzing the yield curve, and especially term structure premia, macro-nance
models bring along several benets over pure nance term-structure models and
structural macro models. In contrast to pure nance models, macro-nance models
use a set of macroeconomic variables to span the yield curve and allow the macro
fundamentals to evolve jointly over time. The short-end of the yield curve, that
is, the short-term risk-free interest rate is under the control of the central bank.
Using information of the state of the macroeconomy helps to model the short-term
interest rate process. Moreover, since term premia are not only time varying, but
are also di¤erent across bond maturities, exploiting all information available over
the entire yield curve helps to identify the term premium and thus to separate the
term premium component from the expectation component of long-term yields. In
contrast to structural macro models, macro-nance models do not impose strong
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theoretical assumptions on how macroeconomic developments a¤ect term premia
and term premia, in turn, a¤ect the economy, but use a more exible time-series
approach, as discussed by Ireland (2015, p. 125). This is in particular appealing
because of the conicting evidence of the e¤ects of movements in term premia on the
economy from previous empirical studies.
In order to model the dynamics of yields consistently over the yield curve, macro-
nance models of the term structure of interest rates employ cross-equation restric-
tions. Based on Du¢ e and Kan (1996), these cross-equation restrictions arise from
the assumption of the absence of arbitrage opportunities in bond markets. The
precise specication of the term structure part of the model follows Dewachter and
Iania (2011), Dewachter et al. (2014), and Ireland (2015): In order to evaluate the
interplay of term premia movements, monetary policy, and the economy, a latent
risk variable that captures term premia movements is employed. In the spirit of
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005, 2008), the risk variable is constructed to be the only
force that drives the one-period expected excess holding return (the one period-return
premium) and is integrated into the state-space system. The dynamics of the state
variables are modeled as a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The risk
variable responds to all state variables and exhibits an autonomous dynamic. Thus,
the yield curve is not fully spanned by observable macro factors as suggested by
Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2014). Moreover, while Dewachter and Iania (2011)
and Dewachter et al. (2014) does not allow term premia to a¤ect the economy, follow-
ing Ireland (2015), the model allows for feedbacks from term premia movements to
the economy. Identication of the structural shocks of the state equations is achieved
by imposing restrictions on the contemporaneous relation among the variables of the
state equation. The estimation of the model is carried out by Bayesian estimation
techniques. The likelihood function is constructed using the Kalman lter. The
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posterior is evaluated using an Adaptive Metropolis (AM) algorithm in the lines of
Haario et al. (2001).
My results reveal a strong interaction among term premia, monetary policy, and
the economy. In line with the practitioner view, I nd that a rise in term premia
is associated with a drop in the output gap and in ination. The ECB lowers the
short-term interest rate in response to an increase in term premia. Thus, during
the sample period, the ECB mitigates the e¤ect of a rise in the term premium on
the yield curve by lowering the short-end of the yield curve. However, I nd only
negligible e¤ects of conventional monetary policy on term premia in turn.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section serves a
literature overview of the e¤ects of term premia movements on output. Section (3.3)
explains the macro-nance model and discusses the decomposition of the yield curve
into the expectation part and term premia part. Section (3.4) casts the model into
the state-space system, describes the data, and discusses the estimation procedure
and the prior distribution. Section (3.5) presents and discusses the results of the
estimation. The last section concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
This section covers a literature overview of the empirical results and the theoretical
consideration of the e¤ects of term premia movements on output.
In standard linearized New-Keynesian models, term premia do simply not exist.
Log-linearization eliminates higher order terms like term premia by construction. In
order to analyze term premia in a DSGE framework, limits-to-arbitrage or non-linear
setups are required. Rudebusch et al. (2007) show that a non-linear New-Keynesian
model with habit formation produces time-varying term premia which respond to
the state of the economy. They emphasize that the relationship between the term
premium and the output gap depends on the kind of the underlying distortion. How-
ever, their model does not o¤er a feedback from the term premium to the economy.
Andrés et al. (2004) use a New-Keynesian model with imperfect substitutability
between di¤erent nancial assets and segmented asset markets to analyze the e¤ect
of long-term yields on aggregate demand and supply. They demonstrate that an
increase in term premia dampens economic activity. Chen et al. (2012) estimate
a linearized DSGE model with segmented nancial markets and limits to arbitrage.
They evaluate the e¤ects of Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) on the economy
where the e¤ects are transmitted by a drop in the term premium of long-term gov-
ernment bonds. Though the decrease in term premia works to stimulate economy
activity, their results suggest that the e¤ects are only moderate. Similarly, Kiley
(2012) estimates a model with segmented markets and limits-to-arbitrage using not
only government long-term bond yields but also private long-term bond yields. His
results also suggest that a decline in the term premium has positive but moderate
e¤ects on aggregate spending.
Using less structural approaches, either macro-nance models or reduced form
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regressions, a broad empirical literature analyzes the e¤ect of changes of term premia
on the economy. The following passages summarize their ndings.
Hamilton and Kim (2002) use a regression to investigate the e¤ects of the short-
long term yield spread on GDP growth. They were the rst who decompose the
yield spread into an expectation part and a term premium part in order to evaluate
the e¤ects of both components of the spread on GDP growth separately. Using
ex-post observed short rates as instruments for ex-ante expected rates to isolate
the expectation part, they nd that a decline in premia is associated with slower
future GDP growth, contradicting the practitioner view. Also, Favero, Kaminska,
and Söderström (2005) nd that a lower term premium predicts slower future GDP
growth. They decompose the yield spread similar to Hamilton and Kim (2002) but
use an estimated real-time VAR to predict the expectations of future short-term
rates. Wright (2006) investigates whether the return forecast factor of Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005) - a linear combination of the spot rate and four forward rates - helps
to forecast recessions. He documents that lower term premia raise the odds of a
recession.
In contrast to these results, Ang et al. (2006) nd that changes in the term
premium do not a¤ect output growth. They run a regression of output growth on the
term premium and expected future short rates, where the premium and the expected
future short rates are computed from the estimates of a VAR with long-term rates,
GDP growth, and the short-term interest rate. Also Rosenberg and Maurer (2007)
nd that the term premium has no predictive power for future GDP growth. They
decompose the yield spread as in Hamilton and Kim (2002) and use both components
in a recession forecasting model. In their estimation, the term premium is measured
by the Kim-Wright (2005) term premium measure - the estimated term premium
from a no-arbitrage dynamic latent 3-factor model. Dewachter et al. (2014) use
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a macro-nance model of the term structure where a latent variable captures all
movement in the one-period expected excess holding return (the return premium).
After estimating the macro-nance model, they use the time path of the latent
variable in a regression on future GDP growth. They nd that the term premium
has no predictive power for future output growth.
However, in line with the practitioner view, Rudebusch et al. (2007) nd that a
decline in the term premium is associated with higher positive GDP growth. Using
the Kim-Wright term premium measure, they decompose the term spread in order to
perform a regression of GDP growth on changes in the term premium. Also, Jardet,
Montfort, and Pegoraro (2013) and Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2014) nd both
that a rise in the term premium lowers GDP growth in the short run, but has positive
e¤ects on GDP growth for longer horizons. While the former use a macro-nance
near-cointegrated VAR(p) term structure model, the latter employ a macro-nance
model with imperfect correlated macro risk to explore the sources of variations in
expected excess returns on bonds and the e¤ects of term premium shocks on GDP
growth and ination. Recently, using a macro-nance model of the term structure,
Ireland (2015) nd that a rise in the term premium leads to a drop in output.
The aforementioned results show that the ndings on the e¤ects of term premia
movements on output are rather mixed, depending on the used framework and on
how term premia are identied. In view of the unambiguous nding of the literature,
the identication of term premia, that is the separation of the term premium from
the expectation of future short-term interest rates, and how the expected future
becomes even more relevant. Although the estimation of macro-nance models is
computationally more challenging than the estimation of regression models, it comes
along with benets. As discussed in the last section, by tying yields together by
no-arbitrage assumption, the model uses information over the whole cross-section
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of yields. Employing these information helps to separate the term premium part
from the expectation part in bond yields. Based on Dewachter and Iania (2011),
Dewachter et al. (2014), and Ireland (2015), I employ a single latent variable that
captures movements term premia. Specically, by restrictions on the pricing kernel,
this risk variable is identied to be the only source of variation in the prices of risk.
Departing from Dewachter and Iania (2011), Dewachter et al. (2014), and following
Ireland (2015), the risk variable is explicitly allowed to a¤ect the dynamic of the
economy.
In the following, I use a macro-nance model in the lines of Ireland (2015) to
evaluate the interplay of term premia, monetary policy, and the economy.
3.3 The Model
In this section, the macro-nance model is presented. It is a joint model of the
macroeconomy and the term structure as introduced into the macro-nance literature
by Ang and Piazzesi (2003). The structure of the macro part of the model follows
closely Ireland (2015). The term structure is modeled by an a¢ ne no-arbitrage model
of the term structure as developed by Du¢ e and Kan (1996) and Dai and Singleton
(2000). Motivated by the evidence of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) that one single
factor accounts for most of the movements in expected excess holding returns, a
latent variable that captures all movements in the one-period return premium is
introduced. By restricting the prices of risk, this variable is constructed to be the
only potential source for time variation in the market prices of risk and thus for
movements in term premia. The specication of the term structure model follows
Dewachter and Iania (2011), Dewachter et al. (2014) and Ireland (2015).
The model section is structured as follows. The rst part describes the structural
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macroeconomic dynamics and casts the macro model into its state representation.
The state variables are then used as pricing factors in the term structure model.
Cross-equation restrictions, based on the assumption of no-arbitrage, are employed
to tie the movements of yields closely together. Finally, di¤erent notion of the term
structure premium - the yield and the return premium - are discussed and related to
the latent risk variable.
3.3.1 The Macro Part
The macroeconomic dynamics are described by ve state variables, three of them are
observable - the nominal short-term interest rate rt, the ination rate t, and the
output gap gyt - and two variables are unobservable, a risk variable vt and the central
banks ination target t . Following Ireland (2015), the short-term interest rate and
the ination rate do not enter the state equation directly but in form of the interest
rate gap and the ination gap, respectively. Specically, the interest rate gap grt is
dened as the deviation of the interest rate from the ination target, grt  rt   t ,
and the ination gap gt is dened as the deviation of the ination rate from central
banks ination target, gt  t   t .
Monetary policy consists of choosing an ination target and setting the short-
term nominal interest rate. Precisely, the short-term interest rate is assumed to
follow an interest rate rule in the spirit of Taylor (1993),
grt   gr = r
 
grt 1   gr

+ (1  r)

g

t + y (g
y
t   gy) + vvt

+ r"rt; (3.1)
where r 2 [0; 1] is the interest rate smoothing parameter,  > 0 is the central
banks response parameters on ination, y > 0 is the response parameters on the
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output gap, v is the response parameter on the variation of the risk variable, r > 0
is a volatility parameter, and gr and gy are the steady state values of grt and g
y
t ,
respectively. The shock "rt is supposed to be standard normally distributed and
represents the interest rate policy shock. The specication of the interest rate rule
incorporates the assumption that the steady state value of the ination gap is zero.
Thus, it is assumed that in the steady state the actual ination rate equals the central
banks target rate. While  and y are restricted to be non-negative, the sign of the
parameter of the risk variable v is not constrained. A positive value of v implies
that the central bank tightens monetary policy in response to a rise in term premia.
Goodfriend (1993) and McCallum (2005) argue that this should be the case if the
central bank regards an increase in premia as an indicator of ination scaresor as
an indicator of policy laxity.2 In contrast, the practitionerview, as labeled and
discussed by Rudebusch et al. (2007), states that monetary policy should response
to term premia by adjusting the policy rate in the opposite direction to the change in
term premia. Specically, as noted by Bernanke (2006), to the extent that aggregate
demand depends also on long-term interest rates, a rise in the term premium requires
the central bank to lower the short-term interest rate in order to o¤set the e¤ects
of the decline in premia and to retain the economic condition, all else being equal.
Thus, the coe¢ cient v should be negative. Apparently, if v is zero, the central
bank does not react at all to changes in the term structure premium.
The incorporation of an unobservable time-varying ination target is a common
approach in the recent macro-nance term structure literature (as in e.g. Dewachter
2To be precise, McCallum (2005) suggests that the central bank should tighten monetary policy
if the interest rate spread between long-term bond yields and the short-term rate increases, given
that the expectation hypothesis holds and that the premium follows an AR(1) process. A rise in the
long-short rate spread might be due to two reasons: an increase in future expected short rates or
an increase in the term structure premium. In McCallums (2005) specication of the interest rate
rule, the central bank reacts on the long-short spread, and with it, in general, on the uctuation in
the term premium. However, the cause for the rise in the spread is not identied.
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and Lyrio, 2006, Hördahl et al., 2006, Rudebusch and Wu, 2008, or Hördahl and
Tristani, 2012). It allows, on the one hand, for some variation in the conduction
of monetary policy, and it helps, on the other hand, to capture movements in long-
term nominal government bond yields which arise due to changes in central banks
ination target. In fact, Barr and Campbell (1997) for the UK and Gürkaynak et al.
(2005) for the US nd that movements in long-term interest rates occur mainly due
to changes in expected ination. Also Hördahl et al. (2006), using a macro-nance
term structure model with German data, nd that changes in the perceived ination
target tend to have a stronger impact on long-term yields than policy rate shocks,
ination shocks, or output shocks. The ination target t is supposed to follow a
rst-order autoregressive process (AR(1)),
t = (1  )  + t 1 + "t; (3.2)
where  is the steady state level of the ination target,  2 [0; 1),  > 0 and the
shock "t is standard normally distributed. As in Hördahl et al. (2006), Rudebusch
and Wu (2008), Hördahl and Tristani (2012), or Ireland (2015), this restriction is
imposed to ensure stationarity of the ination target process. A non-stationary
ination target leads to non-stationary ination and non-stationary nominal short-
term interest rate (see e.g. Ireland, 2015). As shown by Campbell et al. (1997,
p. 433) or Spencer (2008) for models with homoscedastic shocks, a unit root in
the nominal short-term interest rate translates in undened asymptotic long-term
bond yields. Thus, the assumption of the stationarity of the ination target process
ensures that the term structure part of the model is well-behaved.
Similar to Ireland (2015), the dynamics of the remaining three state variables
are modeled as in more conventional structural VAR models. The ination gap, the
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output gap, and the risk variable are linear functions of their own lags, the lags of
all other state variables, their own innovations, and potentially of the innovations
of the other state variables. This specication allows for a fairly high degree of
exibility while restrictions on the contemporaneous relationship of these variables
ensure identication of the structural model.
Specically, the output gap is supposed to depend on own lags, on lags of the
interest rate gap, of the ination gap, and of the risk variable, and on the innovations
of ination "t, of the ination target "?t, and on its own innovations "yt,
gyt   gy =
3X
i=1
iyr
 
grt i   gr

+
3X
i=1
iyg

t i +
3X
i=1
iyy
 
gyt i   gy

(3.3)
+yvvt 1 + y"t + y??"?t + y"yt;
where the volatility parameters y and  are assumed to be non-negative, and "yt
and "t are both standard normally distributed. The ination gap is assumed to
depend on own lags, on lags of the interest rate gap, of the output gap, and of the
risk variable and on innovations of the ination target "?t and on its own innovations
"t,
gt =
3X
i=1
ir
 
grt i   gr

+
3X
i=1
ig

t i +
3X
i=1
iy
 
gyt i   gy

(3.4)
+vvt 1 + ??"?t + "t;
where the volatility parameter  is non-negative and "t is standard normally dis-
tributed. Finally, similar to Bekaert et al. (2013) and Ireland (2015), the risk variable
is supposed to respond contemporaneously on all distortions of the economy, as bond
prices do. Specically, the risk variable depends on its own lags and lags of all others
state variables and on its own innovations "vt and additionally all innovations in all
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other state variables,
vt = vr
 
grt 1   gr

+ vg

t 1 + vy
 
gyt 1   gy

+ v?
 
?t 1   ?

(3.5)
+vvvt 1 + vrr"rt + v"t + vyy"yt + v??"?t + v"vt;
where the volatility parameter v is non-negative, and "vt is standard normally dis-
tributed.
The chosen structure imposes restrictions in order to identify structural shocks.
Based on Ireland (2015), shocks to the ination target "t a¤ect the interest rate
gap, the ination gap, the output gap, and the risk variable only contemporaneously.
Thus, Irelands (2015) specication implies that all further e¤ects of uctuations
in the central banks ination target a¤ect the economy only if the change in the
ination gap and interest rate gap are not fully o¤set by a proportional adjustment of
the interest rate and the ination rate. This specication imposes a form of long-run
monetary neutrality. Moreover, as in Ireland (2015), the preceding equations impose
exclusion restrictions on the contemporaneous relationship of the models variables in
order to identify structural shocks. In order to separate the e¤ects of the short-term
interest rate and term premia movements on output and ination from the e¤ects of
ination and output on the short-term interest rate and term premia, it is assumed
that neither risk variable shocks nor short-term interest rate shocks do a¤ect output
and ination in the same period but only with one period lag. In contrast, the short-
term interest rate and the risk variable respond to shocks to the ination gap and
the output gap instantly. Moreover, output gap shocks do not a¤ect the ination
gap in the same period. Finally, the risk variable depends on all structural shocks.
Dene the vectors Xt and "t containing the state variables and the innovations
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by
Xt =

grt g
r
t 1 g
r
t 2 g

t g

t 1 g

t 2 g
y
t g
y
t 1 g
y
t 2 
?
t vt
0
;
and
"t =

"rt 0 0 "t 0 0 "yt 0 0 "?t "vt
0
;
then eq. (3.1) - (3.5) can be expressed by
P0Xt = 0 + P1Xt 1 + 0"t: (3.6)
For the specic form of the matrices P0, P1, 0, and 0 see Appendix (3.A.1). Eq.
(3.6) gives the structural form of the model. Multiplying by P 10 yields the reduced
form representation of the state equation,
Xt = + PXt 1 + "t; (3.7)
where
 = P 10 0;
P = P 10 P1;
and
 = P 10 0:
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3.3.2 The Term Structure Model
A¢ ne term structure models, as developed by Du¢ e and Kan (1996) and Dai and
Singleton (2000), are a particular class of term structure models.3 In a¢ ne term
structure models, the time t yield y()t of  period zero coupon bond is modeled as
an a¢ ne function of the state vector Xt ,
y
()
t = A +B
0
Xt;
where both coe¢ cients A and B depend on the maturity  . Though yields are
linear a¢ ne in the state vector Xt, A and B
0
 are highly non-linear functions of
underlying parameters of the state equation and the prices of risk. The particular
functional form of these coe¢ cients is derived from cross-equation restrictions, which
in turn stem from the assumption of the absence of arbitrage opportunities. These
restrictions tie the movements of yields closely together.
The outlined a¢ ne term structure model is similar to the one described in Ang
and Piazzesi (2003). However, in contrast to Ang and Piazzesi (2003), restrictions
are imposed on parameters contained in the matrix of prices of risk which permit
the risk variable vt to be the only source of uctuations in the prices of risk and
with it in the term premium. This subsection is structured as follows: the rst part
relates the short end of the yield curve to the state vector. The next part discusses
the pricing kernel which is used to price bonds. Finally, under the assumption of
no-arbitrage, the functional form of the a¢ ne yield curve representation is derived
and the solution for the coe¢ cients A and B is presented.
3More precisely, the discrete-time term structure model presented in this section belongs to
the class of essentially a¢ ne models of the term structure, as categorized by Du¤ee (2002), and
introduced by Gourieroux et al. (2002) in discrete time.
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Short rate equation
The short-term rate, and thus the short end of the yield curve, is from eq. (3.1) under
the control of the central bank. The short end of the yield curve can be modeled as
an a¢ ne function of the state vector Xt,
rt = 0 + 
0
1Xt; (3.8)
where 0 is a scalar, and 
0
1 is a 1x11 selection vector indicating the position of g
r
t
and  t in Xt. The coe¢ cients 0 and 1 are set to ensure consistency between the
macro part and the term structure part of the model. This requires 0 to be equal
to zero, 0 = 0, and

0
1 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

;
so that eq. (3.8) corresponds to the denition of the interest rate gap.
Pricing Kernel
The prices of government bonds are supposed to be arbitrage free. As shown in
Harrison and Kreps (1979) or in Du¢ e (2001, pp. 108) the assumption of the absence
of arbitrage guarantees for the existence of an equivalent martingale measureor
risk-neutral measureQ.4 Under the risk-neutral measure Q, the price P ()t of any
zero-coupon asset maturing in  periods satises
P
()
t = E
Q
t

exp ( rt)P ( 1)t+1

:
4Moreover, if markets are also complete, then this risk neutral probability measure is also unique
(Harrison and Kreps, 1979).
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Thus, pricing under the risk-neutral measure implies that the price of an asset is
given by the expected discounted future value of the asset, where the discounting
takes place with the risk-free short-term interest rate. If market participants are
risk-neutral, the risk-neutral probability measure coincides with the data generat-
ing measure H. However, in general, the risk-neutral probability measure does not
coincide with the data generating process (see Piazzesi, 2010, p. 697). The Radon-
Nikodym derivative, which is denoted in the following by t, t  dQ=dH, provides
the link between the risk-neutral measure Q and the data generating measure H (see
Du¢ e, 2001, p. 110). It is used to convert one probability measure into an equivalent
measure.5
The specication of the pricing kernel is in reduced form. Though it is not
explicitly derived from underlying preferences and is in particular not expressed in
terms of marginal utility, it is widely used in the nance and macro-nance literature
since it does match empirical properties fairly well (see Dai and Singleton, 2002). For
discrete time models, following Ang and Piazzesi (2003), the nominal pricing kernel
mt+1 is dened by
mt+1  exp ( rt) t+1
t
; (3.9)
and t is supposed to follow the log-normal process
t+1 = t exp

 1
2

0
tt   
0
t"t+1

; (3.10)
where t is an 11-dimensional vector of time-varying prices of risk. Combining eq.
5Given the existence of the risk-neutral measure, for any random variable with nite variance
the following holds:
EQt (Zt+1) =
Et
 
t+1Zt+1

t
;
where EQt () denotes the time t conditional expectations under Q, Et () the time t conditional
expectations under H, and where t is martingale (see Du¢ e, 2001, p. 168).
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(3.9) and (3.10) yields the pricing kernel,
mt+1 = exp

 rt   1
2

0
tt   
0
t"t+1

: (3.11)
The log-normal pricing kernel depends on the short-term interest rate, the structural
shocks and the prices of risk. The prices of risk drive the response of the long-term
government bond yields to macro, policy and risk shocks. If all elements in t are
equal to zero, pricing takes places under the risk-neutral probability measure.
The prices of risk are supposed to be a¢ ne functions of the state variables, taking
the functional form
t = 0 + 1Xt; (3.12)
where 0 is an 11  1 vector and 1 is an 11  11 matrix. For the market prices of
risk, I assume that only contemporaneous state variables are priced. The vector of
constants 0 is given by
0 =

r0 0 0 

0 0 0 
y
0 0 0 

0 
v
0
0
:
Note that the coe¢ cients in 0 and 1 do no vary over time. All uctuations in the
prices of risk t are caused by movements in the state variables in Xt. Evidence by
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005, 2008) indicates that one single factor accounts for a
large portion of variation in one-period return premia. In the spirit of this factor,
the risk variable vt is constructed to be the single source for time variation in the
prices of risk. Following Dewachter and Iania (2011), Dewachter et al. (2014), and
Ireland (2015) the identication of the risk variable is done by setting all elements
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in 1, except the last column, to be equal to zero,
1 =
266666666666666666666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 y
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 v
377777777777777777777777777777775
: (3.13)
From eq. (3.12) together with the restrictions in eq. (3.13) all movements in
the price of risk arise only from changes in the variable that is ordered as the last
element in the vector Xt, that is, the risk variable vt. As discussed in Section (3.3.3),
these restrictions work to attribute movements in term premia to changes in the risk
variable vt.
Bond Prices
Given the pricing kernel, the assumption of the absence of arbitrage opportunities
implies that under the data generating probability measure for any gross return Rt
of a nominal asset the following equation holds
Et (mt+1Rt+1) = 1: (3.14)
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Let P t denote the price of a default-free, zero-coupon bond maturing in  periods.
Then, eq. (3.14) implies that all zero-coupon bond prices can be computed recursively
by the no-arbitrage condition
P
()
t = Et

mt+1P
( 1)
t+1

: (3.15)
That is, the time t price of a  + 1-period zero-coupon bond equals the expected
discounted price of a  -period discount bond in period t + 1, where pricing occurs
under the data-generating measure using the stochastic discount factor mt+1.
Given this set-up, Ang and Piazzesi (2003) demonstrate that the price of a zero-
coupon bond P ()t maturing at time t +  can be written as an exponentially a¢ ne
function of the state vector Xt. Thus, the price of a bond maturing in  -periods is
P
()
t = exp
 
A + B
0
Xt

; (3.16)
where the coe¢ cients At and B can be computed recursively by the following ordi-
nary di¤erential equations (see Appendix (3.A.2))
A+1 = A + B
0
 (  0) +
1
2
B0
0 B   0; (3.17)
B0+1 = B
0
 (P   1)  01: (3.18)
Eq. (3.11), (3.15), and P 0t+1 = 1 together imply that the log discount bond price of
a bond maturing next period is given by log (P 1t ) =  rt . Consistency of eq. (3.8)
and (3.16) for  = 1, given log (P 1t ) =  rt, requires then that the initial condition
for A and B are given by: A1 = 0 = 0, and B01 =  01. The  -period zero-coupon
88
bond yield y()t is related to the bond price by
y
()
t =  
log

P
()
t


: (3.19)
Substituting eq. (3.16) into eq. (3.19), yields the a¢ ne yield curve representa-
tion with functional form
y
()
t = A +B
0
Xt: (3.20)
where A    A= and B    B= :
3.3.3 Term Structure Premia and the Expectation Hypoth-
esis
Term structure premia can be captured in di¤erent forms (see e.g. Cochrane and
Piazzesi, 2008, or Joslin et al., 2014). In the following, similar to Dewachter et al.
(2014), I will focus on the yield premium and the return premium. The denition
of these premia is based on Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008). The yield premium is
the most prominent form of the term premium and the one used by Ireland (2015).
It can be composed into the average of expected future return premia of declining
maturities. The one-period return premium, in turn, is only driven by the risk
variable vt. Before discussing both types of term structure premia, their relationship
to each other and their relation to the risk variable, I will review some relevant basic
relationships between holding period returns, excess holding returns and bond prices
(see e.g. Cochrane, 2005, or Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2008). The holding period return
hpr
()
t+1 is the return from buying a bond at time t that matures in t+  periods and
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selling this bond the period after. Formally, it is dened by
hpr
()
t+1  p( 1)t+1   p()t ; (3.21)
where p()t is the log price of a zero-coupon bond maturing in t +  periods, p
()
t 
log

P
()
t

. The excess holding period return (or short excess return) hprx()t+1 is the
return from buying a long term bond in period t and selling it in the subsequent
period in excess of the return from buying and holding a short term bond maturing
next period,
hprx
()
t+1  hpr()t+1   y(1)t : (3.22)
The yield of a  -period zero-coupon default-free long-term bond y()t can be de-
composed in an expectation part and a part which is denoted as the yield premium

()
t (see e.g. Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2008):
y
()
t =
1

Et
 
 1X
i=0
y
(1)
t+i
!
+ 
()
t : (3.23)
The expectation part consists of the average of expected future short rates over the
bonds residual maturity. Rearranging eq. (3.23) gives the denition of the yield
premium. Thus, the yield premium can be interpreted as the average expected
return from buying a  -period bond and holding this bond until maturity nanced
by a sequence of short-term debt. It is the compensation that a risk-averse investor
demands for holding a long-term bond instead of a sequence of short-term bonds.
Under the (pure) expectation hypothesis of the term structure, this premium is (zero)
constant.
The yield premium can be written as the average of expected future return premia
of declining maturity (as in Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2008, or Ludvigson and Ng, 2009;
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for a detailed derivation see Appendix (3.A.3)), where the respective return premium
is dened as the expected i+ 1-period excess return, Et
 
hprxt+i+1

,

()
t =
1

 1X
i=0
Et

hprx
( i)
t+i+1

; (3.24)
with
Et

hprx
( i)
t+i+1

= Et

hpr
( i)
t+i+1   y(1)t+i

:
Under the expectation hypothesis, these premia are constant but maturity specic.
Eq. (3.24) illustrates that the yield- and the return premium (subsumed under the
expression term structure premium) are not the same objects, but both are related
and can be derived from the other. While the yield premium reects the premium
in a bond yield over the full lifetime of the bond, the return premium reects the
per-period holding premium. Moreover, if return premia are zero or constant, also
the yield premium would be zero or constant.
In order to compute the yield and the return premium, the expectations of future
short rates and excess returns have to be calculated. Following Ireland (2015), the
expected value of the future short-term rate can be written as
Et
 
y1t+j

= Et (rt+j) = 
0
1Et (Xt+j) ;
given eq. (3.8). Now dene the unconditional expectation of the state vector by ,
  E (Xt), then, from eq. (3.7) one can write  = (I   P ) 1 . Subtracting  from
both sides of eq. (3.7) yields the (demeaned) state equation:
Xt+1    = P (Xt   ) + "t+1:
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Then, the time-t conditional expected future short rate for period t+ j, 8j > 0, can
be computed by
Et (rt+j) = 
0
1
 
I   0P j  + 01P jXt
By rearranging eq. (3.23), and using y()t = A + B
0
Xt the yield premium is given
by

()
t = A   01
"
I   1

 1X
j=0
P j
#
 +
"
B   01
1

 1X
j=0
P j
#
Xt:
Using  1j=0P
j = (I   P  ) (I   P ) 1, the yield premium can be expressed in a com-
putationally more convenient form (as in Ireland, 2015)

()
t = A   01

I   1

(I   P  ) (I   P ) 1

 (3.25)
+

B0   01
1

(I   P  ) (I   P ) 1

Xt:
The return premium can be calculated by plugging the model implied log prices,
p
()
t = A + B
0
Xt, into the denition of the i + 1-period return premium and rear-
ranging terms (see Appendix (3.A.4)),
Et

hprx
()
t+i+1

= B0 1

0 + 1
 
I   P i  + 1P iXt (3.26)
 1
2
B0 1
0 B 1
If i = 0, then eq. (3.26) is the one-period return premium. Precisely, the one-period
return premium of a bond with maturity  is given by
Et

hprx
()
t+1

= B0 1 (0 + 1Xt) 
1
2
B0 1
0 B 1: (3.27)
From the restrictions on the elements in 1 in eq. (3.13), eq. (3.27) reveals that
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all variation over time in one-period return premia arises solely from uctuations in
vt for all bond maturities. In contrast, to the extent that the risk variable is not
zero over time, the yield premium is a¤ected by all state variables if  > 1. To see
this, recall that the yield premium can be written as the average of expected future
return premia of declining maturity. Since the i-period return premium, in general,
depends on all state variables, from eq. (3.24) also the yield premium depends on
all state variables if  > 1.
Finally, if all elements in the matrix 1 are equal to zero, then the one-period
return premium and the yield premium are constant. In this case, in eq. (3.27)
the term 1Xt disappears, eliminating all time variation in the one-period return
premium. Similar, as shown by Ireland (2015), if 1 = 011x11, eq. (3.18) is given by
to
B0 = 
0
1
1

(I   P  ) (I   P ) 1 :
Plugging B0 in eq. (3.25) conrms that 
()
t is constant if all elements in the matrix
1 are equal to zero. The discussion of the di¤erent types of term premia completes
the model section.
3.4 Estimation
The rst part of this section discusses the data set that is used for the estimation
of the model. The next part presents the state-space system. Then the estimation
method is discussed. The last part presents and discusses the choice of the prior
distributions for the parameters.
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3.4.1 Data
I include Euro area data from September 2004 to April 2014 in my sample. The data
set contains macro data and yield data. The data is taken from the Bundesbank and
the ECB. The macroeconomic variables are the ination rate, the output gap, and
the nominal short-term interest rate. The nancial variables are the yields from an
index of risk-free zero-coupon treasury bonds of European countries with maturities
of 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months. The yield data is only available from the ECB
since Fall 2004, restricting e¤ectively the size of the available sample. Due to the
short sample size of the dataset - roughly ten years - I use monthly data. This
compromises between the high-frequency yield data and the lower frequency macro
data. The sample space covers 116 observations per time series. Moreover, data for
the risk-free short-term interest rate - the OIS rate for the Eurozone - is only available
since mid-2005. During the estimation, the yield data from Fall 2004 until June 2005
are treated as missing observations. The time path of the missing observations is
constructed by the Kalman lter.
The output gap variable is dened as the percentage (logarithmic) deviation of
actual output from trend output. Since GDP data is only available on a quarterly
frequency, I use the seasonally adjusted industrial production index of the Euro area
(Euro area 18, xed composition) as a proxy for output (as e.g. in Ang and Piazzesi,
2003, Clarida et al., 1998, or Favero, 2006). Trend output is constructed by using a
linear-quadratic trend (as in Clarida et al., 1998, or Hördahl, 2008). The ination
rate is measured by the annual rate of change of the seasonally adjusted HICP of
the Euro area in percentage. For the risk-free zero-coupon yield data, an index of
government bonds of countries from the euro area is used. The government bond
index consists of all countries of the euro area that are AAA rated. All yields are
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continuously compounded. The yield data is taken from the ECB. The yield index
of risk-free zero-coupon treasury bonds is not available for bonds with one-month
residual maturity. To overcome this shortcoming, the risk-free nominal short-term
interest rate is proxied by the Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) rate. The OIS rate
is an interest rate swap with a oating rate indexed to an overnight interbank rate.
In the case of the Euro area, this overnight interbank rate is the EONIA. It had
become, in particular for the euro area, a lately widely used measure of the risk-
free rate (among others by Borgy et al. 2012, Dewachter et al., 2015, Dubeq et al.,
2016, Filipovi´c and Trolle, 2013, Finlay and Chambers, 2009, or Joyce et al., 2011),
rather than inter-bank rates like the EONIA.6 The OIS rate data is taken from the
Bundesbank.
Table (3.1) provides some summary statistics of the data for the macroeconomic
variables and the yield data. The sample average of ination is around the ECBs
announced ination target of 2 percent. By construction, the mean of the output
gap is equal to zero. All macroeconomic variables are persistent, reected by high
rst- to third-order autocorrelation. The summary statistics of the yields conrm
that the employed yield data are line with stylized facts of yield curves7 (though the
sample space covers the nancial crisis): First, the average yield curve is upward
sloping. Thus, the longer the residual maturity of a government bond, the higher
are yields. Second, the term structure of volatility of yields is downward sloping.
The standard deviation of yields declines with maturity. Third, yields are highly
autocorrelated. The rst- to third-order sample autocorrelations are not below 0:94.
Fourth, yields move closely together. The correlation between yields of treasury
6Euro area inter-bank rates, which are on unsecured interbank lending, are quite likely to com-
promise a certain amount of premia for credit risks, in particular, since the onset of the nancial
crisis in 2007. In contrast, netting and credit enhancement mechanisms of in swap contracts seem
to work, also in times of nancial turmoil, to mitigate counterparty risk (see Bomm, 2003).
7See for example Ang and Piazzesi, 2003, Campbell, 1995, or Hördahl, Tristani, and Vestin,
2008.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Data Statistics
Obs.: Moments Autocorrelation
116* Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis 1. Lag 2. Lag 3. Lag
t 1:9619 0:9031  0:5073 3:4419 0:9591 0:8970 0:8101
gyt 0 4:9900  0:5449 3:2642 0:9700 0:9281 0:8643
rt 1:5976 1:5223 0:5976 1:7124 0:9938 0:9791 0:9579
y12t 1:6825 1:4942 0:4331 1:6909 0:9918 0:9761 0:9547
y24t 1:8873 1:4262 0:2816 1:7316 0:9892 0:9722 0:9511
y36t 2:1010 1:3350 0:1095 1:7670 0:9877 0:9705 0:9497
y48t 2:3142 1:2431  0:0487 1:8122 0:9862 0:9690 0:9487
y60t 2:5185 1:1566  0:1835 1:8681 0:9843 0:9666 0:9468
Source: Yield data, industrial production and ination: ECB; OIS rate: Bundes-
bank. The yields are annual zero-coupon bond yields. Ination is calculated as the
percentage year-to-year change of the HICP of the Eurozone. Output is measured
by industrial production and the output gap is dened as the deviation of actual
output from its trend.
* For the OIS rate, the sample period is 2005:07 to 2014:04, covering 106 observations
in total.
bonds with a maturity of 12 and yields of treasuries with a maturity of 36 months
is equal to 0:9769 (not displayed in the table) and the correlation between yields of
treasury bonds with a maturity of 60 months and yields of treasuries with a maturity
of 60 months is equal to 0:9880.
3.4.2 The State-Space System
The macro part and the a¢ ne term structure model form a state-space system. The
state equation, given by eq. (3.7), describes the dynamic of the state variables, while
the observables - output gap, ination, the short-term interest, and the long-term
government bond yields - are linked to the state vector by measurement equations.
For the estimation, a version of the state-space model without constant terms
is employed. By dropping the constant terms appearing in eq. (3.7) and (3.20)
and using demeaned data the estimation is simplied. Precisely, following Ireland
(2015), under the assumption that the central bank is able - on average - to implement
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its target ination rate, so that the average of the actual ination rate equals the
average target ination rate, the steady state values of gr,  and gy can be calibrated
to match the data averages of the short-term interest rate, the output gap and
ination. Moreover, as demonstrated in Ireland (2015), the values of the elements
in 0 can be calibrated so that the steady state values of yields match the average
yields. Thus, the state-space system is given by
Xt = PXt 1 + "t; (3.28)
Zt = UXt + V t; (3.29)
where the vector Zt containing the eight observables is dened by
Zt 

rt t g
y
t y
12
t y
24
t y
36
t y
48
t y
60
t
0
;
the matrix U is specied by
U =
26666666666666666666664
Ur
U
Uy
B012
B024
B036
B048
B060
37777777777777777777775
;
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with
Ur =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

;
U =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

;
Uy =

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

;
the vector B0n, n = f12; 24; 36; 48; 60g, is determined by eq. (3.18), given the
denition B    B= and for given starting values B01 =  01, and the matrix
V contains the volatility parameters of the measurement errors t. These errors
are attached in order to avoid stochastic singularity. The problem of stochastic
singularity arises in this type of models because numerous yield data are observed,
but only a few structural shocks of potentially also observable state variables are
used, so that the number of observable variables exceeds the number of shocks.
Noise or measurement errors are added in order to give the model the ability to t
the high dimensional data vector with a lower dimensional state vector. Two di¤erent
assumptions on the nature of these measurement errors are commonly drawn: Either
only some yields are measured with errors (as e.g. in Ang and Piazzesi, 2003, or
Ireland, 2015) or all yields are measured with errors (as e.g. in Ang et al., 2007,
or Chib and Ergashev, 2009). Following, Chib and Ergashev (2009), I will treat all
yields (except the policy rate) as measured with errors.8 Specically, the matrix V
8As discussed in Piazzesi (2010, p. 726), supposing that only a certain number of yields - that
is, the required number of shocks that needs to be added in order to avoid stochastic singularity -
is observed with errors seems to be arbitrary for the particular choice of which yields are observed
with error and which not. Data entry mistakes and interpolation methods for construction the
zero-coupon yield date might lead to errors that should potentially a¤ect all yields. Thus, if some
yields are measured with errors the assumption that possibly all yields are observed with errors
seems to be plausible. See Piazzesi (2010, pp. 726) for a more detailed discussion of noise- or
measurement errors in the context of a¢ ne term structure models.
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is given by
V =
26666666666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0
0 24 0 0 0
0 0 36 0 0
0 0 0 48 0
0 0 0 0 60
37777777777777777777775
with 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 > 0 and the vector of the corresponding measurement
errors t is given by
t =

12t 
24
t 
36
t 
48
t 
60
t
0
:
These zero-mean measurement errors are supposed to be standard normally distrib-
uted.
3.4.3 Estimation Method
To estimate the state-space model, I apply Bayesian estimation techniques. As of-
ten noted in the literature, even the estimation of pure latent a¢ ne term structure
models is computationally challenging and time-consuming (see e.g. Chib and Erga-
shev, 2009, or Christensen et al., 2011). Adding the macro-dynamics enhances these
di¢ culties due to the complexity of the macroeconomic interactions with the term
structure and vice versa (Rudebusch and Wu, 2008). The parameters in the B()
matrices of the observation equations are highly non-linear functions of the under-
lying parameters of the state equations and the prices of risk. This non-linearity,
as demonstrated by Chib and Ergashev (2009), can produce multimodal likelihood
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functions. Applying Bayesian estimation techniques allow employing a priori infor-
mation which helps to down-weight regions of the parameter space which are not
economically reasonable and to rule out economically implausible parameter values.
As a result, the posterior distribution can be smoother than the likelihood function
(see Chib and Ergashev, 2009). Moreover, the usage of prior information is helpful
when dealing with short data sets.
Posterior and Likelihood Function
Formally, let Z denotes the data set, Z = (Z1; :::; ZT )
0, where T is the number of
total observations, and let  denotes the vector of all parameters contained in the
matrices P , , , and V , then from Bayesrule, the joint posterior distribution of
,  (jX), is obtained by combining the likelihood function of the observables, the
prior distribution of the parameter vector, and a norming constant. Thus,
 (jZ) / L (Zj) p () ;
where L (Zj) is the likelihood function, and p () is the prior distribution. Denote
by Zt 1 all available information of the observable variables at time t   1, Zt 1 
(Z1; :::; Zt 1)
0. If the initial state X0 and the innovations f"t; tgTt=1 are multivariate
Gaussians, then the conditional distribution of the observables Zt on Zt 1 is also
Gaussian (see Hamilton, 1994, p. 385)
ZtjZt 1 s N
 
UXtjt 1; Rtjt 1

;
100
where Xtjt 1 denotes the one step ahead forecast, Xtjt 1  E [XtjZt 1; ], and Rtjt 1
denotes the conditional variance, Rtjt 1  V ar (ZtjZt 1; ).9 Hence, the joint density
of the date set Z given  can be written as
L (Zj) =
TY
t=1
(2) 
T
2

det
 
Rtjt 1
  1
2
 exp

 1
2
 
Zt   UXtjt 1
0  
Rtjr 1
 1  
Zt   UXtjt 1

:
Since two of the state variables are latent, the likelihood L (Zj) is constructed
using the standard Kalman lter recursions (see Harvey, 1991). At the start of the
recursions, the initial matrix of the variance of the forecast errors is set equal to the
unconditional variance of the state variables.
Since the posterior density is, in general, not known in closed form, I apply
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods (the Adaptive-Metropolis algorithm)
in order to simulate draws from the joint posterior distribution.
MCMC Method
The choice of the proposal density of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is crucial for
the speed of the convergence of the chain. The scaling of the posterior distribution is
often done by trial and error. But not only is the scaling of the proposal density by
handin general time-consuming, improving the proposal distribution manually also
becomes very di¢ cult, if not infeasible, in high-dimensional problems (see Rosenthal,
2011, p. 95). Therefore, I employ the Adaptive Metropolis (AM) algorithm as
introduced by Haario et al. (2001) to evaluate the posterior. The main idea of the
AM algorithm is to run a chain that alters its own proposal distribution by using all
9See Appendix (3.A.5) for the explicit expressions of the prediction and updating equations of
the mean and the variance.
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information about the posterior cumulated so far. Thus, the algorithm improves on
the y. Precisely, the covariance of the proposal distribution is updated each step
using all available information. Apart from the updating scheme, the algorithm is
identical to the standard random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Due to the
adaptive nature of the algorithm, it is non-Markovian, but Haario et al. (2001) show
that it still has the correct ergodic properties.
Let 0, ..., j 1, denote the sampled parameters until j   1 iterations, where 0
is the initial set of parameters. I follow Haario et al. (2001) and let the proposal
distribution, denoted by q (j0; :::; j 1), be a multivariate Gaussian distribution with
mean at the current value of the parameter vector j 1 and a covariance matrix
Ct. The algorithm starts with a pre-specied strictly positive proposal distribution
covariance C0. After an initial period n0 the adaption takes place by updating the
covariance of the proposal distribution according to Cj = sdCov (0; :::j) + sd"Id,
where sd is a parameter that depends only on the dimension d of the parameter
vector  and " > 0 is a (very small) constant employed to prevent Cj from becoming
singular. In practice, the calculation of the covariance Cj is simplied using the
following recursion formula (see Haario et al., 2001):
Cj+1 =
j   1
j
Cj +
sd
j

j 1
0
j 1   (j + 1) j
0
j + j
0
j + "Id

:
Precisely, the AM algorithm is given by the following steps:
1. Set the number of total iterations n and specify the initial period n0 (n0 < n) after
which the adaption starts. Chose an (arbitrary) positive denite initial covari-
ance matrix C0 and specify the initial parameter vector 0. Set Cj = C0 and
j 1 = 0.
2. Draw a candidate j from q (jj 1; Cj)
102
3. Compute 
 
j ; j 1

= min

1;
(j j)
(j 1j)

:
4. Set j = 

j with probability 
 
j ; j 1

and set j = j 1 with probability 1  
 
j ; j 1

:
5. Update Cj+1 =
8><>: C0; j  n0sdCov (0; :::j) + sd"I; j > n0 :
6. Repeat step 2-5 until j = n.
Haario et al. (2001) note that the choice of an appropriate initial covariance C0
helps to speed up the algorithm and thus to increase e¢ ciency. Therefore, I use a
scaled down version of the inverse of the Hessian matrix computed at the posterior
mode for the initial covariance matrix. The initial parameter vector is set to the
parameter values at the mode. For the choice of the scaling parameter sd, I follow
Haario et al. (2001), whose choice, in turn, is based on Gelman et al. (1996), and
set sd = (2:4)
2 =d. The initial period is set to n0 = 20; 000 and the number of draws
is set to n = 1; 000; 000.
As noted by Chib and Ergashev (2009), the mode of the posterior can in general
not be found using Newton-like optimization methods. Therefore, I employ the
Covariance Matrix Adaption Evolution Strategy (CMA-ES) algorithm. The CMA-
ES is a stochastic method for numerical parameter optimization of non-linear, non-
convex functions with many local optima. It belongs to the class of evolutionary
optimization algorithms (see Hansen and Ostermeier, 2001). The computation of
the mode is conducted by the software package Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011).
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3.4.4 Parameter Restrictions and Prior Distributions
Parameter Restrictions
In addition to restrictions on the interest rate rule parameters and on the parameter
of the ination target process (the non-negativity restrictions of y and , and the
restriction that r and  2 [0; 1), during the estimation the following restrictions
are imposed.
To ensure the stationarity of the state equation, the eigenvalues of P are con-
strained to be less than unity in absolute value, jeig (P )j < 1. Likewise, a similar
eigenvalue restrictions need to be imposed in order to ensure the stability of the
no-arbitrage recursions (see Dai and Singleton, 2000). Specically, the eigenvalues of
P  1 are constrained to be less than unity in absolute value, jeig (P   1)j < 1.
For identication, the parameter v of the latent variable needs to be normalized. As
well known in the literature of latent factor models (e.g. Dai and Singleton, 2000),
multiplicative transformations of the latent factor lead to observationally equiva-
lent systems. In order to x the scale of the latent variable, v = 0:01 is imposed.
Additionally, the direction in which an increase in the risk variable vt moves term
structure premia needs to be pinned down. Following Ireland (2015), without loss of
generality, the constraint   0 is imposed during the estimation. Finally, similar
to Dewachter et al. (2014) and Ireland (2015), to restrict vt from being itself a source
of priced risk, the constraint v = 0 is imposed.
After imposing these restrictions, there are 50 parameters left to estimate in
eq. (3.28) - (3.29). The next sub-section presents the prior distributions for these
parameters.
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Table 3.2: Summary of the Prior Distributions
Taylor Rule
Parameter Type Mean S. D. Parameter Type Mean S. D.
r B 0.80 0.05  G 1.500 0.250
v N 0.00 0.250 y G 0.500 0.15
Macro Part
Parameter Type Mean S. D. Parameter Type Mean S. D.
1r N -0.20 0.150 2y N 0.00 0.075
2r N 0.00 0.075 3y N 0.00 0.050
3r N 0.00 0.050 1yy N 0.90 0.150
1 N 0.90 0.150 2yy N 0.00 0.075
2 N 0.00 0.075 3yy N 0.00 0.050
3 N 0.00 0.050 v N 0.00 0.150
1y N 0.00 0.150 vv N 0.90 0.150
2y N 0.00 0.075 vy N 0.00 0.150
3y N 0.00 0.050 vr N 0.00 0.150
1yr N -0.20 0.150 v N 0.00 0.150
2yr N 0.00 0.075  B 0.90 0.100
3yr N 0.00 0.050 yv N 0.00 0.250
1y N 0.00 0.150 v N 0.00 0.250
Volatility and co-movement parameters
Parameter Type Mean S. D. Parameter Type Mean S. D.
vr N 0.00 2.00  IG 0.01 0.200
v N 0.00 2.00 y IG 0.01 0.200
vy N 0.00 2.00  IG 0.01 0.200
v N 0.00 2.00 12 IG 0.0001 0.001
y N 0.00 2.00 24 IG 0.0001 0.001
y N 0.00 2.00 36 IG 0.0001 0.001
 N 0.00 2.00 48 IG 0.0001 0.001
r IG 0.01 0.20 60 IG 0.0001 0.001
Prices of Risk
Parameter Type Mean S. D. Parameter Type Mean S. D.
r N 0.00 25.00  N 0.00 25.00
 N 0.00 25.00 y N 0.00 25.00
Summary of the prior distributions of the parameters. Type of the distribution is either
N , B, G, or IG where N denotes the Normal distribution, B the Beta distribution, G the
Gamma distribution, and IG the Inverse-Gamma distribution.
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Prior Distributions
Using prior information from previous studies and restricting parameters to lie in an
economically reasonable region helps to reduce the complexity of the maximization
problem by down-weighting economically non-meaningful regions of the parameter
space (see Chib and Ergashev, 2009, for a more detailed discussion). The rst part
of table (3.2) displays the prior distributions of the coe¢ cients of the monetary
policy rule. I follow closely Smets and Wouters (2003) for the choice of these priors.
The parameter capturing the degree of interest rate smoothing r is supposed to
lay in the interval between 0 and 1: Therefore, for the prior distribution of r the
Beta distribution is employed. I set the prior mean equal to 0:8 and the standard
deviation equal to 0:05, assuming a high degree of interest rate inertia. For the
prior distribution of the parameter governing central banks reaction on deviation
of the actual ination rate from its target rate, a Gamma distribution with a mean
of 1:5 and a standard deviation of 0:25 is used. I employ the Gamma distribution
to ensure that the parameter  cannot be negative. The prior mean satises the
Taylor principle. Likewise, I also suppose that the prior for the parameter of central
banks reaction on deviation from the output gap is gamma-distributed. The prior
mean is chosen to correspond to the Taylor coe¢ cient of 0:5. Finally, the coe¢ cient
of central banks response to movements in term premia v is assumed to follow a
Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0:5, so that the
interval [ 1:96; 1:96] covers 95% of the probability mass. Given the normalization
of v, the choice of the standard deviation implies a relatively uninformative prior.
The choice of the prior means implies that monetary policy is, a priori, characterized
by a standard Taylor rule.
The choice of the priors of the parameters describing the dynamics of the macro-
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economy is displayed in the second part of table (3.2). As described in Section
(3.3.1), these dynamics are modeled as in a structural VAR model. The priors for
the VAR part (eq. 3.1 - 3.5) are chosen in the spirit of Minnesota (see Litterman,
1986) by assuming that almost all coe¢ cients are Gaussian distributed and by setting
the prior means of most of the coe¢ cients equal to zero except for these coe¢ cients
corresponding to the rst own lags of the dependent variables. These coe¢ cients are
set equal to 0:9, as suggested by Koop and Korobilis (2010). The choice of the prior
means reects the assumption that these variables exhibit a high degree of persis-
tence but do not follow a unit root process. The standard deviations of the prior
distributions of the parameters are weighted by the lag length, implying that with
increasing lag length the coe¢ cients are shrunk towards zero. As in Dewachter et
al. (2014), I set the standard deviations for prior distributions of these coe¢ cients
on the rst lags equal to 0:15. Departing from Minnesota and following Dewachter
and Iania (2011) and Dewachter et al. (2014), I choose a negative prior mean for
the parameters 1yr and 
1
r. These choices capture the beliefs that an increase in the
interest rate dampens economic activity. For the parameters yv and v, I choose a
relatively uninformative prior. Precisely, I set the prior mean equal to zero and the
standard deviation equal to 0:25, assuming that movements in the risk variable do
not a¤ect output and ination a priori. The coe¢ cient of the ination target process
is Beta distributed with a mean of 0:9 and a standard deviation of 0:1. Employing
the Beta distribution guarantees that the process of the ination target is stationary,
while it avoids that the central banks ination target jumps erratically.
The third part of table (3.2) presents the prior distributions of the volatility
parameters of the structural shocks and of the measurement errors and the prior dis-
tributions of the co-movement parameters. The prior distributions of the volatility
parameters of to the structural shocks and the measurement errors follow, similar to
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Dewachter (2008), an Inverse Gamma distribution with a mean of 0:01 and 0:0001,
respectively, and a standard deviation of 0:2 and 0:001, respectively. This specica-
tion captures the beliefs that measurement errors should be rather small. I employ
the Inverse Gamma distribution in order to prevent the volatility parameter from be-
ing negative or equal to 0. The prior distributions for the co-movement parameters
follow a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 2.
The last part of table (3.2) presents the priors for the prices of risk. For the choice
of the prior distributions of the coe¢ cients , y, r, and  , I follow Dewachter
and Iania (2011) and Dewachter et al. (2014).
I use relatively uninformative priors, reected by the choice of large standard de-
viations. More precisely, each element in the prices of risk is assumed to be Gaussian
distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 25.
The choice of the priors satises the stationarity condition of the state equation
and the stability condition of the no-arbitrage recursions. Hence, under the chosen
prior specication jeig (P )j < 1 and jeig (P   1)j < 1 hold.
3.5 Results
Table (3.3) and (3.4) list the results of the estimation. They report the posterior
modes of the parameters, the posterior means, and the 90% highest posterior density
(HPD) interval. While the posterior mode is obtained by maximizing the (log-) pos-
terior distribution, the latter results are obtained by using the Adaptive Metropolis
algorithm outlined in Section (3.4.3). First, the estimated values of the interest rate
rule parameters are discussed. Then, I will evaluate the estimated mode by plotting
impulse response functions (IRF) and decomposing the error forecast variance.
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3.5.1 Policy Rule Coe¢ cients
Focusing on the four estimated parameters of the interest rate rule displayed in the
rst four rows in the table (3.3), the results show that all four parameters are signif-
icantly di¤erent from zero, including the ECBs response parameter to movements
in term structure premia v. The posterior mean of v is signicantly di¤erent from
zero and negative, v =  0:3693, implying that the ECB lowered the interest rate
in response to a rise in term premia. Thus, in line with the practitioner view, this
indicates that the central bank counteracted changes in term premia to retain the
overall mix of nancial conditions, balancing output and ination. Carlstrom et
al. (2015) demonstrate that in a DSGE model with imperfect nancial markets a
negative response coe¢ cient on term premia in the monetary policy rule improves
welfare. In contrast, Ireland (2015), who estimated the same parameter, but for the
Fed with US data from the 1950th until 2007 (and for an extended sample until the
end of 2014), using a restricted maximum likelihood approach, nds a signicant
positive coe¢ cient.
The estimated values of the other three parameters of the interest rate rule are
similar to those from studies using a more standard interest rate rules specication
for the Euro Area (e.g. Andrés et al., 2006, or Smets and Wouters, 2003). The
estimate of the interest rate inertia r = 0:8730 reects a high degree of interest
rate smoothing. The estimate of the coe¢ cient measuring central banks response
to changes in the output gap is y = 0:1651. The estimated coe¢ cient of the central
banks response to a change in ination is larger than one,  = 1:3681, satisfying
the Taylor principle.
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Table 3.3: Results: Posterior Distributions (Part I)
Parameter Prior Mean Post. Mode Post. Mean 90% HPD Interval Prior
r 0.8000 0.8435 0.8730 0.8281 0.9161 B
 1.5000 1.4399 1.3681 1.0332 1.7358 G
y 0.5000 0.1372 0.1651 0.0924 0.2434 G
v 0.0000 -0.2881 -0.3693 -0.4804 -0.2552 N
vv 0.9000 0.9057 0.8765 0.8213 0.9281 N
vr 0.0000 -0.3190 -0.3314 -0.4824 -0.2086 N
v 0.0000 -0.0641 -0.0580 -0.2582 0.1349 N
vy 0.0000 0.1533 0.1530 0.0908 0.2104 N
v 0.0000 -0.2806 -0.3008 -0.3839 -0.2241 N
 0.9000 0.9922 0.9896 0.9822 0.9964 B
v 0.0000 -0.0176 -0.0199 -0.0347 -0.0045 N
yv 0.0000 -0.0410 -0.0444 -0.0917 0.0054 N
1r -0.2000 -0.0247 -0.0187 -0.1394 0.1023 N
2r 0.0000 -0.0036 -0.0118 -0.1077 0.0929 N
3r 0.0000 -0.0393 -0.0352 -0.1047 0.0383 N
1 0.9000 1.0414 1.0212 0.9238 1.1284 N
2 0.0000 0.0099 -0.0025 -0.0984 0.0865 N
3 0.0000 -0.0753 -0.0763 -0.1296 -0.0119 N
1y 0.0000 -0.0306 -0.0238 -0.0597 0.0086 N
2y 0.0000 0.0075 0.0111 -0.0370 0.0577 N
3y 0.0000 0.0466 0.0399 0.0137 0.0693 N
1yr -0.2000 -0.0295 0.0111 -0.1664 0.1740 N
2yr 0.0000 -0.0102 0.0031 -0.0999 0.1165 N
3yr 0.0000 -0.0389 -0.0252 -0.1124 0.0529 N
1y 0.0000 0.1742 0.1652 -0.0135 0.3340 N
2y 0.0000 -0.0080 0.0006 -0.1177 0.1066 N
3y 0.0000 -0.0117 -0.0088 -0.0902 0.0730 N
Summary of the posterior distributions of the parameters. Type of the distribution is
either N , B, G, or IG where N denotes the Normal distribution, B the Beta distribution,
G the Gamma distribution, and IG the Inverse-Gamma distribution.
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Table 3.4: Results: Posterior Distributions (Part II)
Parameter Prior Mean Post. Mode Post. Mean 90% HPD Interval Prior
1yy 0.9000 1.1363 1.1275 1.0465 1.2118 N
2yy 0.0000 -0.0089 -0.0256 -0.1251 0.0627 N
3yy 0.0000 -0.1765 -0.1732 -0.2309 -0.1117 N
r 0.0100 0.0015 0.0016 0.0014 0.0018 IG
 0.0100 0.0026 0.0026 0.0023 0.0029 IG
y 0.0100 0.0098 0.0102 0.0092 0.0113 IG
 0.0100 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 0.0015 IG
 0.0000 -0.9646 -1.0030 -1.3564 -0.6184 N
y 0.0000 0.7367 0.6767 0.0460 1.3443 N
y 0.0000 -0.2204 -0.2148 -1.7942 1.3055 N
vr 0.0000 1.0316 1.1640 -0.8603 2.8697 N
v 0.0000 3.9946 3.1414 1.9457 4.4911 N
vy 0.0000 -0.3565 -0.2337 -0.5524 0.1260 N
v 0.0000 -0.8689 0.0411 -2.3657 2.6599 N
r 0.0000 1.3260 2.1260 -1.1760 5.4160 N
 0.0000 -2.2438 -2.7796 -6.1481 -0.0014 N
y 0.0000 2.2123 2.1688 -1.2309 6.0037 N


0.0000 -0.7596 -0.9366 -1.6190 -0.3066 N
12 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 IG
24 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 IG
36 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 IG
48 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 IG
60 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 IG
Summary of the posterior distributions of the parameters. Type of the distribution is
either N , B, G, or IG where N denotes the Normal distribution, B the Beta distribution,
G the Gamma distribution, and IG the Inverse-Gamma distribution.
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3.5.2 The Models Dynamic
The estimation results for the remaining parameters are summarized in table (3.3)
and table (3.4). Rather than interpreting each coe¢ cient separately, I will describe
the results of the parameter estimates jointly by computing impulse response func-
tions (IRFs) of the models variables to the fundamental shocks of the economy and
by decomposing the forecast error variance. Both methods help to examine the dy-
namic of the estimated model and to describe the propagation and the relevance of
di¤erent shocks.
Each of the following gures shows the impulse response of the models variables
to a particular shock. Each shock is of a size of one-standard-deviation. The rst
column of each gure displays the impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables
(the nominal short-term interest rate rt, the ination rate t, the output gap g
y
t , and
central banks ination target ?t ). The second column contains the impulse responses
of the yield rates (from the 12-month rate to the 60-month rate). The third and
fourth column display the IRFs of the one-period return premium Et

hprx
()
t+1

and
the yield premium t, respectively. By construction, the one-period return premium
is only driven by the risk variable vt, while the yield premium, which captures the
premium in yields over the full lifetime of the bond, is a¤ected by all state variables.
The light gray shaded areas cover the 90 percentage HPD interval while the dark
gray shaded areas cover the 68 HPD interval. The IRF (displayed by the blue line) is
computed as the mean impulse response. The output gap is depicted in percentage
deviations of the steady state, and the ination- and the yield rate are shown in
annualized percentage points. One period corresponds to one month.
Figure (3.1) shows the response to a term premium shock. The increase in the
risk variable causes the one-period return premia and the yield premia in yields of
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses of the models variables to a one-standard-deviation
risk variable shock "vt:
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bonds with longer maturities to rise. For term premia incorporated in yields of
bonds with shorter, the response is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Similar to
a negative demand shock, output and ination drop in response to a term premium
shock. In line with the ndings of Ireland (2015) for the US, the plots show that
an exogenous rise in term premia works to dampen economic activity. According to
the interest rate rule, the rise in the risk variable causes the central bank to ease
monetary policy. The magnitude of the increase in term premia is larger for premia
of bonds with longer maturities. Following the short-term interest rate, long-term
yields decline. The decline in long-term yields is mitigated by the increase in term
premia. Since the ination target is given by a univariate autoregressive process, the
ination target is not a¤ected by shocks to the other state variables.
Figure (3.2) displays the response of the economy to a positive interest rate rule
shock. The short-term interest rate rises on impact and stays above its steady state
level for more than 7 months, converging back to its steady state. The response of
the output gap and of the ination rate to the interest rate shock are in line with
previous study and economic theory. The tightening of monetary policy dampens
economic activity, leading to a drop in output and ination though the response of
the output gap is not statistically signicant from zero on the 90 percent level. The
responses of the risk variable and the term premia to the interest rate shock are not
signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The impulse responses to the output shock "yt are displayed in gure (3.3). The
output gap rises sharply on impact and decreases slowly over the next 12 months
back to its steady state. The impact response of ination to the output shock is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. After roughly 6 months, ination rises slowly with
its peak after 12 months and remains positive for another 12 months. The increase
in the output gap and in ination causes monetary policy to tighten. The rise in
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses of the models variable to a one-standard-deviation
interest rate shock "rt.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses of the models variables to a one-standard-deviation
output gap shock "yt:
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short-term interest rate pushes the yield curve upwards. However, the rise in long-
term bond yields is only signicantly di¤erent from zero for the 1-year bond yield.
Overall, the e¤ects of this shock work similar to an aggregate demand shock. The
response of the risk variable is, on impact, not statistically di¤erent from zero. After
4 months the risk variable rises and stays signicantly above its steady state value
for roughly 16 months.
The impulse responses to an innovation in the ination rate are shown in gure
(3.4). Ination rises sharply and converges back to its steady state in less than 18
months. According to the interest rate rule, the central bank raises the short-term
interest rate in response to the increase in ination. Yields follow the short-term
interest rate. The response of the output gap is not signicantly di¤erent from
zero. In response to the ination shock, the risk variable rises on impact and stays
signicantly di¤erent from zero for more than 12 months. Again, only the response
of the one-period return premium and of the yield premium in yields of bonds with
longer residual maturities are signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Finally, gure (3.5) presents the impulse responses to a shock to the ination
target t . From the parameter estimates of the ination target process  = 0:9896,
the ination target process is highly persistent. Actual ination rises in response to
the increase in the ination target. Also the nominal short-term interest rate and
bond yields rise. In line with the ndings of Ireland (2015) for the U.S., the ination
target works similar to the level factor observed in latent nance term structure
models:10 It moves bond yields simultaneously and persistently upward, resulting in
a higher level of the yield curve. The output gap does not respond on impact but
starts to rise slowly after two years. The risk variable drops in response to the to
10The rst three latent factors commonly studied in a¢ ne term structure models in nance, are
denoted as level-, slope-, and curvature factor. The factor names refer to the e¤ect that each factor
has on the yield curve.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses of the models variables to a one-standard-deviation
ination shock "t:
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Figure 3.5: Impulse responses of the models variables to a one-standard-deviation
ination target shock "t:
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the ination target shock.
The displayed results show a rich interaction between the economy and term
premia. Previous empirical studies indicate that the bond term premium varies over
the business cycle and that this variation is countercyclical (Cochrane and Piazzesi,
2005, Ludvigson and Ng, 2009, or Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008). My results are in
line with these ndings, but emphasizes that the kind of underlying disturbance is
crucial for the sign of the correlation between output gap and term premia, as theory
suggests (see e.g. Hördahl et al., 2008, Rudebusch, et al., 2007, or Rudebusch and
Swanson, 2012). Shocks to the risk variable move output gap and term premia in
opposite directions, leading to a countercyclical relationship. Shocks to the ination
target do not move output gap and term premia on impact, but with a delay. Similar,
output gap shocks do not move term premia on impact, but with a delay of 4 months.
The results indicate, thus, whether term premia are countercyclical over the business
cycle or not depends on the source of the movements.
Next, in order to assess the relative importance of di¤erent shocks for the vari-
ability of a variable, I compute the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD).
The FEVD helps to quantify the contribution of each of the ve structural shocks
to the forecast error variance of the models variables. Formally, the fraction of the
forecast error variance of variable i due shock j for horizon h, denoted by i;;j (h), is
dened by (see e.g. Lütkepohl, 2005)
i;;j (h) =
!i;;j (h)

i (h)
;
where !i;;j (h) is the forecast error variance of variable i due to shock j at horizon h
and 
i (h) is the total error forecast variance of variable i at horizon h. Table (3.5)
and (3.6) present the FEVD of the models variables for di¤erent horizons to the ve
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Table 3.5: FEVD of Macroeconomic Variables
Short-Term Interest Rate
h "r " "y "v "
1 58.69 0.73 3.92 5.87 30.80
12 8.69 7.69 4.13 73.46 6.04
36 2.84 3.51 1.49 63.83 28.33
60 1.55 1.86 1.21 39.58 55.80
1 0.45 0.53 0.40 11.95 86.67
Ination
h "r " "y "v "
1 0.00 99.97 0.00 0.00 0.03
12 2.29 81.74 7.62 4.53 3.81
36 2.36 43.94 14.70 3.91 35.10
60 1.77 33.08 11.07 2.96 51.12
1 1.20 22.28 7.45 2.00 67.08
Output Gap
h "r " "y "v "
1 0.00 3.67 96.25 0.00 0.08
12 0.41 3.49 91.44 4.08 0.59
36 0.73 3.14 83.37 10.68 2.09
60 0.69 2.91 77.21 11.33 7.86
1 0.49 2.04 64.02 8.39 25.06
Risk Variable
h "r " "y "v "
1 1.06 48.27 5.47 44.66 0.54
12 0.44 34.95 22.04 41.08 1.500
36 0.38 20.22 30.51 42.03 6.85
60 0.38 15.10 23.01 37.86 23.65
1 0.16 5.74 8.79 15.48 69.83
structural disturbances. The FEVD of the macroeconomic variables are displayed in
table (3.5). Since the ination target does only react on own innovations, over all
horizons 100 percent of the forecast error variance is simply explained by ination
target shocks. Therefore it is omitted from table (3.5).
In the very short run, more than half of the variability of the short-term interest
rate is due to interest rate shocks. Term premium shocks "vt account for between 40
to 75 percent of the error forecast variance of the short-term interest rate at a one- to
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ve-year horizon. In the long run, ination target shocks account for more than 86
percent of movements in the interest rate. Term premium shocks do not only move
the short term interest rate but do also account for sizeable variations in ination,
output gap and the risk variable itself, revealing a non-negligible inuence of term
premia shocks on the economy. In line with the practitionerview, risk shocks play
an important role for economic activity. They account for between 4 and 12 percent
of the forecast error variance in the output gap, and also for between 3 and 5 percent
in the ination rate, both at horizons between one and ve years. The forecast
error variance of the risk variable, in turn, is driven by di¤erent disturbances, each
di¤erently important at di¤erent horizons. At a one- and ve-year horizon, term
premium shocks account for the bulk of movements in term premia (between 37 and
43 percent). This corresponds to the ndings of Dewachter et al. (2014) and Ireland
(2015) who nd that a large fraction of movements in term premia is not driven by
macroeconomic shocks, but by exogenous term premia shocks. In the short run, in
addition to term premia shocks, ination shocks account for a large fraction of the
forecast error variance in term premia, while in the long run ination target shocks
account for around 70 percent of the forecast error variance in term premia. At the
horizon between one and ve years, output gap shocks "yt account for between 22
and 30 percent of variations in term premia. The results indicate a bidirectional
linkage, running from the macroeconomic to term premia and vice versa. According
to the estimated model, interest rate shocks did not account for much variance of
the other variables over the sample period. Movements in the output gap are mainly
driven by own shocks. Variations in the ination rate are due to ination shocks and
output gap shocks in the short run and ination target shocks in the long run.
The FEVD of bond yields is presented in table (3.6). In addition to the ve
fundamental disturbances, also the measurement errors are reported. Term premium
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Table 3.6: FEVD of Bond Yields
One Year Yield Rate
Horizon Structural Shock Measurement errors
h "r " "y "v " 
12
t 
24
t 
36
t 
48
t 
60
t
1 4.23 7.21 3.65 73.02 5.74 6.14 0 0 0 0
12 0.80 6.01 0.81 85.22 6.78 0.37 0 0 0 0
36 0.83 2.51 0.91 57.40 38.25 0.10 0 0 0 0
60 0.51 1.36 0.83 34.97 62.28 0.05 0 0 0 0
1 0.16 0.42 0.30 11.30 87.80 0.02 0 0 0 0
Two Year Yield Rate
Horizon Structural Shock Measurement errors
h "r " "y "v " 
12
t 
24
t 
36
t 
48
t 
60
t
1 0.11 7.20 0.62 80.32 11.48 0 0.27 0 0 0
12 0.62 4.65 0.17 75.70 18.85 0 0.02 0 0 0
36 0.62 1.80 0.67 45.09 51.82 0 0 0 0 0
60 0.38 0.99 0.61 27.39 70.62 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.13 0.33 0.24 9.46 89.84 0 0 0 0 0
Three Year Yield Rate
Horizon Structural Shock Measurement errors
h "r " "y "v "v 
12
t 
24
t 
36
t 
48
t 
60
t
1 0.04 6.49 0.22 66.98 26.27 0 0 0.01 0 0
12 0.67 3.75 0.08 59.32 36.18 0 0 0 0 0
36 0.51 1.36 0.48 33.21 64.44 0 0 0 0 0
60 0.31 0.76 0.44 20.43 78.05 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.12 0.27 0.18 7.53 91.90 0 0 0 0 0
Four Year Yield Rate
Horizon Structural Shock Measurement errors
h "r " "y "v " 
12
t 
24
t 
36
t 
48
t 
60
t
1 0.13 5.65 0.20 50.07 43.94 0 0 0 0.01 0
12 0.62 3.04 0.08 43.30 52.97 0 0 0 0 0
36 0.41 1.07 0.33 23.86 74.32 0 0 0 0 0
60 0.25 0.61 0.32 15.00 83.82 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.10 0.23 0.14 5.90 93.6 0 0 0 0 0
Five Year Yield Rate
Horizon Structural Shock Measurement errors
h "r " "y "v " 
12
t 
24
t 
36
t 
48
t 
60
t
1 0.17 4.80 0.28 35.42 59.24 0 0 0 0 0.09
12 0.52 2.47 0.13 30.71 66.16 0 0 0 0 0.01
36 0.33 0.87 0.24 17.12 81.45 0 0 0 0 0
60 0.20 0.51 0.23 11.03 88.02 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.08 0.20 0.11 4.60 95.00 0 0 0 0 0
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shocks account for sizeable variation in bond yields, in particular, for bonds with
shorter terms to maturity and for short forecast horizons. In line with evidence of
Barr and Campbell (1997), Gürkaynak et al. (2005) or Ireland et al. (2015), most
of the variation in bond yields is caused by ination target shocks. The contribution
of ination target shocks to the forecast error variance in bond yields is even more
pronounced for long-term bonds and increasing in the forecast horizon. Ination
target shocks account for between 64 and 88 percent of movements in yields of bonds
of 3- and 5-year residual maturity at forecast horizons between three and ve years.
But also for bonds with shorter terms to maturity (two years and less), ination target
shocks are important determinants of the forecast error variance. These ndings
conrm the earlier observation that ination target shocks work similar to a level
shock, moving the entire yield curve upward. Notably, measurement error shocks do
not contribute to much movement in bond yields, conrming a good t of the model.
They account for around 5 percent of the one-month ahead forecast error variance
in the one-year bond rate, for less than 0:23 percent of the one-month ahead forecast
error variance in the two-year bond rate, and even less for rates of bonds with longer
terms to maturity. The contribution of measurement errors to the variance of bond
yields declines considerably with the forecast horizon.
3.6 Conclusion
In this work, I evaluate the interplay of term premia, monetary policy, and the
economy in the Euro area. Using a macro-nance model of the term structure,
which explicitly allows term premia to a¤ect the economy, my ndings reveal a broad
interaction among term premia, monetary policy, and the economy. Movements in
term premia are captured by an unobservable risk variable which responds to all
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other state variables and exhibits an autonomous dynamic. By restricting the prices
of risk in the pricing kernel (as in Dewachter and Iania, 2011, Dewachter et al., 2014,
and Ireland, 2015) this variable is identied to account for all variations in the one-
period return premium. Furthermore, exclusion restrictions on the contemporaneous
relationship of the models variables, similar to those from more conventional VAR
models, on the state process of macroeconomic variables are entailed to disentangle
the e¤ects of fundamental shocks to the endogenous variables. In line with earlier
studies of the term structure and term premia, I nd that the term premium is
time-varying and that it responds to the state of the economy, contradicting the
expectation hypotheses.
I want to emphasize two aspects of my ndings. First, a rise in the term premium
does a¤ect the economy. Precisely, proving evidence for the practitioner view, a pure
exogenous term premium shock dampens output and ination, similar to an aggre-
gate demand shock. Second, the analysis reveals that the ECB reacts to movements
in the term premium. Indeed, in order to counteract the change in the premia, the
central bank shifts the policy rate contrary to the change in the premium. Further-
more, this paper does not nd evidence for strong e¤ects of conventional monetary
policy on term premia.
Examining how term premia movements a¤ect the economy and the e¤ects of
conventional monetary policy on term premia is the rst step. A natural question
arising from these nding is how unconventional monetary policy actions, in particu-
lar, quantitative easing(QE), a¤ects the term premium. QE intends to stimulate
the economy through aggregate demand channels not only by reducing long-term
yields, the so-called signaling channel but also by reducing the term premium part
in long-term yields, the so-called portfolio-balance channel (International Monetary
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Fund Report, 2013). Recent studies11 nd that QE worked to reduce long-term yields
though the magnitude of these e¤ects di¤ers greatly and the channel through which
large-scale asset purchases a¤ects long-term yields is not clear. If changes in term
premia work to a¤ect the economy, what are the qualitative and quantitative e¤ects
of QE on term premia? However, the analysis of these e¤ects is beyond the scope of
this paper.
11Among many others, Bauer and Rudebusch (2015), Carlstrom et al. (2014), Chen et al. (2012),
Gagnon et al. (2011), Hamilton and Wu (2012), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and
Woodford (2012).
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Parameter Vectors and Matrices
The vectors and matrices P0, P1, 0, and 0 in eq. (3.7) are dened as
P0 
266666666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0   (1  r)  0 0   (1  r) y 0 0 0   (1  r) v
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
377777777777777777777777777777775
;
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P1 
266666666666666666666666666666664
r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1r 
2
r 
3
r 
1
 
2
 
3
 
1
y 
2
y 
3
y 0 v
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1yr 
2
yr 
3
yr 
1
y 
2
y 
3
y 
1
yy 
2
yy 
3
yy 0 yv
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0
vr 0 0 v 0 0 vy 0 0 v? vv
377777777777777777777777777777775
;
0 
266666666666666666666666666666664
(1  r)
 
gr   ygy

0
0
  (1r + 2r + 3r) gr  
 
1y + 
2
y + 
3
y

gy
0
0 
1  1yy + 2yy + 3yy gy    1yr + 2yr + 3yr gr
0
0
(1  ?)?
 vrgr   vygy   v??
377777777777777777777777777777775
;
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and
0 
266666666666666666666666666666664
r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 ?? 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 y 0 0 y 0 0 y?? 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0
vrr 0 0 v 0 0 vyy 0 0 v?? v
377777777777777777777777777777775
:
3.A.2 Recursive Bond Prices
Following Ang and Piazzesi (2003) or Ireland (2015), the di¤erence equations are
derived by induction, using eq. (3.15). Start with  = 0, then, from P 0t+1 = 1, eq.
(3.15) implies
P 1t = Et (mt+1)
= Et

exp

 rt   1
2
0tt   0t"t+1

= exp ( rt) ;
where I used that "t is standard normally distributed so that mt+1 is log-normal
distributed with mean  =  rt   120tt and variance 2 = 0tt. Now suppose that
P 1t = exp
 
A1 + B1Xt

holds, then substituting eq. (3.8) for rt leads to
exp

A + B
0
Xt

= exp ( 01X) :
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Matching coe¢ cients leads to the initial conditions A1 = 0 and B
0
1 =  01. Next,
in order to show that the recursions in eq. (3.17) and (3.18) hold for any value of
 = 1; 2; :::, suppose that P t = exp
 
A + BXt

. Substitute eq. (3.7), eq. (3.11),
(3.12), and (3.16) into eq. (3.15) yields
P +1t = Et

exp

 01Xt  
1
2
0tt   0t"t+1

exp
 
A + B
0
Xt+1

= exp

 1
2
0tt + A + B
0
+

B0P   01

Xt

Et
 
exp
 
B0  0t

"t+1

= exp
0B@  120tt + A + B0+  B0P   01Xt
+1
2

B0
0 B   2 B0t + 0tt

1CA
= exp

A + B
0
+
1
2
B0
0 B   B00 +

B0P   B01   01

Xt

;
where the third equality is obtained by computing the expectation of the exponential
function using the normality of "t+1 and
Et
 
exp
 
B0  0t

"t+1

= exp

 +
1
2
2

;
with  = 0 and 2 = B0 B0   2 Bt + 0tt. Matching coe¢ cients shows that
the recursive solution in eq. (3.17) and (3.18) hold.
3.A.3 Yield Premia and Return Premia
This part of the appendix demonstrates that the yield premium can be written as the
average of expected future return premia of declining maturity. The yield premium
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of  -period bond ()t is given by

()
t = y
()
t  
1

Et
"
 1X
i=0
y
(1)
t+i
#
=
1

"
y
()
t   Et
 1X
i=0
y
(1)
t+i
#
=
1

"
 p()t   Et
 1X
i=0
y
(1)
t+i
#
;
where the last equality uses the relation yt =  pt = . Now add Et
P 1
i=0 p
 i 1
t+i+1  
Et
P 1
i=0 p
 i 1
t+i+1 , rearrange terms, and use the denition Et
 
hprx it+i+1

= p
( i 1)
t+i+1  
p
( i)
t+i   y(1)t+i to obtain

()
t =
1

"
 p()t   Et
 1X
i=0
y
(1)
t+i
#
=
1

Et
"
 1X
i=0
p i 1t+i+1  
 1X
i=0
p i 1t+i+1   p()t  
 1X
i=0
y
(1)
t+i
#
=
1

Et
"
hprxt+1   p 1t+1 +
 1X
i=1
p i 1t+i+1  
 1X
i=1
p i 1t+i+1  
 1X
i=1
y
(1)
t+i
#
=
1

Et
"
hprxt+1 + hprx
 1
t+2   p 2t+2 +
 1X
i=2
p i 1t+i+1  
 1X
i=2
p i 1t+i+1   Et
 1X
i=2
y
(1)
t+i
#
= :::
=
1

Et
"
 2X
i=0
hprx it+i+1 + p
(0)
t+   p(1)t+ 1   y(1)t+ 1   p(0)t+
#
:
Finally, note that p(0)t+ = 0 (since P
0
t+ = exp

p
(0)
t+

= 1) and Et
 
hprx1t+

=
p
(0)
t+   p(1)t+ 1   y(1)t+ 1. Hence,

()
t =
1

 1X
i=0
Et
 
hprx it+i+1

:
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3.A.4 Computation of the i+ 1-period Return Premium
The return premium is given by (for  > i)
Et

hprx
()
t+i+1

= Et

hpr
()
t+i+1

  Et

y
(1)
t+i

= Et

p
( 1)
t+i+1   p()t+i

  Et

y
(1)
t+i

:
Plugging the log prices and the expected short rate into the equation above yields
Et

hprx
()
t+i+1

= A( 1)+ B0( 1)EtXt+i+1  A()  B0()EtXt+i 0 01 01P i (Xt   ) :
Using EtXt+j =  +P j (Xt   ),  = (I   P ) , eq. (3.17), rearranging, and collect-
ing terms yields
Et

hprx
()
t+i+1

=   B0( 1) (  0) 
1
2
B0( 1)
0 B 1 + B0( 1)EtXt+i+1
  B0()EtXt+i   01   01P i (Xt   )
=   B0( 1) (  0) 
1
2
B0( 1)
0 B 1 + B0( 1)
  B0( 1)P i+1   B0() + B0()P i   01 + 0P i
+ B0( 1)P
i+1Xt   B0()P iXt   01P iXt
= c+

B0( 1)P
i+1   B0()P i   01P i

Xt;
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where c is dened by
c    B0( 1) (  0) 
1
2
B0( 1)
0 B 1   B0( 1)P i+1
+ B0( 1)   B0()   0 + 0P i + B0()P i
= B0( 1)0  
1
2
B0( 1)
0 B0( 1)
+

B0( 1)
 
P   P i+1  01 + 01P i   B0() + B0()P i :
Now use B0() = B
0
( 1) (P   1)  01 to see that
c = B0( 1)

0 + 1
 
I   P i   1
2
B0( 1)
0 B( 1):
and
Et

hprx
()
t+i+1

= c+ B( 1)1P iXt:
Hence,
Et

hprx
()
t+i+1

= B( 1)

0 + 1
 
I   P i  + P iXt  1
2
B( 1)0 B( 1):
Note that the i+1-period return premium depends on the state of the economy only
due to the term 1P iXt. If not only the elements in the last columns of P i but also
other elements in the columns in P i are di¤erent from zero and P i 6= I; all variation
in the variables in Xt a¤ect Et

hprx
()
t+i+1

. For i = 0 follows P i = I so that the
1-period return premium reads
Et

hprx
()
t+1

= B( 1)0   1
2
B( 1)0 B( 1) + B( 1)1Xt
= B0 1 [0 + 1Xt] 
1
2
B( 1)0 B( 1):
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Due to the restricted form of 1 the only source of variation in Et

hprx
()
t+1

is the
variable that is ordered at the last position in Xt.
3.A.5 The Likelihood Function
The likelihood function reads
L (Zj) =
TY
t=1
(2) 
T
2

det
 
Rtjt 1
  1
2
 exp

 1
2
 
Zt   UXtjt 1
0  
Rtjr 1
 1  
Zt   UXtjt 1

;
where Rtjt 1 denotes the conditional variance,
Rtjt 1  V ar (ZtjZt 1; ) = Utjt 1U 0 + V V 0;
Xtjt 1 denotes the one step ahead forecast,
Xtjt 1  E [XtjZt 1; ] = PXt 1jt 1;
with
Xtjt  Xtjt 1 + tjt 1U
 
U 0tjt 1U + V V 0
 1  
Zt   UXtjt 1

;
and t+1jt denotes the mean squared error of the forecasts,
t+1jt  E
h 
Xt+1  Xtjt
  
Xt+1  Xt+1jt
0i
= P

tjt 1   tjt 1U
 
U 0tjt 1U + V V 0
 1
U 0tjt 1

P 0 + 0:
The Kalman lter is implemented by iterating on Xtjt 1 andtjt 1for given initial
values 1j0 and X1jt.
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Chapter 4
Risk Aversion, Macro Factors, and
non-fundamental Components in
Euro Area Yield Spreads: A
Macro-Financial Analysis
4.1 Introduction
Since the start of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a phase of
remarkably low spreads between Euro area sovereign bond yields has been observed,
despite large di¤erences in scal positions among those countries. Though interest
rate di¤erentials did not vanish completely, they stabilized around a remarkably low
level, indicating that country-specic factors did only play a minor role in this period.
However, since the onset of the European debt crisis in late 2009, a dramatic surge
between the yield of bonds of Euro area sovereigns vis-à-vis German government
bonds did occur. Figure (4.1) illustrates the evolution of the ve-year sovereign yield
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Figure 4.1: Five-year sovereign bond yield spreads of France, Italy and Spain
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Notes: All spreads are calculated with respect to the yield of German government bonds of the
same maturity. The yield spreads are shown in annualized percentage points.
spreads of France, Italy, and Spain vis-à-vis Germany. The rise in yield spreads
was accompanied by an increase in sovereign debt of several Euro area countries.
However, not did only the spreads of sovereign yields of highly indebted countries
vis-à-vis Germany rise but also the spreads of countries with solid scal fundamentals
(see ECB, 2014, p. 75). This suggests that not only credit risk but also other factors
account for the rise in yield spreads.
In particular at the beginning of the European debt crisis, in addition to credit
risk, the e¤ects of changes in global risk aversion are found to be an important compo-
nent in yield spreads. However, recent evidence by e.g. De Santis (2015), Dewachter
et al. (2015), Di Cesare et al. (2012), or Hördahl and Tristani (2013) suggests that
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the surge in sovereign spreads of Euro area countries cannot be fully explained by
changes in fundamentals and country-specic scal factors. These authors conclude
that, in addition to global risk aversion, other common factors, interpreted as con-
tagion or redenomination risk, have played a non-negligible role for the dynamics of
yield spreads during the European debt crisis.
This paper investigates the e¤ects of economic fundamentals, among them risk
aversion, and a common factor that is unrelated to economic fundamentals on Euro
area yield spreads using a macro-nance model of the term structure. In particular,
this paper seeks to disentangle the e¤ects of changes in risk aversion and the common
non-fundamental risk factor to quantify their respective contribution to yield spreads
of Euro area sovereigns vis-à-vis Germany. Since both, risk aversion and redenomi-
nation risk, are not directly observable, how these factors are captured is relevant to
disentangle their e¤ects on Euro area sovereign yield spreads. In contrast to the ex-
isting literature, the risk aversion measure used in this work is directly derived from
the Euro area bond market within the macro-nance framework. Specically, it is
identied from changes in the prices of risk of the pricing kernel. Moreover, in order
to analyze the drivers of Euro area yield spreads, I account for country-specic scal
variables, the European business cycle, and monetary policy and their dynamics and
interactions.
The results show that the common non-fundamental risk factor played a non-
negligible role for yield spreads, accounting for a substantial increase in yield spreads
during the nancial crisis and the European debt crisis. Notably, the contribution of
common non-fundamental risk factor shocks to the yield spreads increased from 2012
onwards. However, the most dominant drivers of yield spreads have been economic
shocks. Among the economic shocks, risk aversion shocks were the most important
source for variation in sovereign yield spreads, revealing the importance of measuring
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risk aversion in Euro area bond markets adequately.
Studying the driver of yields and yield spreads is of interest to practitioners and
researchers alike. Not do only play sovereign bonds an important role for asset pric-
ing, sovereign yields are also used as reference rates for key interest rates. Moreover,
understanding the determinants of yields is important for understanding the trans-
mission of monetary policy. Likewise, spreads between Euro area sovereign yields
may indicate impairments of the transmission process of monetary policy (see ECB,
2014). In addition, higher sovereign yields lead to higher marginal (re-) funding costs
of governments and thus have the potential to increase the debt burden of a country.
Since the beginning of the EMU, a large empirical literature analyzes Euro area
sovereign yields and yield spreads. Traditionally, the literature focuses on a set of
variables describing credit risk, investorsrisk aversion, and liquidity risk (see ECB,
2014). A large part of the literature uses regressions of yield spreads of Euro area
countries vis-à-vis Germany at a specic maturity on di¤erent determinants. In con-
trast, a small but growing literature relies on a¢ ne term structure models to explore
the determinants of Euro area sovereign yields (see e.g. Borgy et al., 2011, Dewachter
et al., 2015, Geyer et al., 2004, Hördahl and Tristani, 2013, or Monfort and Renne,
2011). By cross-section restrictions derived from no-arbitrage assumptions, these
models tie the movements of yields across maturities closely together. They allow to
employ information from the cross-section and are suitable to capture the interaction
and dynamics of macro variables and the prices of risk. In the empirical literature,
investorsrisk aversion is usually proxied by U.S. corporate bond spreads or a U.S.
stock market volatility index (see e.g. Attinasi et al., 2010, Bernoth et al., 2012,
Codogno et al. 2003, Favero et al., 2010, or Favero and Missale, 2012). Although
the correlation between risk aversion and these variables is supposed to be high,
these measures are unable to infer the underlying determinants that drive risk aver-
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sion, as noted by Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009). They suggest using the risk-free
short-term interest rate as a proxy for risk aversion. Although evidence (see e.g. by
Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009, or Bekaert et al., 2013) indicates an inverse rela-
tionship between the short-term interest rate and risk aversion, risk aversion should
potentially also respond to other macroeconomic developments (see e.g. Dewachter
et al., 2014) and this response does not necessarily have to coincide with that of
the monetary policy authority to macroeconomic developments. Therefore, in this
work, the short-term interest rate is, together with other Euro area-wide factors, one
potential driver of changes in risk aversion, while the risk aversion measure is derived
from European bonds markets with-in the model.
In order to assess the e¤ects of di¤erent determinants on the evolution of sov-
ereign yield spreads, I use a multi-country macro-nance model. The model features
a unique pricing kernel reecting the integration of nancial markets in a currency
union while it still allows for country-specic variables to a¤ect one countrys yield
curve. Specically, the yield curve of a country is driven by common variables cap-
turing the European business cycle, a unied monetary policy, the common non-
fundamental risk variable, and time-varying risk aversion, and also a country-specic
scal variable capturing default risk.
The common non-fundamental risk factor captures dynamics in Euro area yield
spreads that are unrelated to dynamics in the common economic fundamentals, i.e.
a part in Euro area yield spreads that cannot be accounted for by macroeconomic
variables (see Dewachter et al., 2015). This factor is identied from information con-
tained in cross-country yield curves. Gathering these information requires estimating
the term structure of sovereign yields of di¤erent European sovereigns jointly. As in
Hördahl and Tristani (2013), the common non-fundamental risk factor is modeled as
a latent variable and is, by construction, unrelated to economic fundamentals.
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Changes in risk aversion are measured by a risk aversion variable. While the iden-
tication of the risk aversion variable follows Dewachter and Iania (2011), Dewachter
et al. (2014), and Ireland (2015), the idea behind it is more closely related to Cac-
eres et al. (2010) who use estimates of the prices of risk based on the VIX in order
to construct a measure of risk aversion. In contrast, the risk aversion measure in
this framework is derived from the pricing kernel of a European investor with-in the
macro-nance model. Specically, following the approach of Dewachter and Iania
(2011), Dewachter et al. (2014), and Ireland (2015), by imposing restrictions on
the stochastic discount factor, this risk aversion variable is identied from the term
structure of default-free government bonds as the only driver of time variation in
the prices of risk. Thus, to construct the risk aversion variable, the information
contained over the whole yield curve of default-free government bonds are employed.
This variable is used to explore the e¤ects of changes in risk aversion on the evo-
lution of yield spreads. The risk aversion variable responds, in turn, to distortions
in economic fundamentals, the common non-fundamental risk factor, and exogenous
risk aversion shocks.
Monetary policy is described by a policy rate rule in the spirit of Taylor (1993).
In addition to output and ination, monetary policy potentially also responds to
movements in the risk aversion variable as in Ireland (2015). To the extent that
monetary policy responds to movements in the risk aversion variable, including this
channel is important to model expectations of future short-term interest rates and
thus for separating changes of risk aversion from changes in expected future short
rates. Indeed, as shown by Herrmann (2015) for the Euro area and Ireland (2015)
for the U.S., the respective central bank does respond to movements in term premia
which are captured by the risk aversion variable. Moreover, the central bank sets
the ination target around which ination is stabilized. This target is modeled by
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a latent variable. The long-run trend component helps to shape the expectation of
long-term bond yields. The e¤ects of fundamental shocks on di¤erent state variables
are identied, similar to structural VAR models, by exclusion restrictions on the
contemporaneous relationship of the models variables.
The model is estimated by Bayesian estimation techniques. The posterior func-
tion is evaluated using an Adaptive Metropolis (AM) algorithm in the lines of Haario
et al. (2001).
4.2 Literature Review
A broad literature investigates the determinants of Euro area sovereign yield spreads.
Traditionally, the literature considers the role of credit risk, liquidity risk, and global
risk aversion. More recently, also redenomination risk or systemic risk are considered
as drivers of Euro area yield spreads. Credit risk or default risk, measuring a coun-
tries creditworthiness, is typically proxied by variables describing the scal position
of a country (e.g. debt-to-GDP ratio, decit-to-GDP ratio, the debt maturity, or
interest expenditure-to-GDP). The literature nds that the importance of credit risk
in sovereign bond yield spreads increased, since the start of the nancial crisis and
even more since the European sovereign debt crisis (see e.g. Attinasi et al., 2010,
or Barrios et al., 2009). Liquidity risk measures the liquidity of sovereign bonds
of a specic country. Typically, liquidity risk is proxied by the bid-ask spreads, the
amount of outstanding public debt of a country, trading volumes, or turn-over ratios.
Global risk aversion is typically proxied by the spread of U.S. Corporate Bonds over
U.S. treasury bonds or a volatility index of U.S. stock markets (see e.g. Attinasi et
al., 2010, Bernoth et al., 2012, Codogno et al., 2003, Favero et al., 2010, or Favero
and Missale, 2012).
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Although a broad spectrum of di¤erent modeling approaches is used to assess
the determinants of yield spreads, the literature on the determinants of yield spreads
can be roughly categorized into two strands. The rst strand regresses sovereign
bond yields or sovereign bond yield spreads at di¤erent maturities on di¤erent sets
of explanatory variables, representing macro fundamentals, credit risk, liquidity risk,
and global risk aversion (see e.g. Attinasi et al., 2010, Barrios et al., 2009, Beber et
al., 2009, Bernoth et al., 2012, Di Cesare et al., 2012, Favero et al., 2010, Manganelli
and Wolswijk, 2009, or Schuknecht et al., 2011). The second strand of the literature
uses no-arbitrage term structure models in order to examine the determinants of
euro area sovereign yield spreads. Among these authors are Battestini et al. (2013),
Borgy et al. (2012), Dewachter et al. (2015), Geyer et al. (2004), and Hördahl and
Tristani (2013). These models tie the yield of bonds of di¤erent maturity together
by the assumption of the absence of no-arbitrage. This approach helps to employ
information contained in the cross-section of yields. While Geyer et al. (2004) employ
a purely latent factor model, Borgy et al. (2012) investigate the determinants of
yield spreads using only macro variables as factors. Focusing on the e¤ects of scal
variables on spreads, they nd that the importance of these variables for Euro area
yield spreads increased since the beginning of the nancial crisis. My work shares
the closest focus with the work of Dewachter et al. (2015). They use a multi-country
a¢ ne term structure model with unspanned macro risk factors to analyze the e¤ects
of common non-fundamental risk factors, interpreted as redenomination risk, and
economic fundamentals on a set of Euro area sovereign yield spreads. Common
non-fundamental factors are identied by the dynamic in the rst two principal
components of all the standardized yield spreads that cannot be accounted for by
economic fundamentals, a measure of ight-to-safety motives, and a factor capturing
the political uncertainty of the Euro area. In order to measure global tension, they
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use the VIX. In contrast to the presented analysis in this paper, they use only
observable factors. Moreover, in this work, the risk aversion measure is extracted
directly from the Euro area sovereign bond markets. This potentially enhances the
models ability to explain common dynamics in yield spreads.
While the importance of credit risk and global risk aversion, not only during but
also before the onset of the European debt crisis, seems to be unambiguous (e.g.
Attinasi et al., 2010, Bernoth et al., 2012, Codogno et al., 2003, Favero et al., 2010,
Geyer et al., 2004, Laubach, 2011, Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009, or Schuknecht et
al., 2011), the evidence for the relevance of liquidity risks for sovereign bond yields
seems to be less striking (as discussed in Borgy et al., 2012, p. 9). Beber et al. (2009)
or Haugh (2009) stress the importance of liquidity risk, in particular for smaller
European economies, and in particular in times of high market distress. Favero et al.
(2010), in contrast, nd a negative relationship between their proxy for risk aversion
and their proxy for liquidity, suggesting that in times of market stress investors value
liquidity less than in normaltimes. Meanwhile, other authors nd no or only less
explanatory power of liquidity for sovereign yield spreads (e.g. Codogno et al., 2003,
Geyer et al., 2004, Pagano and von Thadden, 2004, Favero et al., 2010, or Bernoth et
al., 2012). For example, Bernoth et al. (2012) nd that liquidity played only a role
in European sovereign bond yields before the start of the EMU, but not after the
start of the EMU. I follow Borgy et al. (2012) in their conclusion that liquidity risks
seem to play, at its best, only a minor role, in particular, for the sovereign bonds of
the four largest economies in Europe and during a nancial crisis.
Finally, the recent literature nds, in addition to the relevance of global risk aver-
sion, the importance of another common factor, widely interpreted as systemic risk
or redenomination risk. Evidence by e.g. Amisano and Tristani (2013), Ang and
Longsta¤ (2013), Caceres et al. (2010), De Santis (2014, 2015), Dewachter et al.
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(2015), Di Cesare et al. (2012), Geyer et al. (2004), Giordano et al. (2013), or Hör-
dahl and Tristani (2013) suggests that also systemic risk or redenomination risk and
nancial contagion e¤ects may be drivers of Euro area sovereign yield spreads. Geyer
et al. (2004) nd evidence for a common factor in yield spreads which they interpret
as systematic risk. They conclude that systematic risk arises from is a small but
positive probability of a general failure of the EMU(Geyer et al., 2004, p. 174).
Amisano and Tristani (2013) use a Markov switching VAR to examine contagion in
euro area sovereign bond spreads. Considering a normal and a crisis regime, they
nd that the risk of falling into the crisis regime depends on macroeconomic funda-
mentals, on risk aversion, and on the other countries regime dynamics. Di Cesare
et al. (2012) show that the surge in euro area sovereign yield spreads during the
debt crisis cannot be fully explained by country-specic scal variables and macro-
economic fundamentals but by a common non-fundamental factor. They argue that
this common risk factor is the perceived risk of a break-up in the euro area. Giordano
et al. (2013) categorize di¤erent types of contagion. In contrast to a large part of
the literature, using a dynamic panel approach, they do not nd evidence for pure
contagion, that is, a contagion that is completely unrelated fundamentals in euro
area bond markets during the debt crisis. Hördahl and Tristani (2013) construct a
quadratic, no-arbitrage term structure model for defaultable sovereign bonds. Using
yield spreads of ve di¤erent Euro area countries vis-à-vis German yields at corre-
sponding maturities, they nd that economic fundamentals, but also an unobservable
non-fundamental factor contribute signicantly to the surge in spreads of most of the
considered Euro area countries. De Santis (2015) proposes a measure for redenomi-
nation risk in the euro area using CDS spread data. He nds that redenomination
risk shocks adversely a¤ect euro area yield spreads. He also provides evidence for
spill-over e¤ects of redenomination shocks, concluding that these e¤ects are a source
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of systemic risk. Finally, Dewachter et al. (2015) show that economic fundamen-
tals are the dominant drivers of euro area sovereign bond spreads. However, also
shocks unrelated to economic fundamentals have played an important role during
the European debt crisis.
In the following, I present a multi-country a¢ ne term structure model where
a common non-fundamental factor which is by construction unrelated to the other
fundamental components, risk aversion, and Euro area wide and country-specic eco-
nomic factors drive Euro area yield spreads. Contributing to the literature, I try to
disentangle the e¤ects of this common non-fundamental factor and the risk aversion
variable on Euro area yield spreads. Specically, in contrast to the existing litera-
ture, the risk aversion measure used in this work is directly derived from European
sovereign bond markets.
4.3 The Model
This section develops a multi-country no-arbitrage a¢ ne term structure model for
the Eurozone. The model section is structured as follows. The rst part describes
the structural macroeconomic dynamics and casts the macro part into its state rep-
resentation. The state variables are then used as pricing factors in the term structure
model in the second subsection. Cross-equation restrictions, based on the assumption
of no-arbitrage, are employed to tie the movements of yields closely together. The
risk aversion variable is identied from restrictions on the prices of risk. Finally, the
last subsection discusses the properties of the risk aversion variable. In particular,
this subsection demonstrates that the risk aversion variable is the only driver of term
premia of the default-free government bonds.
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4.3.1 The State Equation
The model state system contains nine variables, six of them are observable, and
three are unobservable. The observables are the short-term interest rate rt, the
output gap gyt , the ination rate t, and the scal variables of the three sovereigns
whose sovereign bonds might be subjected to credit risk. The latent variables are
a common time-varying central banks ination target t , the risk aversion variable
vt, and a common risk factor Ct. This common risk factor is meant to capture
non-fundamental risks, i.e. the part of the spread between yields of a potentially
defaultable government bond and of a non-defaultable reference bond of the same
maturity that cannot be justied by country-specic economic factors and euro area
economic fundamentals. The analysis focuses only on countries belonging to the Euro
area. Therefore, monetary policy for all countries is conducted by a single central
bank. I follow Ireland (2015) closely in the specication of the dynamics of the Euro
area variables while the specication of the country-specic variables is based on
Borgy et al. (2012).
The central banks policy is depicted as choosing an ination rate target and ad-
justing the short-term interest rate accordingly. The incorporation of an unobserv-
able time-varying ination target is a common approach in the recent macro-nance
term structure literature (as e.g. in Dewachter and Lyrio, 2006, Hördahl et al., 2006,
Ireland, 2015, or Rudebusch and Wu, 2008). It allows for some variation in the con-
duction of monetary policy, and it helps to capture movements in long-term nominal
government bond yields which arise due to changes in central banks ination target.1
The central banks ination target is supposed to follow a stationary AR(1) process.
1In fact, Barr and Campbell (1997) for the UK and Gürkaynak et al. (2005) for the US nd
that movements in long-term interest rates occur mainly due to changes in expected ination.
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Specically,
t = (1  )  + t 1 + "t; (4.1)
where  is the steady state level of the ination target,  2 [0; 1),  > 0, and the
shock "t is standard normally distributed. As e.g. in Hördahl and Tristani (2012),
Ireland (2015), or Rudebusch and Wu (2008), the restriction on  is imposed to
ensure stationarity of the ination target process.2
By dening the ination gap and the interest rate gap, as in Ireland (2015), the
notation is simplied. Specically, the ination rate gap is dened as the deviation of
the ination rate from central banks ination target, gt  t   t ; and the interest
rate gap is dened as the deviation of the interest rate from the ination target,
grt  rt   t :
The central banks policy rule for the short-term nominal interest rate is specied
in terms of the interest rate gap, the ination gap, and the output gap. Specically,
the central bank sets the interest rate according to the following interest rate rule in
the spirit of Taylor (1993),
grt   gr = r
 
grt 1   gr

+ (1  r)

g

t + y (g
y
t   gy) + vvt

+ r"rt; (4.2)
where r 2 [0; 1] is the interest rate smoothing parameter,  > 0 is the central banks
response parameter on ination, y > 0 is the central banks response parameter on
the output gap, v is the central banks response parameter on the term premium
variable, r > 0 is a volatility parameter, and gr and gy are the steady state values of
grt and g
y
t , respectively. The shock "rt is supposed to be standard normally distributed
2A non-stationary ination target leads to non-stationary ination and non-stationary nominal
short-term interest rate. For models with homoscedastic shocks, a unit root in the nominal short-
term interest rate translates in undened asymptotic long-term bond yields (as discussed in Ireland,
2015, and shown by Campbell, et al., 1997, p. 433). Thus, imposing stationarity of the ination
target process ensures that the term structure part of the model is well-behaved.
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and represents the interest rate policy shock. The notation of the policy rule entails
the assumption that the central bank is on average able to implement its ination
target. Thus, in the steady state, the actual ination rate equals the central banks
target rate. While the response parameter  and y are restricted to be non-negative,
the response parameter v is unconstrained. By restrictions on the prices of risk, the
risk aversion variable is constructed to account for all variations in the prices of risk.
As demonstrated in Section (4.3.3), these restrictions imply that the risk aversion
variable is also the only source for uctuations in the one-period return premium. If
the coe¢ cient v is positive, the central bank increases the short-term interest rate
in response to a rise in term premia. In contrast, if the coe¢ cient v is negative the
central bank lowers the short-term interest rate in response to a rise in term premia.3
To the extent that the central bank does respond on the risk aversion variable,
including this response in the monetary policy rule is important for modeling the
expectation of future short-term interest rates and thus for separating the movements
in long-term bond yields into changes in the expectation of future short-term rates
and changes in risk aversion. In fact, Herrmann (2015) for the Euro area and Ireland
(2015) for the U.S. nd that there is a systematic response of the respective central
bank to changes in the risk aversion variable and with-it to term premia movements.
The dynamics of the output gap and the ination gap are modeled as linear func-
tions of its own lags and lags of the other state variables. Identication is achieved
by contemporaneous timing restrictions. Specically, the output gap depends on
its own lags, on lags of the interest rate gap, on lags of the ination gap, on lags
of the risk aversion variable, on the innovations of the ination target "?t, on the
3See Chapter (3.3.1) for a more detailed discussion of the theoretical considerations of the central
banks response to movements in term premia.
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innovations of ination "t, and on its own innovations "yt,
gyt   gy = yr
 
grt 1   gr

+
3X
i=1
iyg

t i +
3X
i=1
iyy
 
gyt i   gy

(4.3)
+yvvt 1 + y"t + y??"?t + y"yt;
where the volatility parameter y is non-negative, and "yt is supposed to be standard
normally distributed. The evolution of the ination gap depends on own lags, on
lags of the interest rate gap, on lags of the output gap, on lags of the risk aversion
variable, on innovations of the ination target "?t, and on its own innovations "t,
gt = r
 
grt 1   gr

+
3X
i=1
ig

t i +
3X
i=1
iy
 
gyt i   gy

(4.4)
+vvt 1 + ??"?t + "t;
where the volatility parameter  is non-negative, and "t is standard normally
distributed.
The scal variable of a country is given by the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio
of the respective country. In the choice of the change of the debt-to-GDP ratio as
the measure of scal sustainability, I follow Borgy et al. (2012) and Dewachter et
al. (2015). Similar to Borgy et al. (2012), the dynamics of the scal variables are
modeled by a stationary AR(1) process,
dit = 
i
dd
i
t 1 + 
i
d"
i
dt 8i 2 fr, it, es (4.5)
where dit denotes the scal variable of a country i, 
i
d 2 [0; 1) is the persistence pa-
rameter and id > 0 is the volatility parameter. The shock "
i
dt is standard normally
distributed. For parsimonious reasons, the specication supposes that the debt-to-
GDP growth rate is exogenous from the other state variables. Omitting feedback
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e¤ects from the European business cycle and the common variables to the national
scal variables help to reduce the number of parameters in an already highly para-
meterized model.
The model features a latent common non-fundamental risk variable which can
a¤ect the yield spreads of the Euro area sovereigns. This factor potentially captures
the e¤ects of redenomination risk or contagion on yield spreads. As in Hördahl and
Tristani (2013), the common non-fundamental risk variable is supposed to be unre-
lated to economic fundamentals but is allowed to exhibits an endogenous dynamic
through a feedback e¤ect C and a structural shock "Ct developments. Specically,
the dynamic of the common non-fundamental risk variable is given by the following
AR(1) process
Ct = CCt 1 + C"Ct; (4.6)
where C 2 [0; 1), C > 0, and the shock "Ct is standard normally distributed.
The risk aversion variable is supposed to be the most endogenous variable in
the economy. It does respond to shocks to the common variables ("rt, "t, "yt, "?t,
and "Ct) and the country-specic scal variables ("
fr
dt , "
es
dt, "
it
dt) and also to a risk
aversion shock ("vt). This shock is meant to account for not macro related shifts
in risk aversion. Moreover, the stochastic process allows for endogenous dynamics,
through a feedback e¤ect (vv). The risk aversion variable is identied from the
time variation in the prices of risk in the stochastic discount factor. Precisely, by
construction, all movements in the prices of risk are attributed to the risk aversion
variable (see Section (4.3.3)). Movements in the prices of risk are in turn identied
from the default-free reference term structure. Specically, the evolution of the risk
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aversion variable is given by
vt = vvvt 1 + vrr"rt + v"t + vyy"yt + v??"?t (4.7)
+vCC"Ct + 
fr
vd
ft
d "
fr
dt + 
es
vd
es
d "
es
dt + 
it
vd
it
d "
it
dt + v"vt;
where the volatility parameter v is non-negative, and "vt is standard normally dis-
tributed.
The chosen structure imposes restrictions in order to identify the structural
model. As in Ireland (2015), shocks to the ination target "t a¤ect the inter-
est rate gap, the ination gap, the output gap, and the risk aversion variable only
contemporaneously. All further e¤ects from the change in the ination target arise
only from changes in the ination gap and the interest rate gap. Thus, Irelands
(2015) specication imposes a form of long-run monetary neutrality. To disentan-
gle the e¤ects of di¤erent fundamental disturbances on the economys variables, eq.
(4.2) - (4.7) contain restrictions on the contemporaneous relationship of some of the
models variables.
The central bank responds immediately to changes in the risk aversion variable
while the risk aversion variable only responds to interest rate shocks. While the
interest rate responds immediately to uctuations of the output gap and the ination
gap, changes in the short-term interest rate do not a¤ect the output gap and the
ination gap immediately, but with one period lag. Following Ireland (2015), the
output gap shock "yt does only a¤ect the ination gap with a lag of one period, while
a shock to the ination gap a¤ects the output gap contemporaneously. Moreover,
the scal variables are modeled by an autoregressive process, as already discussed
above. In addition, as in Borgy et al. (2012) and Hördahl and Tristani (2013),
direct feedbacks from the national scal variables to the Euro area business cycle are
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omitted. However, through their e¤ects on vt, they can a¤ect the economy.
Dene the vectors Xt and "t containing the state variables and the structural
disturbances, respectively, by
Xt =

grt g
y
t g
y
t 1 g
y
t 2 g

t g

t 1 g

t 2 

t Ct vt d
fr
t d
es
t d
it
t
0
and
"t =

"rt "yt 0 0 "t 0 0 "?t "Ct "vt "
fr
d "
es
d "
it
d
0
;
then, eq. (4.1) - (4.6) can be written more compactly,
P0Xt = 0 + P1Xt 1 + 0"t: (4.8)
For the precise denition of the matrices P0, P1, 0, and 0 see Appendix (4.A.1).
Eq. (4.8) gives the structural form of the model. Multiplying by P 10 yields the
reduced form representation of the state equation,
Xt = + PXt 1 + "t; (4.9)
where
 = P 10 0;
P = P 10 P1;
and
 = P 10 0:
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4.3.2 The Term Structure Model
A¢ ne term structure models, as developed by Du¢ e and Kan (1996) and Dai and
Singleton (2000), are a particular class of term structure models where the time t
yield y()t of  period zero coupon bond is modeled as an a¢ ne function of the state
vector.
The outlined model follows the discrete-time version by Ang and Piazzesi (2003).
Restrictions on the prices of risk similar to those in Dewachter and Iania (2011),
Dewachter et al. (2014), and Ireland (2015) are imposed to identify the risk aversion
variable vt as the only source of uctuations in the prices of risk. In order to study
the role of default risk in this a¢ ne set-up, I employ the extension of a¢ ne term
structure models to defaultable bond as proposed by Du¢ e and Singleton (1999).
This subsection is structured as follows: the rst part derives the default-risk-free
bond prices and discusses the restrictions on the prices of risk. The second part
derives the prices of defaultable bonds.
Default risk-free Bond Pricing and the Prices of Risk
The short-end of the yield curve, the nominal short-term risk-free interest rate, is
modeled as an a¢ ne function of the state vector Xt. The short-term interest rate
equation is given by
rt = 0 + 
0
1Xt; (4.10)
where 0 is a scalar, and 
0
1 is a 1x13 selection vector indicating the position of g
r
t
and  t in Xt. The short-term rate is from eq. (4.2) under the control of the central
bank. The coe¢ cients 0 and 1 are restricted to ensure consistency between the
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macro part and the term structure part of the model. This requires 0 = 0 and

0
1 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

;
so that eq. (4.10) corresponds to the denition of the interest rate gap.
The prices of government bonds are supposed to be arbitrage free. As shown in
Harrison and Kreps (1979) or Du¢ e (2001, pp. 108) this assumption guarantees for
the existence of a positive stochastic discount factor. Following, among many others,
Ang and Piazzesi (2003), the stochastic discount factor which is used to price all
bonds in the economy is given by the following log-normal process
mt+1 = exp

 rt   1
2

0
tt   
0
t"t+1

; (4.11)
where t are the time-varying prices of risk. If all elements in t are equal to zero,
investors are risk neutral. The prices of risk are supposed to be a¢ ne functions of
the state variables, taking the functional form
t = 0 + 1Xt; (4.12)
where 0 is a 13 1 vector and 1 is a 13 13 matrix.
In the following, restrictions on the matrix 1 are imposed. First, similar to
Dewachter and Iania (2011), Dewachter et al. (2014), and Ireland (2015), in order
to identify the risk aversion variable vt as the only source for time-variation in the
prices of risk, all elements in 1, except the 10th column, are restricted to be equal
to zero. Second, I assume that only contemporaneous state variables can be priced.
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After applying the restrictions on the matrix 1, 1 reads
1 (; i) =

r y 0 0  0 0 

C v dfr des dit
0
for i = 10,
1 (; i) = 0 for i 6= 10,
and the corresponding vector 0 reads
0 =

r0 
y
0 0 0 

0 0 0 

0 
C
0 
v
0 
dfr
0 
des
0 
dit
0
0
:
From eq. (4.12) these restrictions work to attribute all movements in the prices of
risk t to the variable that is ordered at the 10th position in Xt, that is, the risk
aversion variable vt. As demonstrated in section (4.3.3), from the restricted form of
1 also all time-variations in the one-period return premium are attributed to the
risk aversion variable.
Let P +1t denote the price of a risk-free zero-coupon bond maturing at time t+  ,
then, given the no-arbitrage assumption, the pricing kernelmt+1, and the a¢ ne prices
of risk t, from the no-arbitrage condition
P +1t = Et
 
mt+1P

t+1

;
the bond price P +1t can be written as an exponentially a¢ ne function of the state
vector Xt. Specically, the price of a t +  -period risk-free zero-coupon bond P +1t
at period t is given by
P +1t = exp
 
A+1 + B
0
+1Xt

: (4.13)
The coe¢ cients A+1 and B+1 can be computed by the standard recursive formulas
as provided by Ang and Piazzesi (2003).
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Pricing of Defaultable Bonds
Following Du¢ e and Singleton (1999), the no-arbitrage a¢ ne term structure model
can be extended to price also defaultable bonds. Du¢ e and Singleton (1999) show
that under the assumption that the recovery value of a defaulting bond is a fraction
of the bonds value conditional on no default would occur (the so-called recovery
of market valueassumption), there exists some recovery-adjusted default intensity
process sj;t (see Appendix (4.A.2)). Defaultable bonds can then be priced using the
same formulas, simply by replacing the risk-free short-term interest rate rt by the
default-adjusted short-term interest rate rj;t+1 = rt + sj;t+1, Then, bond prices can
be expressed by
~P +1j;t = Et

exp

 rj;t+1  
1
2

0
tt   
0
t"t+1

~P j;t+1

,
where ~P +1j;t denotes the time-tprice of a  + 1-period defaultable bond of country j.
If the recovery-adjusted default intensity(see e.g. Monfort and Renne, 2011) sj;t
of a country j is also an a¢ ne function of the state vector,
sj;t =  j;0 +  j;1Xt,
then one can proceed as in standard valuation models for default-risk free bonds.
Hence, the price of a zero-coupon defaultable bond can be expressed by
~P +1j;t = exp
 
Aj;+1 + B
0
j;+1Xt

(4.14)
where the specic solution of the pricing matrices Aj;+1 and B0j;+1 can be computed
by the standard recursive formulas. However, these formulas come along with intense
computational costs since the pricing matrices have to be calculated for each period
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 = 1; :::; 60, each country j and each evaluation of the log-posterior function. There-
fore, I apply an algorithm based by Borgy et al. (2012). Instead of computing the
pricing matrices Aj;+1 and B0j;+1 recursively, this algorithm computes only selected
nested bond maturities and concatenates country-specic pricing matrices to com-
pute parts of the pricing matrices for all countries simultaneously. As demonstrated
by Borgy et al. (2012), this algorithm reduces computation time considerably. The
solution for the pricing matrices Aj;+1 and B0j;+1and the algorithm are discussed in
Appendix (4.A.3).
Finally, the dependence of the adjusted default intensities of country j on the
state variables, that is, the elements in the vector  j;1 need to be specied. Instead
of estimating all elements in  j;1, I follow, among others, Borgy et al. (2012) and
impose restrictions on  j;1. This helps to conserve the number of parameters that
need to be estimated. First, the German term structure is supposed to be free of
default risk, thus  ger;1 = 013x1. Noteworthy, in this case, the solution of Ager;+1
and B0ger;+1 reduces to the solution for pricing matrices of the risk-free bonds A+1
and B+1, respectively. Thus, the German term structure is taken as the default-free
reference term structure. It is used to identify the time variation in the prices of
risk. Second, as in Borgy et al. (2012) and Dewachter et al. (2015), the spread
between risk-free and defaultable bonds depends on common and country-specic
factors. In particular, the spread between the yield on a defaultable bond of country
j and the yield of a risk-free bond with the same maturity is assumed to depend on
the common, euro area economic fundamentals, the common non-fundamental risk
factor, and the country-specic scal variable of country j. However, it does not
depend on the scal variables of the other countries. Finally, only contemporaneous
variables are allowed to a¤ect spreads.
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Bond Yields
The continuously compounded bond yields y()j;t are dened by
y
()
ger;t =  
log (P t )

;
and
y
()
j;t =  
log

~P j;t


8j 6= ger:
Given the bond prices P +1t and ~P
+1
j;t from eq. (4.13) and eq. (4.14), respectively,
the yields are given by
y
()
ger;t = A +B
0
Xt; (4.15)
and
y
()
j;t = Aj; +B
0
j;Xt 8j 6= ger; (4.16)
respectively, where A =   A= , B0 =   B0= , Aj; =   Aj;= and B0j; =   B0j;= .
4.3.3 Term Premia
This section demonstrates how the restrictions on the prices of risk a¤ect the one-
period return premium. It can be shown that all movements in the one-period return
premium can be to attribute to the risk aversion variable vt. Term structure premia
can be captured in di¤erent forms (see e.g. Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2008, or Joslin
et al., 2014). Similar to Dewachter and Iania (2011), I focus in this analysis on the
return premium (as classied by Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2008). For a more detailed
discussion of di¤erent types of term premia and their relation see Section (3.3.3).
The one-period return premium is dened as the expected excess holding period
return (or short expected excess return). It is the expected return from buying a
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long-term bond in period t and selling it in the subsequent period t+ 1 in excess of
the expected return from buying a one-period bond. Formally, the one-period return
premium is dened as
Et

hprx
()
t+1

= Et

hpr
()
t+1   y(1)t

;
where hpr()t+1 is the holding period return dened by hpr
()
t+1  p( 1)t+1  p()t ; where p()t
is the log price of a zero-coupon bond maturing in t +  periods, p()t  log

P
()
t

and y(1)t is the yield of a one-period bond. The holding period return hpr
()
t+1 is the
return from buying a bond at time t that matures in t +  periods and selling this
bond the period after.
To bring the one-period return premium in a computationally more tractable
form, the expected holding period return and the expected short rate have to be
calculated. The expected future short rate is given from eq. (4.10) by Et (rt+1) =
01Et (Xt+1). To calculate the expected future short-term interest rate, it proves to
be helpful to demean the state equation, eq. (4.9). Let  be the unconditional mean
of the state vector, then from eq. (4.9)  is given by  = (I   P ) 1 , and the
demeaned state equation reads Xt+1    = P (Xt   ) + "t+1. Then, the time-t
conditional expected future short rate for period t+ 1, can be computed by
Et (rt+1) = 
0
1 (I   0P )  + 01PXt:
The expected holding period return can be calculated by plugging the model implied
log prices, p()t = A + B
0
Xt, into the denition of the one-period holding period
return. Plugging the expected short-term interest rate and the expected holding
period return into the denition of the one-period return premium and rearranging
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terms (see Appendix (4.A.4)) yields
Et

hprx
()
t+1

= B0 1 (0 + 1Xt) 
1
2
B0 1
0 B 1: (4.17)
Due to the restricted form of 1 the only source of variations in Et

hprx
()
t+1

is the
variable that is ordered at the 10th position in Xt, that is, the risk aversion variable
vt. Thus, eq. (4.17) reveals that all variation over time in one-period return premia
arises solely from uctuations in vt. If all elements in the matrix 1 are equal to
zero, then the one-period return premium is constant. Likewise, if vt is constant over
time, the return premium is constant.
4.4 Estimation
4.4.1 Data
My sample contains monthly data on the Euro area from the beginning of 2000 until
the End of 2014. I use government bonds from the four biggest economies in the
Euro area: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The German term structure is taken
as the reference term structure and considered to be free of default risk.4 Not only
is the country relatively large and plays a central role in the Euro area, but also,
as shown by De Santis (2014) does the German Bund yield co-move with the OIS
rate. The sample contains data for the country-specic scal variables, the Euro area
business cycle, and the risk-free short-term interest rate.
The model requires zero-coupon yield data. However, government bonds with
maturities of more than one year usually do pay coupons. The zero-coupon yields
need to be constructed from these data. All zero-coupon yields are constructed using
4As noted by De Santis (2015), the expected probability of a credit event in Germany is consid-
ered to be negligible.
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Figure 4.2: One-year bond yields of Euro area sovereigns
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the same method to ensure the comparability of yields across countries. Specically,
I estimate the zero-coupon bond yields from the prices of government bonds of each
of the four countries using the Nelson-Siegel (1987) model. The data for the end-of-
month government bond prices of each country is taken from Datastream. Appendix
(4.A.5) describes the data selection and the estimation of the zero-coupon yields
in more detail. After constructing the zero-coupon yield data, for the subsequent
estimation, yields with maturities of 3 months and 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years for the
German term structure are selected and yields with maturities of 1 and 5 years for
the French, Italian and Spanish term structure are selected. Figure (4.2) and (4.3)
depict the estimated one-year and ve-year yields of the government bonds of France,
Germany, Italy and Spain.
The Euro area variables are the ination rate, the output gap, and the short-term
interest rate. While the rst two variables capture the European business cycle, the
latter captures monetary policy. The ination rate is measured by the annual rate of
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Figure 4.3: Five-year bond yields of Euro area sovereigns
2000 2005 2010 2015
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
5-year bond yield Germany
5-year bond yield France
5-year bond yield Spain
5-year bond yield Italy
change of the seasonally adjusted HICP of the euro area. The output gap is dened
as the percentage (logarithmic) deviation of actual output from trend output. Since
GDP data is only available at a quarterly frequency, I use the seasonally adjusted
industrial production index of the Euro area as a proxy for output (as e.g. Clarida et
al., 1998, or Favero, 2006). Trend output is constructed using the one-sided HP lter
with a smoothing parameter equal to 14,400. The Euro area-wide, risk-free monetary
policy rate is proxied by the 3-month rate of zero-coupon German government bonds.
In choosing the 3-month rate as the rate with the shortest maturity, I follow the
practice of the Bundesbank (see Schich, 1997).5
The scal variable of a country is measured by the change in the debt-to-GDP
ratio of the respective country. The data for the debt-to-GDP ratio is taken from
Datastream. Since the debt-to-GDP ratio is only available on a quarterly basis,
5The trading volume of government bonds decreases considerably for short residual maturities so
that their prices seem to be signicantly inuenced by low liquidity (see BIS, 2005, p.9). Therefore,
prices of bonds with residual maturities shorter than one month are excluded.
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the missing observations need to be constructed. Instead of simply interpolating
the data, I follow Hördahl and Tristani (2013) and suppose an autoregressive law of
motion for the debt-to-GDP ratio. Specically, in a preceding step, by presuming the
autoregressive law of motion the time-path of the missing observations is constructed
by the Kalman lter. Finally, I suppose that the long-run mean of the change in the
debt-to-GDP ratio is zero (as in Borgy et al., 2012).
4.4.2 The State-Space System
The state equation (4.9) and the measurement equations (4.15) and (4.16) form the
state-space system. For the estimation, a version of the state-space model without
constant terms is employed. Following Ireland (2015), by using demeaned data and
dropping the constant terms appearing in eq. (4.9), (4.15), and (4.16), the estimation
is simplied. In particular, under the assumption that the central bank is, on average,
able to implement its target ination rate, the steady state values of gr,  , and gy can
be calibrated to match their data averages. More precisely, by setting the steady-state
ination target equal to the steady-state value of the ination rate, the steady-state
value of the interest rate gap gr can be calculated from the average of the short-term
interest rate net the average of the ination rate. The steady state value of the
output gap is set equal to the sample mean of the output gap. As in Borgy et al.
(2012), the scal factors are assumed to have a mean of zero. This implies that the
debt-to-GDP ratio of each country is stationary. Finally, as shown by Ireland (2015),
the values of the elements in 0 can be set so that the steady state values of yields
match the average yields. The state equation then reads
Xt = PXt 1 + "t;
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and the measurement equation can then be written by
Zt = UXt + V t;
where Zt is a vector of observables, U is a matrix connecting the observables to the
state vector, t is a vector of i:i:d: distributed errors and V is a matrix capturing
the volatility parameters of these errors. The vector of observables Zt consists of the
government bond yields of the four countries, the country-specic scal variables and
the three observables capturing the European business cycle and monetary policy.
The vector of observables reads
Zt 

y12ger;t y
24
ger;t y
36
ger;t y
48
ger;t y
60
ger;t y
12
fr;t y
60
fr;t
y12es;t y
60
es;t y
12
it;t y
60
it;t d
fr
t d
es
t d
it
t rt g
y
t t
0
:
The denition of the matrix U is presented in Appendix (4.A.1).
The matrix V contains the volatility parameters of the yield errors. The errors
are attached to avoid stochastic singularity. The problem of stochastic singularity
arises in macro-nance term structure models because a high dimensional vector
of observables (the yield data and the observable macro variables) is tted to a
lower dimensional state vector. Instead of attaching errors to some selected yields, I
assume that all yields are a¤ected by error terms, as in Chib and Ergashev (2009).
The last columns of V are equal to zero, reecting that the short-term interest rate,
the output gap, the ination rate, and the changes in the debt-to-GDP ratios of the
three countries are not measured with errors.
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4.4.3 Estimation Method
The model captures the e¤ect of national scal variables, investors risk aversion,
the European business cycle, a time-varying ination target, and a common non-
fundamental risk factor on sovereign yields. Changes in risk aversion are identied
from the default-free term structure. The non-fundamental risk variable is given by
the part of sovereign yields that cannot be accounted for by economic fundamentals
and country-specic scal factors.
In order to account for the interaction of risk aversion and the non-fundamental
risk factor, it is not possible to split the estimation into separate steps (e.g. estimating
rst the risk-free term structure and the macro dynamics together and then the term
structure of each of the other counties separately). Instead, the term structures of
the four countries under consideration need to be estimated jointly. This complicates
the estimation considerably.
Due to the non-linearity of the parameters in the Bj; -matrices of the measure-
ment equations, even the estimation of pure latent a¢ ne term structure model is
computationally challenging and time-consuming (see e.g. Chib and Ergashev, 2009,
or Christensen et al., 2011). Due to the dynamics and interactions of the macroeco-
nomic variables in the state system, the estimation becomes even more challenging
(as discussed e.g. in Rudebusch and Wu, 2008). The non-linearity of the parameters
in the Bj; matrices can produce multimodal likelihood functions, as demonstrated
by Chib and Ergashev (2009). In this case, Bayesian estimation techniques help to
down-weight regions of the parameter space which are not economically reasonable
and to rule out economically implausible parameter values by employing a priori
information. As a result, the joint posterior distribution can be smoother than the
joint likelihood function (see Chib and Ergashev, 2009). Moreover, the usage of
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prior information is helpful when dealing with short data sets in highly parameter-
ized models like this one.
Posterior and Likelihood function
Formally, let Z denotes the data set, Z = (Z1; :::; ZT )
0, where T is the number of
total observations, and let  denotes the vector of all parameters contained in the
matrices P , , , and V , then from Bayes rule, the joint posterior distribution of
,  (jX), is obtained by combining the likelihood function of the observables, the
prior distribution of the parameter vector and a norming constant, thus,
 (jZ) / L (Zj) p () ;
where L (Zj) is the likelihood function, and p () is the prior distribution. If the
initial state X0 and the innovations f"t; tgTt=1 are multivariate Gaussians, then the
distribution of the observables in Zt conditional on all information of the observables
available at time t   1 is also Gaussian (see Hamilton, 1994, p. 385). The joint
density of the date set Z given  can be written as
L (Zj) =
TY
t=1
(2) 
T
2

det
 
Rtjt 1
  1
2
 exp

 1
2
 
Zt   UXtjt 1
0  
Rtjr 1
 1  
Zt   UXtjt 1

;
where Xtjt 1 denotes the one step ahead forecast, Xtjt 1  E [XtjZt 1; ], and Rtjt 1
denotes the conditional variance, Rtjt 1  V ar (ZtjZt 1; ).6 Since two of the state
variables are latent, the likelihood L (Zj) is constructed using the standard Kalman
lter recursions (see Harvey, 1991). Since the posterior density is, in general, not
6See Section (3.4.3) and the therein mentioned Appendix for the explicit expressions of the
prediction and updating equations of the mean and the variance.
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known in closed form, I apply Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, in par-
ticular an Adaptive-Metropolis algorithm, to simulate draws from the joint posterior
distribution.
MCMC Method
The choice of the proposal density of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is impor-
tant for the speed of the convergence of the Metropolis-Hastings chain. As already
discussed in Section (3.4.3), the scaling of the proposal density by hand, becomes
very hard if not infeasible. Therefore, in order to evaluate the posterior, I apply the
Adaptive Metropolis (AM) algorithm as introduced by Haario et al. (2001).
The main idea of the AM algorithm is to run a chain that improves on the yby
using all information cumulated so far. More precisely, in each step of the algorithm,
the covariance of the proposal distribution is updated using the information from
of all of the previous states. Therefore, the AM algorithm adapts continuously to
the target distribution. Apart from the updating scheme, the algorithm is based
on the standard random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Haario et al. (2001)
show that although the AM algorithm is non-Markovian due to its adaptive nature,
it still has the correct ergodic properties. A detailed description of the outlined AM
algorithm and its implementation are given in Section (3.4.3).
In order to start the algorithm, the initial covariance matrix of the proposal
distribution is set equal to a scaled down version of the inverse of the Hessian matrix
computed at the posterior mode. The choice of an appropriate initial covariance C0
helps to speed up the algorithm and thus to increase e¢ ciency (see Haario et al.,
2001). The initial parameter vector is set to the parameter values at the mode. For
the choice of the scaling parameter sd, I follow Haario et al. (2001), whose choice, in
turn, is based on Gelman et al. (1996), and set sd = (2:4)
2 =d. The initial period is
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set to n0 = 20; 000, and the number of total draws is set to n = 1; 000; 000.
Since Newton-like optimization routines tend to get stuck in local optima, there
are not suitable to nd the mode of the posterior function (as discussed by e.g.
Chib and Ergashev, 2009). In order to nd the mode of the posterior, I employ
an evolutionary optimization algorithm. Precisely, the Covariance Matrix Adaption
Evolution Strategy (CMA-ES) algorithm is a stochastic method for numerical para-
meter optimization of non-linear, non-convex functions with many local optima (see
Hansen and Ostermeier, 2001). The computation of the mode is conducted by the
software package Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011).
4.4.4 Parameter Restrictions and Prior Distributions
Parameter Restrictions
For the estimation, restrictions are imposed to ensure the stationarity of the macro
dynamics, the stability of the arbitrage recursions, and the identication of the model.
Stationarity of the state dynamics requires the eigenvalues of the matrix P to be less
than unity in absolute value, jeig (P )j < 1. A similar restriction has to be imposed
to guarantee the stability of the no-arbitrage recursions (see e.g. Dai and Singleton,
2000). Specically, the eigenvalues of P   have to be less than unity in absolute
value, jeig (P   )j < 1. For identication purposes, the scaling of the latent
variables vt and Ct have to be pinned down, since a multiplicative transformation of
each of the latent factors leads to an observationally equivalent system. To pin down
the scale of the latent variables, the scaling parameters of these variables are set equal
to v = 0:01 and C = 0:01. In the same spirit, the direction in which an increase in
the risk aversion variable vt moves the prices of risk, needs to be specied. Following
Ireland (2015), without loss of generality, the constraint   0 is imposed. Finally,
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similar to Dewachter et al. (2014) and Ireland (2015), to guarantee that vt only moves
the prices of risk associated with the other four state variable, the restriction v = 0
is imposed. This imposes that the risk aversion variable is not itself a sourced for
priced risk. After applying the restrictions, there are 83 parameters left to estimate.
Prior Distributions
This section presents the prior distributions. By applying prior distributions to
the parameters, economically non-meaningful regions of the parameter space can be
down-weighted. This reduces the complexity of the maximization problem (see Chib
and Ergashev, 2009, for a more detailed discussion).
The rst part of the table (4.1) displays the prior distributions of the parameters
of the monetary policy rule and the parameters associated with the endogenous dy-
namic of the other state variables. I follow closely Smets and Wouters (2003) for the
choice of the priors for the monetary policy rule coe¢ cients. The parameter captur-
ing the degree of interest rate smoothing r is B (0:8; 0:05) distributed. The choice
of the Beta distribution captures the belief that the parameter lies in the interval
between 0 and 1. The prior distributions of the response coe¢ cient on ination gap
 and on the output gap are y are given by G (1:5; 0:25) and G (0:5; 0:1), respec-
tively. The Gamma distribution is employed to capture the assumption that both
parameters are not negative. The coe¢ cient of central banks response to changes in
the risk aversion variable v is assumed to be N (0; 0:25) distributed. The choice of
the prior means implies that monetary policy is, a priori, characterized by a standard
Taylor rule.
The prior distributions of the parameters describing the dynamics of the macro-
economy are also displayed in the rst part of table (4.1). The prior distributions
for the state equation (eq. 4.2 - 4.7) are chosen in the spirit of Minnesota (see Lit-
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Table 4.1: Summary of the Prior Distributions
Taylor Rule and Persistence Parameter
Param. type mean std. dev. Param. type mean std. dev.
r B 0.80 0.050 1y N 0.00 0.150
 G 1.50 0.250 2y N 0.00 0.075
y G 0.50 0.150 3y N 0.00 0.050
v B 0.00 0.250 1yy N 0.90 0.150
r N -0.20 0.150 2yy N 0.00 0.075
1 N 0.90 0.150 3yy N 0.00 0.050
2 N 0.00 0.075 id B 0.90 0.100
3 N 0.00 0.050 C B 0.90 0.100
1y N 0.00 0.150  B 0.90 0.100
2y N 0.00 0.075 yv N 0.00 0.250
3y N 0.00 0.050 v N 0.00 0.250
yr N -0.20 0.150
Volatility and co-movement Parameters
Param. type mean std. dev. Param. type mean std. dev.
vr N 0.00 2.00 y IG 0.01 0.200
v N 0.00 2.00  IG 0.01 0.200
vy N 0.00 2.00 frd IG 0.01 0.200
v N 0.00 2.00 esd IG 0.01 0.200
vC N 0.00 2.00 itd IG 0.01 0.200
frvd N 0.00 2.00 12 IG 0.1 1.000
esvd N 0.00 2.00 24 IG 0.1 1.000
itvd N 0.00 2.00 36 IG 0.1 1.000
y N 0.00 2.00 48 IG 0.1 1.000
y N 0.00 2.00 60 IG 0.1 1.000
 N 0.00 2.00 i12 IG 0.1 1.000
r IG 0.01 0.20 i60 IG 0.1 1.000
 IG 0.01 0.20
Prices of Risk and Spread Parameters
Param. type mean std. dev. Param. type mean std. dev.
 id N 0.00 2.00 r N 0.00 25.00
 igy N 0.00 2.00  N 0.00 25.00
 i N 0.00 2.00 C N 0.00 25.00
 ir N 0.00 2.00  N 0.00 25.00
 iv N 0.00 2.00 y N 0.00 25.00
 iC N 0.00 2.00 d;i N 0.00 25.00
 i N 0.00 2.00
Summary of the prior distributions of the Parameters. Type of the distribution is either
N , B, G, or IG where N denotes the Normal distribution, B the Beta distribution, G the
Gamma distribution, and IG the Inverse-Gamma distribution. The prior distribution
holds for all countries i, 8i = fr; es; it.
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terman, 1986) by assuming that almost all coe¢ cients are normal distributed and
by setting the prior means of most of the coe¢ cients equal to zero, except for those
coe¢ cients corresponding to the rst own lags of the dependent variables. These
coe¢ cients are set equal to 0:9 as suggested by Koop and Korobilis (2010). The
choice of the prior means reects the assumption that these variables exhibit a high
degree of persistence, but do not follow a unit root process. The standard devia-
tions of the prior distributions of the parameters are weighted by the lag length,
implying that with increasing lag length the coe¢ cients are shrunk towards zero.
Departing from Minnesota and following Dewachter and Iania (2011) and Dewachter
et al. (2014), I choose a negative prior mean for the parameters 1yr and 
1
r. These
choices capture the beliefs that an increase in the interest rate dampens economic
activity. For the parameters yv and v, I choose a relatively uninformative prior
distribution N (0; 0:25). This specication assumes that movements in the risk vari-
able do not a¤ect output and ination a priori. The coe¢ cient of the ination target
process is B (0:9; 0:1) distributed. Employing the Beta distribution guarantees that
the process of the ination target is stationary while avoiding that the central banks
ination target jumps erratically. Finally, the persistence parameter of the com-
mon non-fundamental risk factor C and the persistence parameters of the change
in the debt-to-GDP ratios id, 8i 2 ffr; es; itg, are also assumed to be B (0:9; 0:1)
distributed.
The second part of table (4.1) presents the prior distributions of the volatility
parameters associated with the structural shocks, the yield errors, and the prior
distributions of the co-movement parameters. The prior distributions of the volatility
parameters of the structural shocks and the yield errors are given by IG (0:01; 0:2)
and IG (0:0001; 0:001), respectively, corresponding to a mean of 1 percentage point
of the structural shocks and a mean of 0:01 percentage points of the yield errors.
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This specication captures the beliefs that yield errors should be rather small. I
employ the Inverse Gamma distribution to prevent the volatility parameters from
being negative or equal to 0. Note that the table (4.1) displays a reparameterized
version of the volatility parameters of the yield errors. The reparameterization is
performed since the Inverse-Gamma distribution is not very exible in dealing with
very small numbers, as discussed by Chib and Ergashev (2009). Therefore, the
transformations j  sj, 8j 2 f12; 24; 36; 48; 60g, and ik  sik, 8k 2 f12; 60g ;
8i 2 ffr; es; itg, are performed, where s is given by s = 1000. The prior distributions
for the co-movement parameters are N (0; 2) distributed. For the elements in the
vectors  es,  fr, and  it, I use relatively uninformed priors N (0; 2). Finally, for the
prior distributions of the parameters in the matrix of the prices of risk 1, I follow
Dewachter and Iania (2011) and Dewachter et al. (2014). The last part of table (4.1)
presents the priors for the prices of risk. Specically, for the parameters in 1, I use
a loose, zero mean prior N (0; 25).
The overall choice of the priors satises the stationarity condition of the state
equation, jeig (P )j < 1, and the stability condition of the no-arbitrage recursions,
jeig (P   1)j < 1.
4.5 Results
This section presents the results of the estimation. Table (4.2) - (4.4) list the es-
timated parameters. The tables report the posterior modes, the posterior means,
and the 90% highest posterior density (HPD) interval of the estimated parameters.
While the posterior mode is obtained by maximizing the (log-) posterior distribution,
the latter results are obtained by using the Adaptive Metropolis algorithm outlined
in Section (4.4.3). In this model, a part of the spreads is explained by a common
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Table 4.2: Results: Posterior Distributions (Part I)
Param. Prior Mean Post. Mode Post. Mean 90% HPD Interval Prior
r 0.800 0.7910 0.7977 0.7682 0.8296 B
 1.500 1.0845 1.1030 0.7999 1.3907 G
y 0.500 0.1682 0.1791 0.1357 0.2195 G
v 0.000 -0.1609 -0.1905 -0.2393 -0.1390 N
vv 0.900 0.9885 0.9804 0.9650 0.9988 B
 0.900 0.9800 0.9800 0.9770 0.9829 B
C 0.900 0.9990 0.9987 0.9977 0.9997 B
frd 0.900 0.9937 0.9884 0.9785 0.9998 B
esd 0.900 0.9934 0.9898 0.9813 0.9999 B
itd 0.900 0.9962 0.9917 0.9835 0.9999 B
v 0.000 0.0092 0.0111 0.0062 0.0157 N
yv 0.000 -0.0183 -0.0177 -0.0339 0.0012 N
r -0.200 -0.0211 -0.0130 -0.0348 0.0076 N
1 0.900 0.8590 0.8439 0.7589 0.9301 N
2 0.000 -0.0358 -0.0339 -0.1127 0.0571 N
3 0.000 0.0163 0.0231 -0.0183 0.0660 N
1y 0.000 0.0088 0.0155 -0.0149 0.0471 N
2y 0.000 -0.0137 -0.0175 -0.0489 0.0139 N
3y 0.000 0.0162 0.0114 -0.0088 0.0289 N
yr -0.200 -0.4444 -0.4500 -0.5582 -0.3508 N
1y 0.000 -0.1335 -0.1628 -0.3327 -0.0064 N
2y 0.000 -0.0305 -0.0454 -0.1593 0.0603 N
3y 0.000 -0.0000 -0.0059 -0.0861 0.0664 N
1yy 0.900 1.0161 0.9935 0.9155 1.0759 N
2yy 0.000 0.1073 0.1087 0.0219 0.1907 N
3yy 0.000 -0.0486 -0.0262 -0.1050 0.0421 N
Summary of the posterior distributions of the parameters. Type of the distribution is
either N , B, G, or IG where N denotes the Normal distribution, B the Beta distribution,
G the Gamma distribution, and IG the Inverse-Gamma distribution.
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Table 4.3: Results: Posterior Distributions (Part II)
Param. Prior Mean Post. Mode Post. Mean 90% HPD Interval Prior
 frd 0.000 0.0039 0.0039 0.0023 0.0055 N
 esd 0.000 0.0086 0.0084 0.0055 0.0117 N
 itd 0.000 0.0272 0.0263 0.0137 0.0377 N
 frC 0.000 0.1203 0.1122 0.0835 0.1400 N
 esC 0.000 0.6130 0.5737 0.4383 0.7154 N
 itC 0.000 0.7608 0.7107 0.5487 0.8828 N
 frv 0.000 0.0349 0.0339 0.0232 0.0446 N
 esv 0.000 0.2077 0.2071 0.1671 0.2410 N
 itv 0.000 0.2642 0.2655 0.2220 0.3079 N
 frr 0.000 -0.1376 -0.1341 -0.1874 -0.0780 N
 esr 0.000 -0.6495 -0.6328 -0.8383 -0.4280 N
 itr 0.000 -0.7951 -0.7678 -1.0507 -0.5098 N
 frgy 0.000 0.0759 0.0743 0.0504 0.0971 N
 esgy 0.000 0.3909 0.3838 0.2793 0.4802 N
 itgy 0.000 0.4968 0.4850 0.3416 0.6126 N
 fr 0.000 -0.2441 -0.2479 -0.3574 -0.1403 N
 es 0.000 -1.0391 -1.0664 -1.4487 -0.6555 N
 it 0.000 -1.7172 -1.7614 -2.2622 -1.2197 N
 fr 0.000 0.1236 0.1184 0.0730 0.1587 N
 es 0.000 0.5553 0.5314 0.3260 0.7453 N
 it 0.000 0.6434 0.6089 0.3384 0.8834 N
r 0.000 0.3195 0.6509 -0.9197 2.0600 N
 0.000 -0.4610 -1.1660 -2.3252 -0.0003 N
y 0.000 -0.5005 0.2136 -2.4125 2.7543 N


0.000 0.3421 -0.3222 -2.3236 2.0795 N
C 0.000 -1.7516 -2.0393 -3.0835 -1.0601 N
d;fr 0.000 -14.6679 -15.5174 -23.0080 -6.3857 N
d;es 0.000 -0.6462 -0.8842 -5.3875 3.2281 N
d;it 0.000 8.8063 10.1227 4.7343 15.0851 N
Summary of the posterior distributions of the parameters. Type of the distribution is
either N , B, G, or IG where N denotes the Normal distribution, B the Beta distribution,
G the Gamma distribution, and IG the Inverse-Gamma distribution.
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Table 4.4: Results: Posterior Distributions (Part III)
Param. Prior Mean Post. Mode Post. Mean 90% HPD Interval Prior
r 0.010 0.0026 0.0027 0.0024 0.0029 IG
 0.010 0.0021 0.0021 0.0019 0.0023 IG
y 0.010 0.0068 0.0071 0.0062 0.0081 IG
 0.010 0.0022 0.0022 0.0019 0.0024 IG
frd 0.010 0.0109 0.0110 0.0101 0.0121 IG
esd 0.010 0.0197 0.0198 0.0180 0.0214 IG
itd 0.010 0.0058 0.0058 0.0053 0.0063 IG
 0.100 -0.3524 -0.3424 -0.5105 -0.1750 N
y 0.000 1.7489 1.6673 1.1113 2.1956 N
y 0.000 -1.6153 -1.5250 -2.0635 -1.011 N
vr 0.000 1.7024 1.7574 0.8551 2.6508 N
v 0.000 4.3751 4.6409 3.1486 6.0133 N
vy 0.000 -1.2394 -1.0403 -1.5189 -0.5720 N
v 0.000 -2.6718 -2.5953 -3.7861 -1.4208 N
vC 0.000 -2.1858 -1.9179 -2.5135 -1.3061 N
frvd 0.000 0.0664 0.1100 -0.3805 0.6736 N
esvd 0.000 -0.4222 -0.3974 -0.7357 0.0341 N
itvd 0.000 -0.0043 0.1224 -1.3368 1.5694 N
12 0.100 0.0774 0.0787 0.0711 0.0862 IG
24 0.100 0.0192 0.0199 0.0156 0.0240 IG
36 0.100 0.0345 0.0348 0.0313 0.0385 IG
48 0.100 0.0169 0.0175 0.0142 0.0206 IG
60 0.100 0.0924 0.0935 0.0846 0.1021 IG
fr12 0.100 1.0827 1.1064 0.9958 1.2065 IG
fr60 0.100 0.8727 0.8975 0.8005 0.9809 IG
es12 0.100 2.6639 2.7297 2.4696 2.9692 IG
es60 0.100 3.3555 3.3956 3.0914 3.6843 IG
it12 0.100 2.8495 2.9152 2.6749 3.1695 IG
it60 0.100 0.0463 0.0809 0.0247 0.1445 IG
Summary of the posterior distributions of the parameters. Type of the distribution is
either N , B, G, or IG where N denotes the Normal distribution, B the Beta distribution,
G the Gamma distribution, and IG the Inverse-Gamma distribution.
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Figure 4.4: Estimated time path of the common risk factor
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non-fundamental risk factor. Figure (4.4) displays the time path of the common non-
fundamental risk factor. The common non-fundamental risk factor has been above
its steady state level during the nancial crisis, on the onset of the European debt
crisis, and from 2012 onwards.
In the literature of macro-nance term structure models, the standard deviations
of the yield errors are used to evaluate the t of the model. The bottom part of table
(4.4) presents the standard deviations of these errors. With standard deviations of
these errors around 9 and 11 basis points for French bond yields, around 26 and 33
basis points for Spanish bonds yields and around 4 and 29 basis points for Italian
bond yields, the t of the yield curves is reasonably good (see e.g. Borgy et al., 2012,
or Hördahl and Tristani, 2013). The models t of the German term structure is
remarkably good.
The estimates of the interest rate rule parameters are given in the rst four
rows in table (4.2). Notably, all four parameter estimates are signicantly di¤erent
from zero, including the ECBs response parameter to movements in the risk aversion
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variable v. The posterior mean of v is signicantly di¤erent from zero and negative,
v =  0:1905. As demonstrated in Section (4.3.3), all variation in the one-period
return premium is attributable to the risk aversion variable. This implies that the
ECB lowered the interest rate in response to a rise in term premia. In line with the
practitioner view (see Rudebusch et al., 2007), this indicates that the central bank
counteracted changes in term premia. Using a macro-nance model and an index of
Euro area government bonds, Herrmann (2015) also nds a negative coe¢ cient.
The estimated values of the other three parameters of the interest rate rule are
in line with those from studies using a more standard interest rate rules specication
for the Euro Area (e.g. Andrés et al., 2006, or Smets and Wouters, 2003). The
estimate of the interest rate inertia r = 0:7977 reects a high degree of interest
rate smoothing. The estimate of the coe¢ cient measuring central banks response
to changes in the output gap is y = 0:1791. The estimated coe¢ cient of the central
banks response to a change in ination is larger than one,  = 1:1030, satisfying
the Taylor principle.
In the following, rather than interpreting each of the remaining estimates sepa-
rately, I describe the results of the parameter estimation jointly by computing impulse
response functions (IRFs) of the yield spreads to selected shocks, by decomposing
the forecast error variance of the yield spreads, and by performing a historical shock
decomposition of yield spreads. These methods help to examine the dynamic of yield
spreads, to describe the propagation of di¤erent shocks, and to reveal the relevance
of di¤erent shocks for variation in the yield spreads. All yield spreads are calculated
with respect to Germany.
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Figure 4.5: IRFs to a one-standard-deviation risk aversion shock
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Notes: All spreads are calculated with respect to the yield of German government bonds of the
same maturity. The yield spreads are shown in annualized percentage points. The grey shaded
areas cover the 90 percent HPD interval.
4.5.1 Impulse Response Functions
Each of the following gures shows the impulse responses of the yield spreads to a
particular shock. Each shock is of a size of one-standard-deviation. The rst row
of each gure gives the graphs of the impulse responses of the one-year spreads of
France (y12t;fr   y12t;ger), Spain (y12t;es   y12t;ger), and Italy (y12t;it   y12t;ger). The second row
contains the graphs of the impulse responses of the ve-year yield spreads of France
(y60t;fr y60t;ger), Spain (y60t;es y60t;ger), and Italy (y60t;it y60t;ger). The gray shaded areas cover
the 90 percentage HPD interval. The IRF (displayed by the blue line) is computed
as the mean impulse response. The yield spreads are shown in annualized percentage
points. One period corresponds to one month.
The impulse responses to a risk aversion shock "vt are presented in gure (4.5).
The yield spreads of bonds of both maturities of all countries rise signicantly on
impact. Over a horizon of ve years, the impulse responses of the yield spreads
converge slowly back to their steady state. The magnitude of the responses to the
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Figure 4.6: IRFs to a one-standard-deviation shock to dfrt
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Notes: All spreads are calculated with respect to the yield of German government bonds of the
same maturity. The yield spreads are shown in annualized percentage points. The grey shaded
areas cover the 90 percent HPD interval.
risk aversion shock is signicantly stronger for the spreads of Italy (around 30 basis
points for both maturities on impact) and Spain (around 25 basis points for both
maturities on impact), than the magnitude of the response of French yield spreads
(around four and ve basis points, on impact, for the one-year and ve-year spread,
respectively).
Figure (4.6) displays the impulse responses to a rise in the French debt-to-GDP
growth rate. The gure highlights that only the one-year yield spread and the ve-
year yield spread of France are a¤ected by an increase the debt-to-GDP growth rate
of France. The response of all other spreads is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The same applies for a shock to the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio of Italy and
Spain. Figure (4.7) and (4.8) shows that debt-to-GDP growth rate shocks do only
a¤ect the yield spreads of the respective country vis-à-vis Germany. All other spreads
do not respond signicantly. Thus, the results provide no evidence for e¤ects running
from the country-specic scal variables to the other countriesyield spreads.
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Figure 4.7: IRFs to a one-standard-deviation shock to dest
y
fr
12 - y
ger
12
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
y
es
12 - y
ger
12
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
y
it
12 - y
ger
12
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
y
fr
60 - y
ger
60
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
y
es
60 - y
ger
60
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
y
it
60 - y
ger
60
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Notes: All spreads are calculated with respect to the yield of German government bonds of the
same maturity. The yield spreads are shown in annualized percentage points. The grey shaded
areas cover the 90 percent HPD interval.
Finally, gure (4.9) shows the impulse responses of the yield spreads to the com-
mon non-fundamental risk factor shock. The yield spreads of all countries rise signif-
icantly and persistently. The increase in the yield spreads is of stronger magnitude
for Spain and for Italy than for France.
4.5.2 Variance Decomposition
To identify the main drivers of movements in bond yield spreads and to assess the rel-
ative importance of di¤erent shocks for the variability of the yield spreads, I perform
a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD). The FEVD quanties the contri-
bution of each of the structural shocks to the forecast error variance of the di¤erent
yield spreads. Formally, the fraction of the forecast error variance of variable i due
to shock j for horizon h, denoted by i;;j (h), is dened by (see Lütkepohl, 2005, p.
64)
i;;j (h) =
!i;;j (h)

i (h)
;
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Figure 4.8: IRFs to a one-standard-deviation shock to ditt
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Notes: All yield spreads are calculated with respect to the yield of German government bonds of
the same maturity. The yield spreads are shown in annualized percentage points. The grey shaded
areas cover the 90 percent HPD interval.
where !i;;j (h) is the forecast error variance of variable i due to shock j at horizon h
and 
i (h) is the total error forecast variance of variable i at horizon h.
For the sake of clarity, I divide the contribution of the di¤erent shocks into two
groups: economic and country-specic factors and the common non-fundamental risk
factor. Economic and country-specic factors contain the common economic vari-
ables, including the risk aversion variable, and country-specic variables.7 The com-
mon non-fundamental risk factor, given by Ct, captures common dynamics in yield
spreads that are unrelated to the other common economic factors. The FEVD is
performed for the one- and ve-year yield spreads of France, Italy, and Spain for
di¤erent horizons. Table (4.5) displays the FEVD of the yield spreads.
Both, economic factors and the common non-fundamental risk factor are impor-
tant drivers of Euro area sovereign yield spreads. Within the group of economic
7For convenience, also the country-specic yield errors are subsumed in this group. They only
play a role for short horizons and do not contribute substantially to the forecast error variance of
yield spreads for longer forecast horizons.
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Figure 4.9: IRFs to a one-standard-deviation common non-fundamental risk factor
shock
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Notes: All yield spreads are calculated with respect to the yield of German government bonds of
the same maturity. The yield spreads are shown in annualized percentage points. The grey shaded
areas cover the 90 percent HPD interval.
factors, the risk aversion variable takes a pronounced role. For intermediate forecast
horizons (from one year up to three years), it accounts for between 41 and 51 per-
cent of the forecast error variance in the one-year yield spreads of France and for
between 44 and 62 percent of the forecast error variance in the ve-year yield spreads
of France. Risk aversion shocks are also important for the yield spreads of Spain and
Italy. They account for between 57 and 72 percent and for between 50 and 68 per-
cent of the variability of the Spanish one-year yield spread and the Spanish ve-year
yield, respectively, at an intermediate forecast horizon. For the Italian yield spreads,
the risk aversion variable accounts for between 50 and 70 percent and for between 45
and 73 percent of the variability in the one-year yield spread and the ve-year yield
spread, respectively, both at an intermediate forecast horizon. Notably, risk aversion
shocks are more pronounced for shorter forecast horizons, while their importance for
yield spreads of all maturities decreases with the forecast horizon.
Also common non-fundamental risk factor shocks contribute substantially to the
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Table 4.5: Variance Decomposition
1-year yield spread 5-year yield spread
France
h Econ C RA Econ C RA
3 months 91.39 08.61 28.19 99.02 00.98 45.16
1 year 84.14 15.86 50.47 96.72 03.28 61.54
3 years 69.30 30.70 41.98 83.55 16.45 44.93
5 years 54.45 45.55 26.85 68.20 31.80 30.45
10 years 33.98 66.02 12.18 43.96 56.04 14.80
Spain
h Econ C RA Econ C RA
3 months 94.56 5.44 56.12 99.29 00.61 55.63
1 year 93.32 5.68 71.37 98.31 01.69 67.84
3 years 86.21 13.79 57.47 87.97 12.03 50.43
5 years 71.00 29.00 37.70 62.94 27.06 34.51
10 years 45.09 54.91 17.21 37.11 52.89 16.77
Italy
h Econ C RA Econ C RA
3 months 90.09 09.91 59.46 92.58 07.42 79.58
1 year 86.63 13.27 69.15 89.38 10.62 72.43
3 years 74.70 25.30 50.88 74.50 25.50 45.31
5 years 59.63 40.37 31.70 59.39 40.61 28.82
10 years 37.48 62.52 14.03 37.60 62.40 13.34
Notes: Econ denotes the contribution of the economic shocks (including risk aversion
shocks) and country-specic shocks to the FEVD. C denotes the contribution of common
non-fundamental risk factor shocks to the FEVD. RA displays the contribution of risk
aversion shocks to the FEVD separated from the other economic factors.
variability of sovereign yield spreads. The e¤ects of variation in the common non-
fundamental risk factor are more pronounced for longer forecast horizons. In fact,
for longer forecast horizons, common non-fundamental risk factor shocks are the
main source of variations in the yield spreads, accounting for between 54 and 66
percent of the variations in the one-year yield spreads and for between 52 and 63 of
the variations in the ve-year yield spreads at a 10-year forecast horizon. But also
for intermediate horizons, shocks to the common non-fundamental risk factor play
a non-negligible role. For the one-year yield spread of French government bonds,
shocks to the common non-fundamental risk factor account for between 15 and 31
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percent of the forecast error variance, and for the ve-year yield spread, they account
for between 3 and 17 percent of the forecast error variance, both for an intermediate
forecast horizon. The same holds true for Spanish and Italian yield spreads. Between
5 and 14 percent of all variation in the one-year yield spread of Spanish government
bonds and between 13 and 26 percent of all variations in the one-year yield spread of
Italian government bonds are attributable to shocks to the common non-fundamental
risk factor. The common non-fundamental risk factor shocks also account for sizeable
movements in the ve-year yield spreads of both countries. It accounts for between
1 and 12 percent in the Spanish ve-year yield spreads and for between 10 and 26
percent in the Italian ve-year yield spreads at intermediate horizons.
4.5.3 Historical Shock Decomposition
The historical shock decomposition of the yield spreads is performed to identify
the contribution of shocks of each group of factors to the evolution of bond yield
spreads. Figure (4.10) - (4.12) presents the historical decomposition of the ve-year
yield spreads of sovereign bonds of France, Italy, and Spain with respect to the
German bond yield of the same maturity. Each gure contains three panels. Each
panel shows the historical values of the respective yield spread and the contribution
of shocks a factor or a group of factors to the yield spread. The rst panel in each
gure displays the contribution of shocks to country-specic factors and common
economic shocks (including shocks of the risk aversion variable) to the evolution of
the respective yield spread. The second panel in each gure depicts the contribution
of common non-fundamental risk factor shocks to the evolution of the respective yield
spread. The last panel in each gure displays the contribution of risk aversion shocks
separated from the contribution of the other economic factors to the respective yield
spread. This helps to visualize the importance of risk aversion shocks for the yield
184
Figure 4.10: Historical Shock Decomposition of the ve-year yield spread of France
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Notes: The spread is shown in annualized percentage points. The gure presents the histori-
cal decomposition of the ve-year French yield spread with respect to Germany. Economic and
Country-Specic Factors contain country-specic factors and Euro area wide economic fundamen-
tals (including risk aversion shocks); Risk Aversion shocks are depicted separately in the last row.
The initial values are not displayed.
spreads and to compare the contribution of risk aversion shocks to the contribution
of common non-fundamental risk factor shocks. The contribution of the initial values
is not plotted. Their contribution to the yield spreads is highly persistent, reecting
the persistence of some of the models shocks.
In all of the three yield spreads, economic shocks have played the most important
role for their evolution. Within the group of economic factors, shocks to the risk
aversion variable are the most important drivers. For the Spanish and Italian ve-
year yield spreads, shocks to the risk aversion variable explain most of the spread
between 2010 and the beginning of 2012. From mid-2012 onwards until the end of
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Figure 4.11: Historical Shock Decomposition of the ve-year yield spread of Spain
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Notes: The spread is shown in annualized percentage points. The gure presents the histori-
cal decomposition of the ve-year French yield spread with respect to Germany. Economic and
Country-Specic Factors contain country-specic factors and Euro area wide economic fundamen-
tals (including risk aversion shocks); Risk Aversion shocks are depicted separately in the last row.
The initial values are not displayed.
2014, the importance of shocks to the risk aversion variable for the evolution of yield
spreads decreases slowly. Shocks to the risk aversion variable also explain a large part
of the 5-year French yield spread, although their contribution to the spread is not
as pronounced as to the Spanish and the Italian yield spreads. Within the group of
economic factors, shocks to the short-term interest rate had a negative contribution
to the yield spreads.
Shocks to the common non-fundamental risk factor also had a substantial impact
on yield spreads. In particular, during the nancial crisis and the European debt cri-
sis until the end of 2010, common non-fundamental risk factor shocks had a positive
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Figure 4.12: Historical Shock Decomposition of the ve-year yield spread of Italy
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Notes: The spread is shown in annualized percentage points. The gure presents the histori-
cal decomposition of the ve-year French yield spread with respect to Germany. Economic and
Country-Specic Factors contain country-specic factors and Euro area wide economic fundamen-
tals (including risk aversion shocks); Risk Aversion shocks are depicted separately in the last row.
The initial values are not displayed.
contribution to the yield spreads of all three countries. From 2012 onwards until the
end of the sample at the end of 2014, the contribution of common non-fundamental
risk factor shocks to the yield spreads increases slowly. The absolute contribution
of common non-fundamental risk factor shocks to the yield spreads is larger for the
Spanish and the Italian yield spread than for the French yield spreads. For exam-
ple, in mid-2013, the common non-fundamental risk factor shock explains 40 basis
points in the Spanish yield spread and 70 basis points in the Italian yield spread,
highlighting that spreads of Euro area countries cannot be fully justied by economic
and country-specic factors only. This result is in line with the ndings of previous
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studies (see De Santis, 2015, Di Cesare et al., 2012, and Dewachter et al., 2015).
However, in contrast to the nding of Dewachter et al. (2015), the contribution of
common non-fundamental risk factor shocks to the surge in yield spreads is compa-
rably smaller. Instead, economic shocks are able to explain most of the variation
in yield spreads. Moreover, the contribution of the common non-fundamental risk
factor to the yield spreads is much smoother over time. Specically, while Dewachter
et al. (2015) nd that shocks to common non-fundamental risk factors account for a
large fraction in the dramatic surge in yield spreads at the end of 2011, my nding
shows that the increase in yield spreads during 2011 can largely be explained by an
increase in risk aversion.
Thus, though the common non-fundamental risk factor played a non-negligible
role for yield spreads, accounting for a substantial increase in yield spreads during
the nancial crisis and the European debt crisis, the most important drivers of yield
spreads have been economic shocks. In particular, shocks to the risk aversion variable
had a huge impact on yield spreads, revealing the importance of measuring risk
aversion in Euro area bond markets adequately.
4.6 Conclusion
In this work, I evaluate the e¤ects of economic fundamentals and a common non-
fundamental risk factor on Euro area yield spreads. Specically, using a multi-
country macro-nance model of the term structure, where changes in risk-aversion
are captured by a single variable, I am interested in disentangling the e¤ects of
changes in risk aversion and a common non-fundamental risk factor in Euro area
yield spreads. In contrast to the existing literature on Euro area yield spreads, the
risk aversion measure used in this work is directly derived from the pricing kernel
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of a European investor. Particularly, by restrictions on the prices of risk, one single
variable is identied to account for all time-variation in the prices of risk. This
risk aversion variable responds contemporaneously to distortions of the economy but
also exhibits an autonomous dynamic. The common non-fundamental risk factor is
identied as a common factor in Euro area yield spreads that is not related to Euro
area economic fundamentals, i.e. the part of the spread that cannot be accounted for
by common Euro area economic fundamentals. This common non-fundamental risk
factor potentially captures contagion e¤ects or redenomination risk. Furthermore,
exclusion restrictions on the contemporaneous relationship of state variables, similar
to those from more conventional VARs, are entailed to identify structural shocks.
In line with the results of De Santis (2015), Dewachter et al. (2015), or Di Cesare
et al. (2012), a non-negligible part of the Euro area yield spreads cannot be explained
by economic fundamentals but is accounted for by the common non-fundamental
risk factor. However, although the contribution of the common non-fundamental risk
factor has been important for yield spreads, most of the surge in yield spreads during
the European debt crisis is explained by economic fundamentals. Within in the group
of economic factors, shocks to the risk aversion variable are the most important
drivers of yield spreads. This nding underlines the importance of measuring risk
aversion in Euro area bond markets adequately.
I like to emphasize two aspects of my ndings. First, from the beginning of 2010
onwards until the end of 2011, shocks to the risk aversion variable are able to explain
the dramatic surge in yield spreads very well. In fact, for the Spanish and Italian
ve-year yield spreads shocks to the risk aversion variable explain large parts of the
spreads during this time. Shocks to the risk aversion variable also explain a large
part of the French yield spreads, although their contribution to the spreads is not
as pronounced as for the Spanish and the Italian yield spreads. From 2012 onwards
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until 2014 the importance of shocks to the risk aversion variable for the evolution
yield spreads decreases. Second, common non-fundamental risk factor shocks had, in
particular, during the nancial crisis until the beginning of the European debt crisis
in 2009, a strong positive contribution to the yield spreads of France, Italy, and
Spain. Moreover, from 2012 onwards until the end of the sample in December 2014,
the contribution of the common non-fundamental risk factor shocks to the evolution
of yield spreads increases.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Parameter Matrices
State Equation
The matrix P0 is given by
P0 =
2666666666666666666666666666666666666664
1 y 0 0  0 0 0 0 v 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3777777777777777777777777777777777777775
;
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where y =   (1  r) y,  =   (1  r) , and v =   (1  r) v. The matrix P1
is given by
P1 =
2666666666666666666666666666666666666664
r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
yr 
1
yy 
2
yy 
3
yy 
1
y 
2
y 
3
y 0 0 yv 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r 
1
y 
2
y 
3
y 
1
 
2
 
3
 0 0 v 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 vv 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 frd 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 esd 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 itd
3777777777777777777777777777777777777775
;
and the matrix 0 is given by
0 =

10 
2
0

;
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where the sub-matrices 10 and 
2
0 are given by
10 =
2666666666666666666666666666666666666664
r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 y 0 0 y 0 0 y
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0  0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
vrr vyy 0 0 v 0 0 v??
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777777777777777777777777777775
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and
20 =
2666666666666666666666666666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 0 0
vCC v 
fr
vd
fr
d 
es
vd
es
d 
it
vd
it
d
0 0 frd 0 0
0 0 0 esd 0
0 0 0 0 itd
3777777777777777777777777777777777777775
:
194
Finally, the vector 0 is given by
0 =
2666666666666666666666666666666666666664
(1  r)
 
gr   ygy

 rgr    1y + 2y + 3y gy
0
0 
1   1yy + 2yy + 3yy gy   yrgr
0
0
(1  )?
0
0
0
0
0
3777777777777777777777777777777777777775
:
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Measurement Equation
The matrix U is given by
U 
266666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
B012
B024
B036
B048
B060
B0fr;12
B0fr;60
B0es;12
B0es;60
B0it;12
B0it;60
U ffr
U fes
U fit
U r
Uy
U
377777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
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The elements in the B vectors are given by eq. (4.19) and (4.20). The remaining
elements in the U matrix are given by
U ffr =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

;
U fes =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

;
U fit =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

;
U r =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

;
Uy =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

;
U =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

:
4.A.2 Pricing of Defaultable Bonds
The derivation of the market value of a defaultable bond follows Borgy et al. (2012)
and Monfort and Renne (2011). Consider the time t price of a defaultable zero-
coupon bond ~P j;t issued by the sovereign of country j maturing in  periods that
promises to pay a certain amount at maturity. If no default has occurred until time
t, the value of this bond is given by the present value of the recovery payment in the
case of default between period t and t + 1 plus the present value of the bond if no
default occurred,
~P j;t = Et

mt+1 ~P
 1
j;t+1 j Dj;t+1 = 0

+ Et

mt+1 ~P
 1
j;t+1 j Dj;t+1 = 1

(4.18)
where Dj;t is a default indicator variable taking the values 0 in the event of no-default
prior to time t and 1 in the event of default at/or prior to time t. Du¢ e and Singleton
(1999) assume that the recovery value of the bond is equal to a fraction ! of what
197
the bond would have been worth in the event of no-default (the so-called recovery
to market value assumption).
Denote the time t default probability of issuer j that it survives until t + 1 by
~sj;t
8, then
Et

mt+1 ~P
 1
j;t+1 j Dj;t+1 = 0

= Et

exp ( ~sj;t+1)mt+1 ~P  1j;t+1

and
Et

mt+1 ~P
 1
j;t+1 j Dj;t+1 = 1

= Et

(1  exp ( ~sj;t+1))mt+1! ~P  1j;t+1

;
and the present value of the bond is given by
~P j;t = Et

(1  exp ( ~sj;t+1))mt+1! ~P  1j;t+1 + exp ( ~sj;t+1)mt+1 ~P  1j;t+1

= Et

[(1  exp ( ~sj;t+1))! + exp ( ~sj;t+1)]mt+1 ~P  1j;t+1

:
Finally, dene the recovery-adjusted default intensitiessj;t (see e.g. Monfort and
Renne, 2011) by
exp ( sj;t+1)  (1  exp ( ~sj;t+1))! + exp ( ~sj;t+1) ;
then the market value of the bond is given by
~P j;t = Et

exp ( sj;t+1)mt+1 ~P  1j;t+1

:
Note, if the recovery rate is equal to zero (! = 0), then the recovery-adjusted default
intensity sj;t would be equal to the default probability ~sj;t+1. However, since the
8Thus, the time t survival probability of an issuer j until time t+1 is given by Et (exp ( ~sj;t+1)) :
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recovery rate is, in general, larger than zero, sj;t reects the adjusted default intensity
of country j, rather than actual default intensities.
4.A.3 Pricing Matrices
Borgy et al. (2012) depart from the standard formulas for the computation of the
matrices Ai; and Bi; in eq. (4.14), as provided by Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and
suggest an improved algorithm to compute the pricing matrices of the di¤erent coun-
tries. Instead of computing each of the pricing matrices Ai; and Bi; 8 = 1; :::; 60,
the idea behind their algorithm is to compute only selected nested bond maturities
and to concatenate country-specic pricing matrices. As demonstrated by Borgy et
al. (2012), this algorithm reduces computation time signicantly, in particular for
increasing numbers of yield curves and for high frequency data.
Starting from the no-arbitrager condition, pricing of defaultable bonds of a coun-
try i under the risk-neutral measure is given by
P +1i;t = E
Q
t
 
exp
  rt   sit+1 P i;t+1 :
By iterating, we get
P +1i;t = E
Q
t
 
exp
  rt   sit+1:::  rt+   sit++1 :
The short-term interest rate rt and the default intensities sit+1 are both a¢ ne in Xt,
rt = 1Xt;
and
sit+1 =  0 +  
i
1Xt+1:
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Moreover, it can be shown (see e.g. Gourieroux et al., 2003) that the pricing factors
Xt (under the risk-neutral measure) follow the autoregressive process
Xt = 
 + P Xt 1 + "t ;
where "t  N (0; I) and
 =   0;
P  = (P   1) :
Thus,
P +1i;t = E
Q
t
0B@exp
0B@  1Xt     i0 +  i1Xt+1  1Xt+1
    i0 +  i1Xt+2 :::  1Xt+     i0 +  i1Xt++1
1CA
1CA
= exp
   i0EQt exp 1Xt   ~ i1 (Xt+1 + :::+Xt+ )   i1Xt++1 ;
where ~ 
i
1 is dened by
~ 
i
1 =  
i
1 + 1:
Now, dene
F (i)t;t+   1Xt   ~ 
i
1 (Xt+1 + :::+Xt+ )   i1Xt++1
and note that if Xt+1; :::; Xt+ are Gaussian under the risk-neutral measure, then
also Ft;t+ is Gaussian under the risk neutral measure. More precisely, let F (i)t;t+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be Gaussian distributed
F (i)t;t+  NQ
 
i0;+1 + 
i
1;+1Xt;
i;t

;
then, one can express the price of an defaultable government bond of country i with
maturity  by P +1i;t = exp
 
Ai;+1 + Bi;+1Xt

, where from
P +1i;t = exp
   i0EQt expF (i)t;t++1
= exp

  i0 + i0;+1 +
1
2

i;t + 
i
1;+1Xt

the coe¢ cients Ai;+1 and Bi;+1 are given by
Ai;+1 = 
i
0;+1 +
1
2

i;t; (4.19)
Bi;+1 = 
i
1;+1: (4.20)
Finally, in order to calculate the coe¢ cients Ai;+1 and Bi;+1, it remains to compute
i0;+1, 1;+1 and 
i;t. However, since I employ a version of the model without con-
stant terms, it is only necessary to calculate i1;+1. Computation of the conditional
201
expectation of F (i)t;t+ is done by
EQt

F (i)t;t+

= EQt

 1Xt   ~ i1 [Xt+1 + :::+Xt+ ]   i1Xt++1

= EQt
0B@  ~ i1
h
 + P Xt + :::+
Pj 1
k=0 
 (P )k + (P ) Xt
i
 1Xt    i1 (P )+1Xt
1CA
+EQt
0B@  ~ i1
h
"t + :::+
P 1
j=0 (P

1 )
j "t
i
  i1
P
j=0 (P

1 )
j "t
1CA
=  1Xt   ~ i1

I + (   1)P + (   2)P 2 + :::+ P  1
 ~ i1 [P  + :::+ (P ) ]Xt    i1 (P )+1Xt
=  ~ i1

P  [(P )   I] [I   (P )] 1   I [I   (P )] 1 
 
h
1 + ~ 
i
1P
 [(P )   I] [I   (P )] 1 +  i1 (P )+1
i
Xt;
where I used in the second equality thatEQt Xt+j = E
Q
t
hPj 1
k=0 
 (P )k
i
+EQt
h
(P 1 )
j Xt
+
Pj 1
k=0 (P

1 )
k "t
i
and in the fourth equality that

I + (   1)P + (   2)P 2 + :::+ P  1
=

P  [(P )   I] [I   (P )] 1   I [I   (P )] 1 
and
P  + :::+ (P ) = P  [(P )   I] [I   (P )] 1 :
Thus,
EQt

F (i)t;t+

= i0;+1 + 
i
1;+1Xt;
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where
i1;+1 =  
h
1 + ~ 
i
1P
 [(P )   I] [(P )  I] 1 +  i1 (P )+1
i
; (4.21)
i0;+1 =  ~ 
i
1

P  [(P )   I] [I   (P )] 1   I [I   (P )] 1 : (4.22)
Note that the terms P  [(P )   I] [(P )  I] 1 and (P )+1 in eq. (4.21) do not
depend on the debtor, thus, these terms do not need to be calculated for each debtor
separately.
4.A.4 Computation of the one-period Return Premium
The one-period return premium is given by (for  > 1)
Et

hprx
()
t+1

= Et

hpr
()
t+1

  Et

y
(1)
t

= Et

p
( 1)
t+1   p()t

  Et

y
(1)
t

:
Plugging the log prices and the expected short rate into the equation above yields
Et

hprx
()
t+1

= Et

A( 1) + B0( 1)EtXt+1   A()   B0()Xt   01   0   01 (Xt   )

:
Next, the pricing matrices A() and B() can be expressed recursively by
A(+1) = A() + B
0
() (  0) +
1
2
B0()
0 B0()   0; (4.23)
B0(+1) = B
0
() (P   1)  01; (4.24)
with initial conditions for A() and B() are given by A1 = 0 = 0, and B01 =  01
(see e.g. Ang and Piazzesi, 2003). Using EtXt+1 =  + P (Xt   ),  = (I   P ) 
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and eq. (4.23), rearranging and collecting terms yields
Et

hprx
()
t+1

= A( 1)   A() + B0( 1) [ + P (Xt   )]
   B0( 1) (P   1)  01Xt   01   01 (Xt   )  0
= A( 1)   A() + B0( 1) (I + P )  + B0( 1)1Xt   0
= A( 1)  

A( 1) + B0( 1) (  0) +
1
2
B0( 1)
0 B( 1)   0

+ B0( 1) (I + P )  + B
0
( 1)1Xt   0
= B0( 1) [0 + 1Xt] 
1
2
B0( 1)
0 B( 1):
Due to the restricted form of 1 the only source of variation in Et

hprx
()
t+1

is the
variable that is ordered at the last position in Xt.
4.A.5 Zero-Coupon Yield Data
The model uses yield data of zero-coupon government bonds from four European
countries (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain). However, usually, most bonds bear
coupon payments, in particular, those issued with a maturity of more than one year.
Thus, a method to extract zero coupon rates from the prices of coupon-bearing bonds
is needed. In order to construct zero-coupon bond data, di¤erent methods are in used
in practice (see BIS, 2005), which can be broadly categorized into parametric and
spline-based approaches.
As in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2005), I use a parametric model. The basic
idea of parametric models is to specify a single function dened over the entire
maturity domain. In particular, following Borgy et al. (2012), I choose the Nelson-
Siegel (1987) model. In the following, I will briey discuss the Nelson-Siegel model
and the estimation approach. The discussion of the Nelson-Siegel model is based on
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BIS (2005).
The Nelson-Siegel function for the instantaneous forward rates f at a given point
in time t is dened by
f t () = 0 + 1 exp

  
 1

+ 2

 1
exp

  
 1

;
where  denotes the time to maturity, and  =
 
0; 1; 2; 1
0
denotes the parameters
of the Nelson-Siegel Function. It can be shown that to the corresponding spot rate
function for a given point in time t is given by
yt () = 0 + (1 + 2)

1  exp

  
 1

  2

  
 1

n;
where 0 can be interpreted as the instantaneous asymptotic rate and the term
(0 + 1) as the asymptotic spot rate.
Consider one particular coupon bearing bond at time t that matures in  periods.
The present value of the coupon-bearing bond is calculated as the discounted sum
of coupon payments and the bonds repayment on maturity. Thus, the price of a
coupon-bearing bond will be equal to
P^t; =
X
i=1
dt;iC + dt;V; (4.25)
where C denotes the coupon payment, V is the bonds repayment on maturity, and
the discount function which gives the price of a zero-coupon bond paying one Euro
at maturity is dened by
dt;i = exp
  yit () i :
For given parameters from the discount function together with eq. (4.25), the model
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based bond prices can be computed.
In the estimation process, the parameters of the Nelson-Siegel spot rate function
are chosen to minimize the distance between the observed bond prices at time t and
the calculated bond prices. Specically, the minimization problem is given by
^t = arg min

NX
j=1
wj

P jt   P^ jt
2
;
where N is the total number of observed dirty bond prices at date t, P jt denotes the
observed dirty prices of coupon bond j at time t, P^ jt denotes the model-implied price
of the coupon bond j, and wj is a weighting factor.9
A di¤erent approach is to minimize the sum of squared yield errors (as opposed
to minimizing the sum of squared pricing errors). However, minimizing the sum
of yield errors is computationally more time consuming since it requires to solve
additionally for the yields after calculating bond prices. However, as noted by BIS
(2005), minimizing the squared sum of pricing errors (instead of minimizing the sum
of squared yield errors) leads to an unsatisfactory t of yields of bonds relatively
short residual maturity.10 In order to correct for this shortcoming, di¤erent weights
are chosen for di¤erent residual maturities. In particular, I set the optimization
weight, following the practice of e.g. the Belgian central bank or the Spanish central
bank (see BIS, 2005) equal to the inverse of the modied duration times the observed
dirty price.
The data for the prices of coupon bonds is taken from Datastream. In order
to calculate the bonds cash ows accrued interest and the respective day-count
9The dirty price of a bond is dened as the price of a bond including any interest accruing on
the next coupon payment.
10Intuitively, the smaller (modied) duration (which is the elasticity of bond prices to changes
in yield to maturity changes) of bonds with shorter/longer residual maturities makes their prices
more/less sensitive to yield changes. Choosing equal weights would lead to an overtting of the
long-end of the yield curve at the expense of the t of the short-end of the yield curve.
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conventions are taken into account. In the spirit of Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and
following the practice of the ECB (ECB, 2008) di¤erent lters on the bond data
are applied in order to detect and remove outliers that would bias the estimation
results. In particular, I exclude all bonds from the estimation that are issued before
1990, and prices of bonds with a residual maturity less than 1 month. In order to
prevent noise from the yield estimation, outliers are traced separately for a number
of residual maturity brackets. Specically, bond yields that deviate more than two
standard deviations from the average yield in this bracket are considered as outliers
and excluded. The procedure is iterated in order to account for potentially large
outliers in the rst round that would distort the average yield and the standard
deviation. For the size of each maturity bracket, I follow the specication of the
ECB.
Finally, due to the lack of information on the trading volume of bonds, for each
point in time at which the estimation has been conducted, the yields are checked
manually. Since the trading volume of bonds usually decreases considerably for
shorter maturities, this may lead to large outliers at the short end of the yield curve.
Moreover, some maturity brackets may not include enough bond yield data to apply
the outliers removal algorithm. Checking yields manually helps to eliminate outliers
that would otherwise result in unrealistic high or low short-term rates (e.g. short-
term rates above 50 percentage points).
207
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The presented thesis contributes to di¤erent important topics of the recent literature
of nancial and monetary economics.
Chapter 2 analyzed the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent unconventional monetary policies
in a macro model where private nancial intermediation is limited by an agency
problem. It shows that, in general, the e¤ects of collateralized lending and direct
lending di¤er and that the e¤ectiveness of both policies depends on how strong the
considered nancial friction a¤ects the dynamic of the model. In particular, in a
setting where the agency problem a¤ects the dynamic of the model substantially,
collateralized lending does only work, at its best, modestly to reduce credit spreads.
Chapter 3 conducted an empirical analysis of interplay of monetary policy, term
premia movements, and economic activity in the Euro area. Chapter 3 demonstrated
that movements in term premia incorporated in long-term bond yields do a¤ect
economic activity. Thus, if the central bank wants to inuence long-term bond rates
by forward guidance of the path of future short-term rates, they have to take changes
in term premia into account. Moreover, Chapter 3 provided evidence that the ECB
indeed responds to movements in term premia by adjusting the short-term interest
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rate.
While Chapter 3 focused on the e¤ects of movements in term premia on the Econ-
omy in the Euro area and the response of the ECB on these term premia movements,
Chapter 4 analyzed the determinants of Euro area yield spreads and their interplay.
In particular, this chapter disentangled the e¤ects of changes in risk aversion and a
common non-fundamental risk factor, interpreted as redenomination risk or systemic
risk, on Euro area yield spreads. The analysis performed in Chapter 4 did show that
although the common non-fundamental factor played a non-negligible role in the
dynamics of Euro area yield spreads, economic shocks, in particular, risk aversion
shocks, have been the most dominant drivers of Euro area yield spreads. Contribut-
ing to the literature on the determinants of yields spreads, Chapter 4 showed that
risk aversion shocks are able to explain a substantial fraction of Euro area yield
spreads, highlighting the importance of measuring risk aversion adequately.
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